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Introduction 
 
The aim of my dissertation is to offer an innovative revising of the methodological and 
economic contributions of the Austrian economist Carl Menger (1840-1921), and to 
shed light on the actual influence his work had in the history of the discipline of 
economics.  
To do this, I will not a priori embrace any of the many (and contrasting) 
interpretations of his position, but will rather reconsider his contributions from his 
formative years. I will outline which problems Menger considered urgent for political 
economy, addressing both why they were urgent and the solutions he offered for them. 
At the same time, I will avoid the temptation to give too much weight to any possible 
influences on him by other scholars (both predecessors and contemporaries). In 
addressing epistemological, psychological, juridical and moral fields of research, my 
intention is to lend an interdisciplinary aspect to the research. 
 
But why Carl Menger? Several reasons induced me to reconsider Menger’s 
scientific production
1
. First of all, I was particularly interested in investigating the state 
of art of the economic discipline in the second half of the 19
th
 century. While Adam 
Smith (1723-1790) inaugurated a new era by publishing one of the first systematic 
treatments of economic theory, i.e. Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations (1776), it was only in the following century that the discipline would become a 
self-contained academic field. Menger’s investigations perfectly portray this crucial 
transition and, through them, we can better understand the problematic issues that were 
at stake.  
Further reasons for my research are related to the economic discoveries of the 
period. Carl Menger, William S. Jevons (1835-1882) and Léon Walras (1834-1910) are 
generally considered the major exponents of the “marginal revolution”, which officially 
took place in the 1870s. For all of them, political economy was no longer the science of 
                                                          
1
 I use expressions such as «scientific production» and «scientific contribution» in order to emphasize the 
special character of Menger’s approach to the study of political economy (as it will emerge in this 
dissertation). At the same time, I prefer to speak of «intellectual production» and «intellectual 
contribution» while referring to some of his contemporaries, since they were certainly interested in 
investigating economic matters, but they used to treat them from a humanistic point of view.  
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the production and distribution of income and wealth, but rather the study of human 
economic behaviour. New notions were introduced in this connection, such as the 
principle of marginal utility, and the theory of value was subjectively interpreted. The 
marginalist economists conceived the value of any given commodity as the outcome the 
intertwined subjective dispositions within an inter-subjective process. Speaking of a 
“revolution” in this context is a mistake, since elements from marginal theories were 
already present in the earlier economic analyses of scholars such as Richard Whately 
(1787-1863), Francesco Ferrara (1810-1900), Hermann-Heinrich Gossen (1810-1858), 
who belonged to different countries and traditions. In any case, Menger, Jevons and 
Walras undoubtedly gave a decisive contribution to the subjectivist turn in political 
economy.  
When I began my research project, I quickly noted strange discrepancies 
between interpretations of Menger’s work. Whereas Menger is still commonly 
considered an innovator for the economic field in economic handbooks (as well as 
Jevons and Walras), most critics (in particular philosophers) have attempted to show 
that, in opposition to his two colleagues, he was actually a very conservative thinker. 
The most popular arguments employed to sustain this thesis are the following: i) 
Menger was explicitly opposed to the introduction of mathematical tools for economic 
analysis; ii) he was highly influenced by Aristotelian philosophy, in particular regarding 
his conception of utility and his (alleged) essentialist point of view. Based on these 
initial considerations, an urgent question arose: how can there be two so contrasting 
interpretations of the same scholar? Which is correct? 
 
In order to answer these complex questions, I will articulate my dissertation in 
five Chapters, each of them addressed to a specific issue. In the first three Chapters I 
will discuss relevant methodological and epistemological topics. The last two Chapters 
will instead have a historical nature. Each Chapter is conceived of as autonomous from 
the others.  
In order to clarify Menger’s position, and provide a rational reconstruction of his 
thought, in Chapter 1 series of pivotal concepts, such as methodological individualism, 
subjectivism, atomism etc. will be outlined. Critics have often used these concepts 
indistinctively in their analyses, thus creating a particularly misleading reading of his 
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work. I will then elaborate a conceptual framework to be employed as an analytic tool 
not only for the current research project, but also for future critical analyses and 
comparisons of other economists’ positions.  
In Chapter 2, I will provide a rational reconstruction of Menger’s position. By 
employing the conceptual framework elaborated in Chapter 1, I will attempt to clarify 
how he developed his economic research methodology, and how he concretely applied 
this methodology to the study of economic value and money. This survey will also 
allow us to understand which kind of “methodological individualism” he effectively 
adopted. Moreover, by analysing his writing, I will try to reconstruct his formulation of 
the “demarcation problem” and identify which theory of explanation he embraced. I will 
provide an interpretation of Menger’s ontological approach towards economic entities, 
critically discussing the most popular realist reading. 
Chapter 3 will be dedicated to the critical evaluation of certain widespread 
psychological readings of Menger. In order to verify their legitimacy (or not), I will 
start by providing a historical review of Menger’s relationship to two early German-
speaking psychologists, i.e. Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and Wilhelm Wundt (1832-
1920). First, I will consider critics’ popular parallelism between Brentano’s concept of 
intentionality and Menger’s subjectivist perspective. I will then compare the alleged 
similarity between the notions of value which they employed. In addition, I will address 
Menger and Wundt’s methodological debate, also referring to unpublished materials 
consulted at the University of Vienna. Finally, I will hone in on Menger’s approach to 
comprehend whether (and to what extent) he actually introduced psychological 
explanations in his economic theories. To accomplish this, I will also take cognitivist 
and behaviourist psychological models into account, establishing if Menger’s 
perspective fits either one of them. 
 
At the beginning of my research project, I also observed that most critics’ 
attention to Menger’s scientific contribution particularly addressed to the “debate on 
method” (Methodenstreit). This “debate”, at the end of the 19th century, placed the 
Austrian economist against certain renown German scholars, such as Gustav von 
Schmoller (1838-1917. Because of that, the German and Austrian Schools of Political 
Economy are still generally considered as opposed to one another. However, in a closer 
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look, the debate on method constituted a limited aspect of a more articulated 
relationship between the German and Austrian environments. For this reason, Chapters 
4 and 5 will be dedicated to reconstructing some neglected, but fundamental, intellectual 
exchanges that occurred between the Austrian economist and German scholars. I will 
intentionally avoid the vast quantity of literature on the Methodenstreit. I will instead 
suggest alternative readings based on the direct examination of original documents, 
which I had the opportunity to consult at the University of Vienna.  
In Chapter 4, I will demonstrate the close ties between Menger and the most 
renown member of the German School of Law, i.e. Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-
1861). This scholar’s positions decisively influenced Menger’s education, as well as his 
later methodological reflections, in particular in reference to the spontaneous nature of 
social institutions. An analysis of Menger and Savigny’s (underestimated) relationship 
will allow me to outline not only the relevance of the juridical tradition in the 
development of the economic studies in the 19
th
 century, but also the cultural 
heterogeneity of the German environment. Finally, I will reveal, despite their similar 
denominations, the false similarities between the Historical School of Law and the 
Historical School of Political Economy. This fact will inevitably have some 
consequences on the interpretation of Menger and the German economist’s relationship. 
In Chapter 5, I will concentrate on the relationship between Menger and certain 
eminent 19
th
 century German economists, such as Bruno Hildebrand (1812-1878), Karl 
Knies (1821-1898), Wilhelm Roscher (1817-1894), etc. In this case, my aim will consist 
in emphasizing not only the contrasting views, but also the often-omitted similarities 
among them. I will then address the debate on the alleged ethical consequences of 
Menger’s subjectivist and individualistic perspective. In this regard, I will have two 
additional purposes: i) to demonstrate that this debate was derived by erroneously 
overlapping methodological and ethical issues; ii) to show that Menger cannot be 
considered an utilitarian thinker, as most critics do.  
 
These chapters taken together will provide an original interpretation of Menger’s 
contribution from many perspectives, as well as a clear overview of the 19
th
 debate on 
economics in the German-speaking context.  
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1. A Conceptual Framework of Methodological Individualism(s)
2
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The label “Methodological Individualism” (henceforth MI) can be originally attributed 
to the methodological approach of several economists and philosophers belonging to the 
Austrian School, including Carl Menger, Karl Popper, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich 
von Hayek. However, a closer look at their perspectives shows how much their 
respective interpretations of an individualistic framework actually differ one from the 
other. A significant hurdle in correctly evaluating different types of individualistic 
perspectives is the widespread misunderstanding of the MI concept in general, which is 
still a debated topic. In particular, I am referring to disputes regarding 
individualism/holism (or collectivism) and reductionism/pluralism, which are important 
in social sciences. 
My aim in this dissertation is to offer an alternative interpretation of Menger’s 
perspective on MI. It is well known that Menger did not directly use this concept to 
describe his methodological approach to theoretical economics, instead defining it an 
«atomistic method» (see Menger 1883/1985, Book I, Ch. 8). Nevertheless, Menger is 
still commonly considered one of the first scholars to have defended a strictly 
individualistic perspective. This reading is largely due to Hayek, who considers Menger 
«among the first in modern times consciously to revive the methodical individualism of 
Adam Smith and his school» (Hayek 1948, p. 13, fn. 3; italics added). According to 
Hayek, Menger’s approach to individualism is a good example of what Hayek defines 
«true individualism», namely a «theory of society» that attempts to understand the 
forces governing human social life. On the contrary, the idea of human beings as 
isolated atoms who oppose their society is typical of a «false» version of individualism, 
which Hayek identifies with the rationalist tendencies of French Enlightenment. In 
Hayek’s view, such latter interpretations of individualism should be rejected. 
                                                          
2
 I would like to thank Professor Karl Milford (University of Vienna) and Professor Raffaella Campaner 
(University of Bologna) for the rich discussions and useful suggestions that contributed to the elaboration 
of Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of my dissertation. 
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 While not dismissing the validity of Hayek’s analysis, I do not believe it is 
complete and still consider the task of defining Menger’s exact methodological position 
very important for both general and specific reasons. The general reasons regard the 
complexity of the methodological questions mentioned above. Conversely, the specific 
reasons are peculiar to Menger’s case and regard: i) the fact that his approach was 
defined as an important proper example of MI only a posteriori; ii) the fact that Menger 
himself anticipates scientific reflections on the role of method(s) in the social sciences 
by decades.  
 In the current Chapter, I am going to focus on the general reasons, attempting to 
construct a conceptual framework that will allow better comprehension and a more 
adequate definition of Menger’s own perspective (Chapter 2). This Chapter therefore 
represents a preparatory study that is necessary given the complexity of themes and 
interpretations at stake. I will address the following topics: i) the differences, if any, 
between individualism and other concepts that are often considered synonymous such as 
subjectivism, egoism, self-interest, and atomism (Section 1.2); ii) the meanings that 
individualism, when correctly conceived, may assume (Section 1.3); iii) the 
construction of a conceptual framework for MI, through a brief history of the expression 
and references to some of the most recent contributions (Section 1.4); iv) the 
relationship between MI and various theories of explanation (Section 1.5); v) the 
consequences of ontological commitments (Section 1.6); vi) the perspectives that arise 
from different combinations of MI and ontological individualism (Section 1.7). 
As suggested by the structure of the Chapter, I am going to proceed from the 
general considerations of individualism towards a detailed survey of its methodological 
usages within the social sciences.  
 
 
1.2 Individualism and its Similars 
 
“Individualism” is a modern term that can be traced to the extraordinary experience of 
the European Enlightenment. The way in which we generally think about this concept 
has been deeply influenced by that historical period. Individualism and other (only 
apparently) similar notions are often mixed together in philosophical and economic 
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literature, even though they refer to different ideas. This particularly happens when, in 
criticizing individualistic approaches, scholars use these concepts as if they were 
identical, thereby generating serious misunderstandings.  
 The first distinction to be made is between individualism and subjectivism. In 
economics, subjectivism usually refers to theories that explain price formation 
mechanisms by interpreting the value of commodities as the result of personal 
calculations, in a context of scarcity. These are the so-called «marginal theories», which 
coherently introduce an utility function. Conversely, objectivist theories maintain that 
the value of commodities is an intrinsic property of the commodities themselves, 
created by production and labour costs. It is worth emphasizing that a subjectivist 
theory does not imply an individualistic approach to methodology. Similarly, an 
objectivist theory does not entail a collectivist (or essentialist) view. For instance, Adam 
Smith employs an objective theory of value, while embracing a standpoint rooted in 
individual dispositions, believes and interactions.
3
 On the contrary, German economists 
of 19
th
 century basically introduce a sketched theory of subjective value, at the same 
time defending a holistic perspective. In this context, Milford (2010) suggests four 
possible combinations of economic theories of value and methodological approaches: 
 
  
Subjectivist Theories 
 
Objectivist Theories 
 
Individualistic Approach 
 
 
Carl Menger
4
 
 
Adam Smith 
 
Collectivist (or Essentialist) 
Approach 
 
 
German Historical economists 
 
Karl Marx 
 
Figure 1.1: Combinations between theories of value and 
methodological approaches (Milford 2010, p. 163).  
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 It should be emphasized that although Smith’s approach is rooted in individual dispositions, believes 
and interactions, he never explicitly addresses methodological issues. Generally speaking, discussions on 
method(s) were not perceived as urgent or relevant in the 18
th
 century. 
4
 Among examples of an individualistic perspective combined with a subjective theory of value, Milford 
(2010) also includes Gottlieb Hufeland’s approach, a German economist operating at the beginning of the 
19
th
 century and held to be a Menger’s predecessor. The strict theoretical connection between Menger and 
a German economist indicates the partial affinity, rather than contrast, between the two cultural contexts. 
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A second misunderstanding derives from the conception of individualism as 
simply a negative human behaviour. In particular, individualism used to defend and 
justify an egoistic and self-interested behaviour. In this case, an ethical aspect is 
attributed to the term. I will not deny that “individualism” is often utilized with 
reference to the moral field. However, I would like to emphasize that individualism 
does not necessarily involve specific assumptions about human nature and morality. 
Therefore, scholars should be aware of which level their criticisms and interpretations 
are addressed to5. Further considerations on this topic will be illustrated in Section 1.3. 
 The third misunderstanding is a bit more complex and regards the difference 
between individualism and atomism. The latter term is usually employed by referring to 
a negative solipsistic conception of human beings. When they use the term “atomism”, 
critics polemically utilize rationalistic and enlightened interpretations of the subject and 
focus on Cartesian and Kantian philosophies. According to critics, no one actually lives 
in isolation in the social world, and therefore, isolated thinking subjects cannot be the 
primary elements of social theories.  
 
 
 
Individualism interpreted as 
 
 
Economic subjectivism (theories of value) 
 
Negative human behaviour (egoism, self-interest) 
 
Atomism (rational solipsism) 
 
Figure 1.2: Misunderstandings of the concept of “individualism”. 
 
 
1.3 Meanings of Individualism 
 
Having clarified which notions are sometimes erroneously or superficially used as 
synonyms of individualism, in this Section I propose to distinguish the three primary 
meanings that the (properly understood) term could assume, while keeping their 
respective fields of application well separated. Individualism can be read as:  
 
                                                          
5
 Detailed argumentations on misunderstanding of this kind are discussed in Chapter 5, where I examine 
to what extent the confusion about distinct levels of investigation and interpretation is at the basis of the 
dispute between German economists and Menger. 
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i) a methodological concept; 
ii) an ontological concept; 
iii) a normative concept. 
 
Each concept is independent from each other. Scholars may contemporarily 
embrace the three meanings, referring to different investigation fields. As an alternative, 
they could opt for two of them (with all combinations equally possible). Finally, they 
could employ individualism in only one of its meanings. Individualism as 
methodological and ontological concepts will be discussed in further detail later on. 
Here, I wish to focus on individualism as a normative concept, seeing as the 
methodological and moral levels have often been confused in the history of criticism of 
MI. 
While addressing individualism as a normative concept, I intend to consider both 
political and moral perspectives, which take individuals as units of measure of their 
theories. In political philosophy, a good example of the individualistic approach can be 
found in the contract theories developed by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John 
Locke (1632-1704) respectively. Leaving aside the peculiarities of their specific 
positions, both Hobbes and Locke believe that the individuals accept to adhere to the 
social contract. On the contrary, for instance, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) 
maintains that the people is the real subject of the social contract.  
From a moral viewpoint, individualism is usually interpreted as an 
anthropologically negative behaviour. In particular, it is maintained that individualism 
encourages egoistic and self-interested behaviours, which are considered dangerous for 
communities and society. Individualistic ethics are therefore accused of generating 
conflict between the individual and everyone else. In this context, a typical example is 
the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, which is undoubtedly a reference point 
for English economists of 19
th
 century (even if only accidentally). Nevertheless, many 
versions of an individualistic positions can be found in moral philosophy. Not only 
utilitarianism and hedonism, but also epicureanism and existentialism may be included 
to this list. This means that moral individualists do not necessarily defend self-centred 
behaviours of human beings. Instead, it simply means that attention is focused on single 
individuals, and the way they may be inspired to reach their own personal realization.  
12 
 
Having provided clarifications about some confusion regarding individualism 
and morality, I will now to concentrate on MI. 
 
 
1.4 Definitions of Methodological Individualism 
 
Even though an individualistic approach to socio-economic sciences already existed, the 
term “methodological individualism” was officially coined by the Austrian economist 
Joseph Schumpeter in a 1909 article
6
, where he critically discusses the concept of social 
value in economic theories. Within this text, Schumpeter explicitly conceives of MI as a 
«scientific procedure», to be rigorously separated from any political meaning of 
individualism. Among Schumpeter’s achievements we find not only a precise 
delimitation of the field of application, but also an attempt to provide an articulated 
definition of the concept in reference to economic theory: 
 
At the outset it is useful to emphasize the individualistic character of 
the methods of pure theory. Almost every modern writer starts with 
wants and their satisfaction, and takes utility more or less exclusively 
as the basis of his analysis. […] This modus procedendi […], as far as 
it is used, unavoidably implies considering individuals as independent 
units or agencies. (Schumpeter 1909, p. 214; italics added) 
 
According to this passage, individualism characterizes a way of conducting 
theoretical analyses in the economic discipline. Considering individuals «independent 
units» becomes a necessary hypothesis with which to investigate fundamental economic 
relationships. This perspective does not address political, moral or ontological matters. 
Schumpeter confirms this by keeping individual actions separate from the motivations 
that lead to actions themselves:  
 
                                                          
6
 In Schumpeter’s 1909 article the expression “methodological individualism” appears for the first time in 
English literature. However, Schumpeter had already introduced the notion in his German work Das 
Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie the year before. 
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For theory it is irrelevant why people demand certain goods: the only 
important point is that all things are demanded, produced, and paid for 
because individuals want them. (Schumpeter 1908, p. 216) 
 
There is more than one reason why this represents a crucial passage in 
Schumpeter’s position. Every reference to social and psychological elements is indeed 
left aside. Pure theory just considers concrete facts and, according to Schumpeter, 
individual actions are the only observable phenomena through which socio-economic 
explanations can be provided. He maintains that neither external (sociological) nor 
internal (psychological) influences are decisive in the elaboration of individuals’ 
choices. Quite the opposite, he rules these elements out as playing any explanatory role. 
Another aspect emerges from this perspective: it is not assumed that individuals act 
rationally or are exclusively driven by their own interest. Motivations leading to actions 
may be egoistic as well as altruistic, socially determined as well as individually 
determined. This is another demonstration that, in its original formulation, MI assumes 
neither a purely rationalistic perspective nor human egoistical behaviour as a standard 
for economic action. 
While the individualistic approach was originally developed by Austrian 
philosophers and economists (before and after its “official birth”), their viewpoints 
often differ. There have been many positions surrounding MI even from outside of the 
Austrian tradition, that rarely coincide with one another. It could therefore appear 
particularly arduous to provide an unitary definition of MI, that gathers together all its 
different versions. In order to orient ourselves, I will first provide a general analysis of 
MI, by presenting certain recent contributions to the debate and then constructing a 
framework through which we can evaluate the perspectives at stake.  
The first step consists in developing a sufficiently broad definition of MI. In this 
regard, we can look at Lars Udéhn’s “wide” description, according to which «social 
phenomena must be explained in terms of individuals, their physical and psychic states, 
actions, interactions, social situation and physical environment» (Udéhn 2001, p. 354; 
italics added). As emphasized in the quotation, this definition of MI evidently involves a 
very large range of possible perspectives, some of them far one another. Depending on 
which elements we accept in our definition, we commit to a specific version of MI. We 
can then place the definition into one of two sub-categories, which I propose to label 
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respectively Strong Methodological Individualism (SMI) and Weak Methodological 
Individualism (WMI)
7
. 
In SMI, socio-economic phenomena are explained in terms of individuals alone, 
since only individuals’ physical and psychic states and actions can be investigated. We 
can note that SMI coincides with the first part of the broad definition previously 
introduced. It is worth noting that MI critics usually take this version as the standard 
one to be attacked.  
As Hodgson (2007) rightly emphasizes, the adoption of the strong perspective 
implies an infinite regress problem. It becomes impossible to explain each emergent 
layer of a social institution without relying on previous institutions or, at least, on a set 
of “informally” accepted social codes or rules. It is therefore to be acknowledged that 
each «consideration of individuals without an institutional context is a non-starter», 
where the expression “institutional context” has to be broadly conceived (see Hodgson 
2007, p. 219).  
What emerges from the rich literature on the issue is the fact that only in a 
limited number of cases scholars that defend an individualistic position are ready to 
embrace such a binding commitment. It is extremely hard to explain how individuals act 
without taking any kind of social context, relationships or pre-existent social institution 
(more or less developed) into account. A handful of strong individualists can however 
be identified. Returning to “classical” philosophers, I believe John Stuart Mill’s 
perspective should be read as a typical example of SMI, even though at the time the so-
called individualism-holism debate was still far from being initiated. Mill defends the 
idea that social facts should be explained by reducing them to psychological 
phenomena. In the System of Logic he describes his standpoint as follows: 
 
The laws of the phenomena of society are, and can be, nothing but the 
laws of the actions and passions of human beings united together in 
the social state. Men, however, in a state of society are still men; their 
actions and passions are obedient to the laws of individual human 
nature. […] Human beings in society have no properties but those 
                                                          
7
 The two labels are introduced by Udéhn (2001). Nevertheless, I am going to develop the following 
analysis independently. It is worth noting that other authors, like Hodgson (2007), also suggest reading 
MI as having different “degrees”. 
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which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws of the 
nature of individual man. (Mill 1843-1872/1974, p. 879; italics added) 
 
More recently, J.W.N Watkins developed a similar position, describing 
individuals as the «ultimate constituents of the social world». Particularly in writing 
from 1952 he claims that: 
 
A social scientist can continue searching for explanations of social 
phenomena until he has reduced it to psychological terms. […] An 
understanding of complex social situation is always derived from a 
knowledge of the dispositions, beliefs, and relationships of 
individuals. Its overt characteristics may be established empirically, 
but they are only explained by being shown to be the resultants of 
individual activities. (Watkins 1952, pp. 28-29; italics added)  
 
In spite of the strong position defended in that article, it should be acknowledged 
that Watkins himself changes his mind in the following years. It can be claimed that his 
position becomes more flexible or, perhaps, more ambiguous. Proof of the change is 
provided by considerations like the following, where he adds “exogenous” elements as 
necessary to the explanations of social facts:  
 
Every complex social situation, institution, or event is the result of a 
particular configuration of individuals, their dispositions, situations, 
beliefs, and physical resources and environment. (Watkins 1957, p. 
106; italics added) 
 
The ambiguity to which I alluded before emerges within the same paper, where 
he seems to defend his old position:  
 
[…] Methodological individualism certainly does not prohibit 
attempts to explain the formation of psychological characteristics; it 
only requires that such explanations should in turn be individualistic, 
explaining the formation as the result of a series of conscious or 
16 
 
unconscious responses by an individual to his changing situation. 
(Watkins 1957, p. 110)  
 
This suggests that Watkins’ perspective could still be read as an example of SMI. 
However, it remains a problematic example. 
I have provided two examples of SMI, yet identifying a genuine strong approach 
is not a simple task. At this point, further clarification is required. The versions of SMI 
presented above all refer to psychological reductionism. However, the starting 
definition refers to «physical and psychic states», which are somewhat different. A 
question therefore arises: is it possible to imagine a strong individualist position without 
a psychological one? Or do SMI and psychological individualism inevitably coincide? 
The matter perhaps remains open, but on the basis of the strong individualists’ 
perspectives examined so far, I personally retain that a defence of SMI necessarily 
implies a defence of psychological reductionism (to a certain degree at least). Someone 
might go further, by reducing social explanations to psychic states that are in turn 
determined by physical factors, as recent research in neurosciences implies. But this 
could lead to further trouble, involving the issue of “free will”. I do not believe it is a 
feasible way to tackle problems with SMI. 
Addressing WMI is more complex, since a larger number of (only apparently) 
similar positions falls under its label. For this reason we could simply investigate the 
components in “the second half” of Udéhn’s general proposition. According to his 
theory, social phenomena need to be explained in terms of individuals and their 
interactions, their social relations and mutual influences with social institutions. These 
features are not all necessary for each definition we address. Therefore, degrees of WMI 
should be introduced. In the following I propose a three-fold sub-partition, from the 
simplest to the most articulated version. I also provide an example for each case.  
 
• WMI of the 1st degree: Social phenomena are explained in terms of 
individuals and their interactions, which are not, strictly speaking, social 
relations; individuals informally interact with other individuals; no social 
rules or codes are assumed to play any role: 
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By methodological individualism I mean the doctrine that all social 
phenomena (their structure and their change) are in principle 
explicable only in terms of individuals - their properties, goals, and 
beliefs. […] Many properties of individuals […] are irreducibly 
relational, so that accurate description of one individual may require 
reference to other individual. (Elster 1982, p. 453; italics added) 
 
• WMI of the 2nd degree: Social phenomena are explained in terms of individuals 
and their interactions, which also involve social relations; nevertheless, it is 
maintained that institutions are exclusively a later result: 
 
More generally, individual behaviour is always mediated by social 
relations. These are as much a part of the description of reality as is 
individual behaviour. (Arrow 1994, p. 5; italics added) 
[…] social variables, not attached to particular individuals, are 
essential in studying the economy or any other social system and that, 
in particular, knowledge and technical information have an 
irremovably social component, of increasing importance over time. 
(Arrow 1994, p. 8; italics added) 
 
• WMI of the 3rd degree: Social phenomena are explained in terms of individuals, 
but the influence that in turn even social (primitive or not) institutions play on 
individual actions and behaviours is acknowledged. Individuals cannot be 
thought of apart from interactions with their complex social environment. 
Nevertheless, individuals remain the primary unit of measure of social facts’ 
explanations: 
 
[…] institutions constitute a part of the individual’s circumstances 
which together with his aims determine his behaviour. (Agassi 1960, 
p. 247; italics added). 
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[… ] followers of institutionalism declare that certain social entities 
exist, and are of primary importance to the social sciences.
8
 (Agassi 
1975, p. 148) 
 
I have broken down the conception of MI in this manner so far, trying to grasp all 
its possible versions. This is a necessary step for comprehending the methodological 
positions at stake in a detailed and precise manner. In the following I propose 
developing a connection between the individualistic approach to methodology and 
theories of explanation.  
 
 
1.5 Methodological Individualism and Theories of Explanation  
 
MI is committed to explanations of social phenomena. It is however quite surprising 
that the relationship between MI and theories of explanation has rarely been addressed 
in social sciences. Not even in Udéhn’s (2001) rich analysis of MI was this matter 
adequately developed. The only reflections on this subject in his work address the 
inconsistency of Hempel’s models of explanations in the social sciences. Given the 
large number of theories of explanation available in the social sciences, the issue 
therefore consists in understanding which of these theories might be compatible with 
MI.  
Daniel Steel provides an interesting and original analysis in his 2005 paper. 
Therefore, I will use his work as the main reference for this section. In particular, I will 
consider theories of explanation in their most broad versions. I will question whether or 
not each theory actually provides a good defence of the individualistic approach. I will 
begin with theories that involve the notion of «cause». 
 
1. Causal mechanical theory
9
: Even when applied to the social sciences, this theory 
maintains that explaining a fact «consists in tracing the causal mechanisms that led 
up to it». (Salmon 1984, pp. 274-275). Therefore the notion of process becomes very 
                                                          
8
 Agassi uses the label “Institutional Individualism” to refer to this version of MI.  
9
 Here we are referencing Wesley Salmon (1984). This approach was later developed by several other 
scholars such as: Phil Dowe, Stuart Glennan, Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver. 
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important. By comparing different perspectives, one can observe that a mechanism 
may be conceived of as either a theoretical construction or the expression of the 
causal forces in the real world that determine a complex (social) structure. In both 
cases, the basic idea is that explanations of macro-level phenomena are possible 
through the identification of mechanisms at lower-levels. Steel (2005) recognizes 
that CM approaches may be compatible with MI. At the same time he stresses the 
fact that these approaches do not specify the exact level in which mechanisms should 
be identified and described. Despite this, I believe that CM theories could be 
considered good candidates for describing explanations of social phenomena even by 
scholars that embrace an individualistic position. Of course, individualists should be 
required to justify the choice of the micro-level at which mechanisms are supposed to 
operate. Recognizing the possibility for mechanisms to operate at different levels 
(both higher and deeper levels, as discoveries in neuroscience seem to suggest) is not 
a strong enough reason to claim that CM approaches would not work well with MI.  
 
2. Counterfactual theory: According to David Lewis, who is this theory’s primary 
advocate, explaining a phenomenon consists in providing «some information about 
its causal history». (Lewis 1986, p. 217) More in detail, given two events A and B, it 
is said that B depends counterfactually on A if and only if had A not occurred, B 
would not occurred either. Steel (2005) argues that the counterfactual approach does 
not support MI, since causal chains can be identified even among macro-level events. 
Similarly to the previous example, I do not agree that this is a strong argument 
against the usefulness of counterfactual theory for MI. If a pluralistic approach to 
explanation is maintained, Steel’s argument automatically fails; moreover, causal 
chains could be also grasped between micro- and macro-level phenomena. 
 
3. Manipulationist-counterfactual theory
10
: In his 2005 article, Steel particularly 
focuses on this theory, according to which causal generalizations are distinguished 
from mere correlations, since the first are invariant under (some) interventions. 
Mechanisms are therefore recognized to play a crucial role in the explanation of 
social phenomena. If it were demonstrated that micro-levels mechanisms are more 
                                                          
10
 The main advocate of this theory is James Woodward. See in particular Woodward (2003). 
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robustly invariant than macro-levels mechanisms, the manipulationist-counterfactual 
theory would be a valid defence for MI. But, as Steel himself acknowledges, it is 
difficult to identify this kind of robustness in social mechanisms. Steel considers 
examples from economic studies, focusing on preference reversal phenomena, which 
appears as a departure from the standard preference theory. In these examples 
individuals choose bets involving high probabilities of small gains (P-bets) rather 
than bets offering a smaller chance of richer prizes ($-bets), even if a high monetary 
value is attached to $-bets. Preference reversals seem to break the “choice 
mechanism” of individuals. 
 
In the following I consider two perspectives that do not use the notion of cause in 
their explanations. 
 
4. Unificationist theory
11
: According to this theory, “explaining something” means 
«providing a unified account of a range of different phenomena» (cf. Woodward 
2014). Typical examples of these types of explanatory models in the natural sciences 
are Newtonian physics and the evolutionary theory of Darwin. In more detail, cause 
is not taken as a founding concept, instead it is conceived as subsequently emerging 
from the unification process. Therefore, cause itself plays no explanatory role. 
Clearly, this is presented as a top-down explanatory strategy. For social sciences, an 
unificationist approach does not appear compatible with an individualistic 
perspective, while it could instead support a holistic view.  
 
5. Pragmatic approach
12
: In this theory, the context in which explanations for a precise 
phenomenon are required is stressed. Psychological considerations of the people 
providing and receiving explanations are assumed to be relevant as well. Steel (2005) 
hastily claims the pragmatic approach does not provide any defence for MI.  
 
                                                          
11
 For an example of an unificationist approach, see Kitcher (1989). 
12
 In particular, see van Fraassen (1980). 
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Lastly, functionalist theories require a brief discussion, since some of its 
versions involve a notion of cause, whereas others do not
13
. Regardless, they do not 
represent good candidates for individualists in either case. Indeed, all functionalist 
theories share the idea that explanations of single phenomena reflect the specific 
function they carry out within a complex and organized system. It is therefore evident 
that functionalist perspectives are inevitably connected to holistic paradigms and, as a 
consequence, to the acknowledgment of necessary relationships between the whole 
system and its constituent parts. 
We have shown that methodological individualists can embrace a number of 
different theories of explanation, without falling into contradiction. This holds even 
when they opt for a pluralist approach, hence, adopting one theory or another on the 
basis of the phenomena at stake. In any case, individualist should be required to justify 
how their perspective harmonizes with the chosen theory. Unfortunately, this task is 
rarely taken seriously. 
I conclude this section with a criticism of Steel’s analysis. Despite his 
undeniable skill in having emphasized the strict relationship between MI and 
explanation, he does not provide adequate space to the discussion of the single theories 
and usefulness in being employed within an individualistic or holistic methodology. 
With the exception of the manipulative-counterfactual theory, he treats each alternative 
too hurriedly, without attempting a sufficient analysis. Moreover, he seems to only 
reference MI in its strongest version, without explicitly stating it. In fact, his strong 
reading of MI justifies the rejection of some theories of explanation as functional for an 
individualistic approach. On this matters, there is still evidently much to be discussed.  
 
 
1.6 Methodological Individualism and Ontological Commitments 
 
Whereas MI addresses explanations, ontological individualism is committed to 
addressing the existence of individuals in the social world. In more detail, «ontological 
individualism is the thesis that there is nothing to social facts “over and above” facts 
about individuals and certain relations between individuals» (Epstein 2014, p. 18). It is 
                                                          
13
 It is especially Kincaid (1996) who defends the idea that the concept of function cannot avoid that of 
cause. 
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worth pointing out that in Epstein’s perspective, MI embraces both explanatory 
individualism and ontological individualism. Conversely, I argue that MI converges 
with explanatory individualism, whereas ontological individualism is an independent 
position.  
The commitment to only the existence of individuals in the social world leads to 
a number of problematic implications. The first concerns defining precisely what can 
reasonably be conceived of as an “individual”. Even utilizing recent discoveries in 
neuroscience and other disciplines, the task is all but trivial. This might represent a 
challenge for ontological individualists. Secondly, according to Kincaid (1993), it must 
be recognized that ontological individualism inevitably implies two further claims: 
 
i) Social institutions or entities do not exist separately from individuals. 
ii) Social institutions or entities do not exist independently of individuals. 
 
Despite their similarity, the two above propositions refer to distinct aspects of 
ontological individualism. In the first truism, it is maintained that no entities but 
individuals exist in the social world. To this regard, Kincaid affirms that «individuals 
exhaust what there is in the social realm» (p. 229; italics added). Differently, the second 
claim pinpoints the specific kind of relationship between individuals and social 
institutions/entities. Social facts supervene on (are determined by) individual facts. This 
means that «once the facts about individuals are set, then so, too are the facts about 
social entities» (Kincaid 1993, p. 229). 
Ontological individualism hence provokes two sets of issues. First of all, which 
properties count as individualistic properties and which ones count as social 
properties
14
 must be established, following Kincaid’s first claim. Secondly, how the 
dependence relationship between the individualistic and social level is actually 
characterized and determined must be clarified, related to Kincaid’s second claim.  
With reference to the first item, three kinds of individualistic properties are 
usually identified: 
 
i) Psychological properties. 
                                                          
14
 For outlining major aspects of ontological individualism, I mainly refer to Epstein (2009). 
Nevertheless, I am not fully addressing his criticism of it. 
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ii) Physical properties. 
iii) Relational properties among individuals. 
 
Ontological individualists could be committed to just one of those sets of 
properties or to all of them at the same time. Moreover, they maintain these properties 
to be exhaustive, i.e. social properties are completely determined by these three 
individualistic ones. Nevertheless, problems arise for each set of properties. 
In the case of psychological properties, the main challenge consists in 
“externalism”, a thesis widely accepted by philosophers of the mind. According to the 
externalism construct, individual concepts depend on factors external to individuals.
15
 
As a consequence, a circularity takes place and psychological attitudes cannot be 
conceived as strictly individualistic properties anymore, as their independence is 
essentially denied. 
Physical properties concern both bodies and their local environment. Contrary to 
some interpretations, according to which social facts never depend on physical 
properties16, in this case they are recognized as playing a role in social explanations. 
However, physical properties might also represent a problem for ontological 
individualists. Let’s consider, for instance, the property “being a hurricane victim”, 
which could be useful for getting some sort of governmental assistance. It is surely an 
objective condition with respect to an individual, nevertheless: i) “hurricane” cannot be 
exclusively explained within the circumscribed environment where an individual lives; 
ii) the condition of “being a hurricane victim” is also a social one, since it is socially 
established in relation to other social events and, in this example, a specific goal. 
Therefore, although physical properties can be involved in the explanation of social 
phenomena, it is actually difficult to consider them strictly individualistic properties. 
Ontological individualists regard even relational properties among people to be 
individualistic properties. But yet again, relational properties might not be 
individualistic. There are at least two examples: first, there are relational properties 
which are not ascribable to any person; secondly, a relational property could involve a 
                                                          
15
 Goldstein (1956) emphasized the dependence of psychological concepts on sociocultural factors. 
However, two clarification are useful: i) he does not distinguish between methodological and ontological 
individualism; ii) he also conceives methodological individualism and psychologism as similar. 
16
 See Watkins (1955). 
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socially determined property. In this regard, let’s reference the example of “being the 
secretary of the Prime Minister”, where “being Prime Minister” surely counts as an 
individualistic property, but is dependent on social factors.  
The previous discussion leads to the following conclusion. Ontological 
individualism recognizes individual properties as decisive for explaining social facts, 
yet conceives them as exhaustive. No single one of the properties’ categories examined 
above allows for the affirmation of individualistic properties as actually independent 
from social factors. Therefore, the first implication of ontological individualism, as 
illustrated by Kincaid, fails: it is undoubtedly too strong. 
Ontological individualism’s premise also requires an explanation regarding the 
relationship between the micro- and macro-level, given that this theory claims that the 
social world is dependent on individual entities. In order to provide a solution to this 
problem, the thesis of supervenience is usually introduced. According to this thesis, 
properties of individuals at the micro/physical-level determine properties at the higher-
level (social properties). However, this thesis also carries several problems. For 
instance, “Obama being the U.S. President” is a social property not (only) dependant on 
Obama’s individualistic/physical properties. Moreover, it should be demonstrated that 
social properties vary at the same time as other individualistic/physical properties. 
Ontological commitments involve several problems. These problems concern 
exclusively the ontological level, not the methodological one. Of course, there can be 
cases in which the two perspectives are contemporary embraced. I shall focus on this 
possibility in the next Section. 
 
 
 
Individualistic properties 
  
Features 
 
Failures 
 
Psychological properties 
 
 
Internal psychological 
states are fully independent 
from external world. 
 
i) Externalism 
 
Physical properties 
 
Bodies 
(Local) Environment 
 
i) Circularity. 
ii) Difficulties in 
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circumscribing the context. 
 
 
Relational properties 
 
 
Relational properties 
among individuals are 
individualistic. 
 
i) There could be relational 
properties not ascribable to 
anyone. 
ii) An individualistic 
relational property could in 
turn involve socially 
determined properties. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Ontological individualism: analysis of the individualistic properties. 
 
 
1.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
The goal of this Chapter was to investigate the puzzling notion of MI from both an 
general and a specific point of view, since it still lacks a shared agreement on its 
meaning. The general analysis allowed us to point out the precise position of MI in 
respect to other philosophical concepts which involve the use of the term 
“individualism”, hence generating a certain confusion. Differently, the specific survey 
aimed at an analytical decomposition of the notion of MI itself, through the comparison 
with a number of alternative perspectives. This dual strategy made it possible to build a 
general framework, which is a useful tool for deeper and more precise investigation. 
 One significant aspect that I firmly defend is the mutual independence of 
methodological individualism and ontological individualism. Whereas MI deals with 
explanations, ontological individualism only addresses the existence of a precise kind of 
entities (individuals) in the social world. As emerged previously, the two theses 
encounter specific sets of problems.  
 The table below (Fig. 1.4) illustrates combinations between methodological 
approaches and ontological commitments. In this chart, I suggest examples of scholars 
that represent each intersection of theory: 
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Ontological 
Individualism 
 
 
Ontological 
Collectivism 
 
 
No Ontological 
Commitment 
 
Methodological 
Individualism 
 
 
Mill (1843-1872) 
Watkins (1952) 
 
 
--- 
 
Schumpeter (1909) 
Hayek (1948) 
 
Methodological 
Collectivism  
 
 
Weber &Van Bouwel 
(2002) 
 
Hegel 
German economists 
of 19
th
 century 
 
 
Goldstein (1956) 
Kincaid (1993) 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Combinations between methodological approaches and ontological commitments. 
 
 
I believe that some conclusions can be reached: 
 
i) MI and ontological individualism are certainly autonomous theses, but it is possible 
to combine them. When they are contemporarily embraced, the strong version of MI 
follows. It could be affirmed that SMI usually corresponds to psychological 
reductionism, but also that SMI necessarily implies an ontological commitment. 
SMI, ontological individualism and psychological reductionism cannot be 
conceptualized separately. Most criticisms of MI have been addressed to SMI, which 
however only represents one of the alternatives and, as emerged, is not the most 
popular version. 
 
ii) When MI is employed without any ontological commitment, the weak version of MI 
follows. WMI with no ontological commitments gathers the largest number of 
perspectives under its umbrella. The further partition is shown in Fig. 1.5 below, 
referring to the previous analysis of WMI. 
 
iii) That the combination of MI and ontological collectivism is implausible becomes 
evident.  
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iv) MI does not entail ontological individualism. Likewise, ontological individualism 
does not entail MI. A proof is provided by Weber’s and Van Bouwel’s (2002), who 
argue in favour of a pluralist approach in the social sciences, even though they still 
privilege «structural explanations» (i.e. explanations at the macro-level). At the same 
time, they accept ontological individualism, by referring to causal fundamentalism: 
 
[…] ontological individualism is right after all: not because there are 
no structural regularities, and not because intentional regularities 
override social-structural regularities. It is simply that, as causal 
fundamentalism tells us, physical powers fix the pattern of powers and 
regularities that rule at all levels, which means that there must be a 
harmony among levels. (Weber and Van Bouwel 2002, p. 272) 
 
v) The remaining intersections between methodological collectivism and ontological 
commitments suggest interesting considerations as well. Methodological collectivists 
do not usually commit to the effective existence of social/collective entities nor 
completely reject the role that individualistic aspects could play in explanations. In 
this regard, Goldstein claims that: 
 
Methodological collectivism does not deny that there is much to be 
usefully learned from the study of the individualistic aspects of human 
action, but it does insist that merely because all human cultures are 
first discovered through the activities of their individual members it 
does not follow that there are no possible problems for which the 
particular individuals are irrelevant (Goldstein 1965, p. 802). 
 
It could be therefore questioned how far methodological individualism and 
methodological collectivism actually are from one another when considered in their 
respective weakest versions.  
 
 
 
 
 
Weak Methodological Individualism  
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1
st
 degree  
 
Elster (1982) 
 
2
nd
 degree  
 
Arrow (1994) 
 
3
rd
 degree  
 
Agassi (1960, 1975) 
 
Figure 1.5: Degrees of WMI. 
 
According to the previous considerations, I think that the outlined conceptual 
framework leads to the following questions, when analysing scholars’ methodological 
approaches: 
 
• Which kind of individualism/s (methodological, normative, ontological) does the 
scholar employ? 
• Which version of MI do they utilize within their perspective? 
• Do MI and ontological individualism coexist in their view? If so, how?  
• Which theory of explanation do they assume and how do they combine it with 
the individualistic approach? 
 
This conceptual framework may be usefully employed for investigating the 
perspectives of a wide range of scholars. In Menger’s case, I suggest a rational 
reconstruction of his position, since debates on methodological issues in the social 
sciences were developed only in a later period. I believe Menger to be a forerunner of 
methodological debates in social sciences, who grasped the necessity of tackling the 
methodological problems of and in socio-economical disciplines well ahead of his time. 
Of course, this implies that his standpoints are not always explicitly expressed, and 
interpretation is therefore required. yet such an interpretation must follow a rigorous 
path and the constructed conceptual framework is a useful tool for this aim. Through it, 
I also intend to show how narrow the readings that see a mere opposition to the German 
mainstream in Menger’s writing are. The so-called Methodenstreit has captured a lot of 
attention across time, but there are reasons to claim that it represents a marginal aspect 
of a wider debate. 
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2. A Critical Analysis of Menger’s Contributions to Methodological 
and Economic Research 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter aims at rationally reconstructing Menger’s scientific approach to 
economics and, above all, to methodological research. It must first to be emphasized 
that, whereas Menger’s contributions to the field of economics were not entirely 
innovative for the 19
th
 century (several scholars had already developed a subjectivist 
approach to the theory of value17), his interest in methodology represents an original 
aspect of his scientific production.  
Menger believed that if economics aspired to be properly treated as a scientific 
discipline, its subject matter, goals and methodology needed to be explicitly and 
precisely defined. He recognized that two very common mistakes impeded significant 
developments in economics. On one hand, there was a widespread tendency to mix 
strictly economic issues with non-economic ones. On the other, the importance of both 
theoretical research and the introduction of a coherent methodology was generally 
underestimated. I argue that Menger’s primary contribution to the field consists in 
having joined three distinct elements: 
 
1) The subjective theory of value, in opposition to classical economic 
theory. 
2) A systematic employment of the principle of marginal utility, which 
German economists had previously only roughly sketched.  
3) A methodological tool specifically designed for the economic discipline.  
 
                                                          
17
 Not only Menger’s contemporaries Jevons and Walras, but also other German economists developed 
(usually trivial) versions of the subjective theory of value. Among the Germans, the most significant 
results are attributed to Hermann Heinrich Gossen (1810-1858), who introduced an analysis of the 
principle of marginal utility in his volume Entwicklung der Gesetze des menschlichen Verkehrs und der 
daraus fließenden Regeln für menschliches Handeln (1854). Gossen’s study anticipated marginal 
economists’ theories by two decades. However, for a long time his work remained unknown, mainly due 
to the fact that he was foreigner in the German academic environment. Menger himself was unaware of 
Gossen’s research at the time he wrote the Grundsätze. 
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In outlining Menger’s perspective, therefore, several issues must be discussed. 
The first set of questions that arises concerns his individualistic approach. Building on 
previously constructed framework, we would like to pinpoint which version of MI the 
Austrian economist embraces and how its employment contributes to his explanation of 
economic phenomena. This investigation inevitably leads to another question: Is there a 
recognizable correspondence between Menger’s methodological reflections and the way 
he actually investigated specific economic facts? Or, in other terms: Does he actually do 
what he claims to do? Menger’s methodological interests do seem to follow in his 
economic research. This can be found not only by superficially considering the 
chronological order of his most significant publications, but, as the Archive documents 
testify, also by observing that no methodological concern seriously influences the very 
early phases of his economic investigations. For such a reason, a discrepancy cannot be 
excluded at this stage of my thesis (Section 2.2). 
Secondly, we must question what the Austrian economist actually meant by 
theoretical research and how this contributed to the enhancement of the economic 
discipline. In this regard, Menger distinguishes between exact laws and empirical laws. 
The actual difference between these concepts, as well as their respective roles within his 
methodological system is extremely relevant to our discussion. An investigation of this 
topic also leads to further understanding of Menger’s approach towards the external 
world and reality. Does he believe that exact and/or empirical laws refer to real social 
laws or are they only instrumental constructions guiding us in the social realm? It is 
worth remembering that the Austrian economist was a pioneer in addressing these 
themes, holding no strong and plausible benchmark, but aiming at rigorous procedures. 
Menger does not place his own approach within a specific tradition, since methods in 
the social sciences had yet to be seriously tackled at that time. These aspects 
undoubtedly make the interpretation of Menger’s orientation particularly arduous 
(Section 2.3). 
Based on the answers to the questions posed earlier, in Section 2.4 I will attempt 
to advance a hypothesis regarding Menger’s theory (or theories) of explanation. To this 
aim, I will also consider his two most significant contributions to the field of economic, 
i.e. the theory of value and the theory of money. Yet again, we intend to investigate 
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whether, and how, Menger’s methodological and theoretical positions coincide with the 
way in which he effectively provides explanations for economic phenomena.  
Once again utilizing the framework developed in Chapter 1, I will finally tackle 
the issue of his ontological commitments. I will investigate several aspects that suggest 
that Menger cannot be conceived as an essentialist or a realist. Moreover, I will compare 
his perspective with the positions of other Austrian economists so that we will be able to 
fully grasp Menger’s peculiarity. I will also refer to a series of articles by Uskali Mäki 
that attempt to demonstrate the inadequacy of the realist reading of Menger’s 
perspective (Section 2.5). 
 In the concluding remarks of this Chapter, I will finally be able to provide a 
unitary picture of Menger’s perspective, offering an original, complete and coherent 
reading of his contribution to the field. 
 
 
2.2 Methodological Individualism in Menger’s Perspective 
 
The first step to appropriately identifying Menger’s individualistic perspective consists 
in considering how the Austrian economist described his own approach. Beyond the 
well-known Untersuchungen (1883), there are also two methodological pieces where 
pivotal reflections on the matter emerge, namely Die Irrthümer des Historisismus in der 
Deutschen Nationalökonomie (1884) and Grundzüge einer Klassifikation der 
Wirtschaftswissenschaften (1889)
18
.  
In the Untersuchungen Menger refers to his method by employing the term 
«Atomismus», which is associated with the theoretical treatment of economic facts. 
According to this atomistic approach, a complex phenomenon must be dismantled to the 
point where its constitutive and ultimate elements are observable. In economics, those 
ultimate components are human beings and their actions. Atomism and individualism 
therefore coincide, but only accidentally. This coincidence is due to the specific way in 
which Menger conceives of economic activity as the «the premeditative activity of 
                                                          
18
 Of the two texts, the first one is undoubtedly the most well-known. Written as a reply to Gustav 
Schmoller’s criticism of Untersuchungen, it constitutes a main piece of the Methodenstreit. Nevertheless, 
given its polemic tone, it turns out to be less useful for our discussion than the second one. 
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humans aimed at the indirect or direct satisfaction of their material needs». (Menger 
1883/1985, p. 193) 
As a consequence, it could be claimed that atomism properly refers to a general 
concept of scientific research methods, whereas individualism represents the specific 
version applied to economic investigations. In Menger’s view, only human activities 
can be observed and therefore scientifically investigated. Conversely, national 
economies are the results of individual actions’ and cannot be treated as individual 
object of research, since they do not exist as such. The atomistic approach therefore 
reflects a top-down strategy.  
It is clear that in such a context both atomism and individualism abandon any 
sort of normative meaning. In particular, atomism is not to be meant to follow Kantian 
solipsism, as it does not draw on any assumptions about human beings as rational, 
isolated and self-sufficient subjects, since atomism consists in a mere technique. 
Similarly, individualism, as a specific application of atomism, refers neither to moral 
statements nor to political ones. Menger subscribes to this strategy once again in 1889, 
claiming that the task of scientific investigation in the economic discipline is:  
 
[…] to analyse complex economic phenomena and to reduce them 
both to their ultimate constitutive factors, still accessible to our certain 
perception, and above all to their psychological motivations
19
 […]. 
(Menger 1889/1998, pp. 49-50)
20
 
 
Menger provides a rather different description of methodological procedure in 
previous work from 1884. The expression «Isolierungsverfahren» (isolation procedure) 
is introduced there to describe his perspective, particularly emphasizing that a 
phenomenon is adequately investigated only when all of its casual elements have been 
recognized and removed:  
 
                                                          
19
 The role of psychological motivations in Menger’s theory is going to be discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 3. In the current Chapter, I do not intended to focus on this theme, even though I will touch on 
psychological elements.  
20
 Our translation from the Italian version: «analizzare i fenomeni economici complessi, e a ricondurli sia 
ai fattori costitutivi ultimi ancora accessibili ad una nostra percezione certa, sia soprattutto alle loro 
motivazioni psicologiche».  
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Wer auch nur die Elemente der Logik kennt, weiß, dass man unter 
dem Isolierungsverfahren nur die Isolierung von den einer 
Erscheinung akzidentiellen Momenten versteht, und wer mein Buch 
gelesen hat, weiß, dass ich nirgends auch nur die entfernteste 
Veranlassung zu der unsinnigen Meinung gebe, dass unter dem 
Isolierungsverfahren die Isolierung von den einer Erscheinung 
essentiellen Momenten zu verstehen sei
21
. (Menger 1884, p. 7n; italics 
added) 
 
 Whether «Atomismus» and «Isolierung» assume the same meaning should be 
addressed. I believe that by using them, Menger actually is referring to distinct moments 
in the methodological procedure he has in mind. He believes the deconstruction of 
complex socio-economic phenomena into its constitutive parts is an important step. The 
second step, i.e. the isolation of the accidental moments of phenomena, specifically 
regards the analysis of the previous identified constitutive parts. When considering 
Menger’s theory of the formation of prices, the following definition can be 
reconstructed:  
 
1. The atomistic (individualistic analysis): in a free-market economy, 
prices are not conventionally established by an authority. On the 
contrary, they are the unintended results of lower-level activities. The 
identification of individual economic performance is the goal of this 
top-down methodological strategy. 
 
1.4.1 The isolation analysis: once it is established that individual 
economic activities constitute the basis for explaining the formation 
of prices, one must identify an ideal standard for economic actions 
to be set as hypothesis of the theory. The isolation technique 
evidently coincides with that of abstraction. It can be used to outline 
                                                          
21
 «Who is just familiar with the elements of logic knows that “isolation process” means the isolation of 
casual moments of a phenomenon and, who read my book knows that I did not give any support to the 
unreasonable opinion that the isolation process should be conceived as the isolation of the essential 
moments of that phenomenon» (our translation). 
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a typical standard of economic behaviour, through the removal of 
misleading elements and influences.  
 
 
1
st
 step 
 
Atomistic (individualistic) 
technique 
 
 
corresponds 
to 
 
Deconstruction procedure 
 
 
2
nd
 step 
 
Isolation procedure 
 
corresponds 
to 
 
Abstraction procedure 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Menger’s double technique. 
 
Hence, I maintain it is possible to describe Menger’s individualistic approach. In his 
perspective MI indeed coincides with a precise component of his most general 
methodological technique, namely the atomistic one. Embracing this kind of 
individualism does not entail any assumptions about human nature, instead it stresses 
that in economic matters the ultimate component is in fact the individuals and their 
actions. The creation of a standard description of economic agents instead concerns the 
isolation or abstraction procedure and, as it will later be shown, involves both empirical 
data and pragmatic choices. 
 
 
2.3. Outlining Menger’s Theoretical System 
2.3.1 The Threefold Articulation of Political Economy 
 
The current Section consists of two parts. In the first part I will briefly sketch Menger’s 
reading of political economy. In the second one I will concentrate on the puzzling issue 
of the demarcation problem that emerges from his approach. 
Let it first be noted that Menger’s theory develops on two separate levels. He is 
interested in identifying the components that actually constitute a political economy, 
hence aimed at delimiting their specific task. In detail, he describes political economy as 
including the following components: 
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1) A historical component. 
2) A statistical component. 
3) A theoretical component. 
 
The historical and statistical components are neither independent disciplines 
from political economy nor auxiliary ones. These components represent different 
aspects that have both genuine descriptive tasks regarding social facts (Taten) and 
standard institutions. In historical research, facts and institutions are studied by looking 
at their changes and developments. Differently, statistical research addresses facts and 
institutions within a circumscribed situation (Zuständlichkeit). Theoretical research has 
instead no descriptive role at all, and is not interested in «concrete phenomena and 
concrete developments (konkrete Erscheinungen und konkrete Entwicklungen)» but in 
the laws and regularities of socio-economic phenomena. 
The second-level analysis starts at this stage. Menger recognizes two distinct 
ways to conduct theoretical research: the empirical way and the exact one. According to 
the empirical address, regular phenomena are found through the immediate observation 
of the socio-economic realm. Given the complexity of phenomena and high number of 
variables at stake, in Menger’s view empirical research cannot provide any deep 
comprehension. For this reason, he looks at the exact address, involving both atomistic 
and isolation techniques. Social laws and regularities established through these 
processes have the same reliability of the natural laws. Nevertheless, Menger is aware 
that even exact laws cannot be, strictly speaking, «rigorous». Far from reading this 
aspect as a typical “weakness” of the social sciences, he maintains that rigorous laws 
cannot be formulated within the natural sciences either, as exceptions are unavoidable. 
Between socio-economic exact laws and natural laws there is therefore only a difference 
of a degree of reliability, both being results of abstraction and not describing reality as it 
actually is. Therefore, both natural and social laws do not properly exhaust the 
description of the world. 
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Exact address 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The Political Economy Components. 
 
 
2.3.2 The Demarcation Problem 
 
In this section I question whether, and how, Menger provides a solution to what Popper 
defines as «the problem of demarcation», i.e. «[t]he problem of finding a criterion 
which would enable us to distinguish between the empirical sciences on the one hand, 
and mathematics and logic as well as “metaphysical” systems on the other […]». 
(Popper 1935/2005, p. 11)  
The reason why I am going to tackle this issue consists in the fact that Menger’s 
perspective is often held to be a classic example of the deductive approach to 
economics, which states: given a set of axioms held by definition to be true a priori, a 
theory follows. This technique is typical of the exact orientation of Menger’s research 
and leaves certain matters open to several interpretations. An inductivist approach 
would instead allow for a clear demarcation between science and metaphysics, i.e. by 
referring to an empirical criterion. However, on the other hand, problems arising from 
the unjustified passage from particular assertions to general ones would not be 
overcome. If a deductive position is embraced, the logical construction of arguments is 
guaranteed, but the problem shifts to finding a selection criterion for axioms and 
fundamental hypotheses.  
As is well-known, Popper introduced the falsification criterion. Menger does not 
evidently utilize Popper’s solution, but is clearly interested in separating scientific 
assertions from assertions of a different nature. I therefore believe that an investigation 
of this aspect is urgent, since the justification of Menger’s approach itself is at stake.  
 As previously introduced, Menger keeps the exact and empirical fields distinct. 
As the two levels are definitively separated, he also rejects any attempt at empirically 
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testing exact economic theories as a methodological mistake (cf. Menger 1883/1985, 
pp. 69-70). As a consequence, we should first clarify how these axioms are selected, 
where they derive from. Moreover, the goal of economic theories constructed on the 
basis of a deductive approach must be defined, as well as the differences between 
empirical orientations. We will attempt to describe how Menger believes economic 
theories should be verified, given that the empirical level is said to have no connection 
to the exact one.  
 With reference to the first issue, it is worth stressing that these axioms are 
clearly established a priori, but stem from those atomistic and isolation techniques 
previously described. They are therefore principles, which present a partial relationship 
with the social world, being results of an analytical process that begins with the 
observation of complex phenomena
22
. At the same time, we must recognize that these 
axioms are also arbitrarily established, to a certain degree, as the variables considered or 
avoided are pragmatically chosen.  
On this topic, I suggest compare Merger’s position with Schumpeter’s, who 
seems to reflect Menger’s ideas, yet renders them more explicit and clear. In Das Wesen 
und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie (1908), Schumpeter replies to 
objections regarding the employment of a deductive method in “pure” economics. In 
particular, he argues that assuming a deductive approach does not mean negating that 
the starting points of theoretical research are all to some extent «induced», hence 
indicating that it would be misleading to interpret the deductive method in a strict sense. 
From Schumpeter’s position, fundamental hypotheses are arbitrarily constructed, but 
always rationally, i.e. by initially referring to observable facts. At the same time, he 
firmly maintains theories are not governed by facts. Theories are therefore acceptable 
only if they allow us to make predictions about socio-economic phenomena and, 
consequently, to control them. For an economic theorists, it does not matter whether 
theories are “true”, or if they refer to “real” facts and objects, as there is no way to 
verify these aspects. 
                                                          
22
 As will be discussed in more detail in the third Chapter, one aspect of Menger’s approach consists in 
starting with the observation of social facts and events. For this reason, psychological motivations do not 
constitute reliable material for economical investigations. On this specific point, Schumpeter shares the 
same perspective.  
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I argue that Schumpeter effectively mirrors Menger’s way of describing the 
deductive method applied to theoretical economics, even though his instrumentalist 
approach goes above and beyond his predecessor’s. Despite their similarities, 
Schumpeter is not concerned at all about the peculiarities of economic activities, 
whereas Menger never distinguishes between the goals of elaborating theories and 
capturing the very “nature” of economic performance. Although arbitrary choices are 
required, Menger defends the idea that the issue is not controlling socio-economic 
phenomena and events, but comprehending (Verstehen) them. 
The second issue has specifically to do with the aims of exact orientation. 
Menger does not retain that economic theories are aimed at describing social reality as it 
is. Similarly, he believes exact laws do not correspond to laws that actually exist in the 
extremely complex socio-economic realm. As already mentioned, he also considers the 
verification of exact theories in the empirical world as a methodological mistake. What 
is then the goal of the exact research? What are the advantages of referring to exact 
theories? Through this theoretical approach, Menger address the very basic causal 
relationships between economic facts, which are obtained through atomistic and 
isolation procedures. By pinpointing these relationships, he can then formulate general 
laws to be employed for the explanation of complex phenomena themselves, as will be 
later analysed. 
A useful example that can help us understand Menger’s position is provided by 
his employment of exact and empirical laws for distinguishing between «economic 
prices» and «real prices». Exact laws establish that «with definite presuppositions an 
increase in need, definite by measure, must be followed by an increase in prices just as 
definite by measure» (Menger 1883/1985, p. 72; original italics). Given a market 
economy, this law allows one to calculate economic prices, i.e. expected prices in an 
ideal situation, characterized by a definite set of variables without considering 
exogenous influences. The corresponding empirical law instead states that «an increase 
in need as a rule is actually followed by one in real prices, and, to be sure, an increase 
which as a rule stands in a certain relationship to the increase in need, even if this 
relationship by no means can be determined in an exact way» (id.). Empirical laws are 
the result of observations of mere correlation or regularities, not of universally valid 
causal relationships. They take into account extra-economic factors, which exercise 
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influence on economic facts themselves, thus allowing for a more complete description 
of the phenomenon at stake. However, the more precise such contextualized 
characterization is, the less general will be the obtained correlation, since for the 
empirical orientation exceptions are conceived of as essential aspects of the analysis.  
In short, exact laws aim to capturing economic (ideal) facts, whereas empirical 
laws aim to capturing real (concrete) facts, which do not necessarily coincide. The 
following table briefly summarizes the main differences between empirical and exact 
orientations of the research: 
 
 
Empirical orientation 
 
Exact orientation 
 
Observation 
 
Observation + deductive 
technique 
(atomistic/individualistic and 
isolation/abstraction technique) 
 
 
Considers even non-economic 
variables. 
 
Considers only relevant economic 
variables. 
 
 
Aims at capturing mere 
correlations. 
 
Aims at capturing universally 
valid causal laws.  
 
 
Figure 2.2: The empirical and exact laws. 
 
 
At this stage, we can finally discuss whether Menger furnishes a convincing 
criterion of demarcation with reference to the exact orientation of his research, i.e. a 
criterion guaranteeing that his exact theories are scientific and not just metaphysical 
statements. Given that he embraces a deductive approach, three alternative methods for 
verification are to be considered:  
 
1) falsification criterion;  
2) experimental verification;  
3) empirical verification.  
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The first can be immediately excluded. As already seen, Menger does not 
anticipate criterion later introduced by Popper. Similarly, he never takes the possibility 
of testing theories through experiments into consideration. The third option is therefore 
more plausible. Menger affirms more than once that exact theories’ goals consist in 
allowing for the control of socio-economic phenomena. Therefore, empirical 
verifications play a crucial role. Without confirmation that exact theories “work”, how 
could one employ them to control socio-economic phenomena? However, as previously 
emerged, Menger denies that exact theories can be empirically tested, given that the 
exact and empirical levels are distinct. This position remains undoubtedly problematic, 
as Menger does not provide any clear criterion of demarcation in the end.  
 
 
2.4 Interpreting Menger’s Approach to Explanation 
 
Earlier, I rapidly mentioned Menger’s interest in capturing the fundamental causal 
relationships within economic phenomena. This interest is evidently strictly related to 
his investigation of the theory of explanation he finally adopts. In the current section I 
am therefore going to explore this topic, keeping the framework constructed in Chapter 
1 as a reference. Let us keep in mind that outlining Menger’s treatment of scientific 
explanation is not a trivial endeavour. His attempts anticipate more structured debates 
on the nature and role of explanation in the social sciences by several decades, and 
therefore have no relevant reference point. As a consequence, it is rather common to 
find claims in his writing that could be read as contrasting and incoherent. I therefore 
have a dual aim: reconstruct Menger’s approach to explanation; and question whether 
his “solution” presents difficulties. 
I will start this review by stressing what Menger is not. Menger is not a 
functionalist. This clearly emerges when he compares social sciences to natural 
sciences, particularly with reference to physiology and anatomy. He calls the 
parallelism, established by several of his contemporaries, between social and natural 
investigations into question. In his view, the employment of superficial and misleading 
analogies between distinct disciplines is literally an «unscientific aberration» and 
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therefore also the consequent application a specific field’s methods to another. Menger 
indicates a few instances of this tendency: the comparison between the circulation of the 
blood and the circulation of money or the traffic in goods; between digestion and the 
consumption of goods; between the function of the individual organs of the human body 
and the function of the various social classes (cf. Menger 1883/1985, p. 137). The 
Austrian economist explicitly sees organic theories in the natural sciences as inadequate 
for the study of economic discipline. This means he rejects the idea that functionalist 
approaches are useful candidates for explaining facts in the social realm. Hence, socio-
economic phenomena cannot be explained by the function they are supposed to play in a 
specific context. According to Menger, this would mean reasoning in terms of parts and 
wholes, and therefore introduce collectivist notions and suppose that social systems 
have well-defined goals.  
I argue that Menger effectively assumes a causal perspective. The exact 
orientation of his research consists in looking for lower levels fundamental relationships 
and regularities, in order to explain macro-economic phenomena. In Menger’s words: 
 
Exact research reduces real phenomena to their simplest elements, 
thought of as strictly typical, and attempts to determine their strictly 
typical relationships, their “laws of nature”. (Menger 1883/1985, p. 
112) 
 
In particular, those relationships pose human beings, their mutual actions, their needs 
and environments in relation. However, the relationships are not conceived of as mere 
correlations, but rather as causal laws. Let’s consider the following quotations:  
 
We are able […] to observe without much difficulty certain 
relationships among [phenomena] recurring now with greater, now 
with lesser regularity (e.g., regularities in their succession, in their 
development, in their coexistence), relationships which we call 
typical. (Menger 1883/1985, p. 36; original italics) 
 
The investigation of types and of typical relationships of phenomena 
is of really immeasurable significance for human life, of no less 
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significance than the cognition of concrete phenomena. Without the 
knowledge of empirical forms we would not be able to comprehend 
the myriads of phenomena surrounding us, nor to classify them in our 
minds; it is the presupposition for a more comprehensive cognition of 
the real world. Without cognition of the typical relationships we 
would be deprived not only of a deeper understanding of the real 
world, as we will show further on, but also, as may be easily seen, of 
all cognition extending beyond immediate observation, i.e., of any 
prediction and control of things. All human prediction and, indirectly, 
all arbitrary shaping of things is conditioned by that knowledge which 
we previously have called general. (Menger 1883/1985, p. 36; original 
italics) 
 
 Social sciences laws regarding typical phenomena are equivalent to natural 
sciences’ «laws of nature», and both are conceived of as general causal laws. Menger is 
not interested in pinpointing causal mechanisms. He refers to «mechanism» only once 
in opposition to the concept of «organism», which he firmly rejects (cf. Menger 
1883/1985, pp. 131-132). If one were to apply a mechanistic position, then Menger 
should commit not only to the identification of the causal factors determining social 
phenomena, but also to the description of their precise internal organization and mutual 
relationships. This would be hardly feasible, even taking into account that individuals 
and their interactions are the fundamental components of Menger’s social explanations. 
The causal perspective is instead fully in accordance with the individualistic approach, 
allowing the atomistic technique to investigate typical relationships at the lower levels.  
 Menger provides further information that allows us to better reconstruct his 
position regarding socio-economic explanation. With reference to exact orientation, he 
repeatedly states that correctly understanding a concrete (observable) phenomenon 
actually means recognizing the general law under which that phenomenon falls:  
 
We understand a concrete phenomenon in a theoretical way […] by 
recognizing it to be a special case of a certain regularity (conformity 
to law) in the succession, or in the coexistence of phenomena. In other 
words, we become aware of the basis of the existence and the 
peculiarity of the nature of a concrete phenomenon by learning to 
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recognize in it merely the exemplification of a conformity-to-law of 
phenomena in general. (Menger 1883/1985, pp. 44-45; italics added) 
 
We understand phenomena by means of theories as we become aware 
of them in each concrete case merely as exemplifications of a general 
regularity. (Menger 1883/1985, pp. 55-56; italics added) 
 
Both quotations suggest a perspective that anticipates Hempel’s D-N model. The 
explanation of the economic phenomenon (explanandum) is the logical conclusion 
inferred from a set of premises (explanans), utilizing both exemplary universal laws and 
specific contextual conditions. Explanation would therefore consist in describing precise 
phenomenon through a certain empirical regularity. Hempel’s D-N model may represent 
a useful interpretation of Menger’s position, since it allows one to combine the 
deductive approach, the employment of general causal laws and the idea that 
“explaining” consists in classifying phenomena under universal laws. 
 Of course, if this interpretation were assumed to be valid, Merger’s theories 
would inevitably attract criticisms similar to those directed at Hempel’s model applied 
to the social sciences. Two objections arise instantaneously:  
 
1) the main problem just shifts, since how to obtain exemplary universal laws has 
still to be established;  
2) inferring does not mean explaining.  
 
Following Menger, the former issue is easily solved by using methodological 
procedures aimed at grasping the fundamental causal relationships previously 
considered. The matter remains open regarding the second item, as for Menger 
“explanation” consists in predicting and controlling phenomena and, in addition, 
comprehending what kind of phenomena they are. 
Menger maintains that socio-economic exact laws are indeed ceteris paribus laws. 
Recognizing exact laws be valid only if other things are equal is a “law of thinking”, 
independently true from experience: 
 
44 
 
There is one rule of cognition for the investigation of theoretical truths 
which as far as possible is verified beyond doubt not only by 
experience, but simply by our laws of thinking. This is the statement 
that whatever was observed in even only one case must always put in 
an appearance again under exactly the same actual conditions; or, 
what is in essence the same thing, that strictly typical phenomena of a 
definite kind must always, and, indeed in consideration of our laws of 
thinking, simply of necessity, be followed by strictly typical 
phenomena of just as definite and different a type. (Menger 
1883/1985, p. 60; original italics) 
 
 At this stage of our analysis of Meger’s position, these statements should not 
look surprising. As seen above, Menger’s exact laws result from isolation/abstraction 
techniques, which aim at characterizing ideal situations and have a particularly 
restricted range of application. However, when a phenomenon requires explanation not 
only exact laws are utilized, but also the specification of the conditions under which that 
phenomenon itself had occurred. In this way, Menger is not concerned with the limited 
employment of general causal laws.  
 I am going to conclude this section by evaluating a final element. In Menger’s 
perspective we can identify the belief that once economic theories are formulated, they 
provide a more complete comprehension of economic facts, only if they are conceived 
of as a whole:  
 
Not just anyone theory of human phenomena, only the totality of such 
theories, when they are once pursued, will reveal to us in combination 
with the results of the realistic orientation of theoretical research the 
deepest theoretical understanding attainable by the human mind of 
social phenomena in their full empirical reality. (Menger 1883/1985, 
p. 63; italics added) 
 
However, I believe this aspect of Menger’s perspective is rather marginal and not 
sufficiently developed in his writings. In any case, this final consideration does not 
seem to contradict the previous analysed positions.  
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 In this section how Menger expresses his theoretical approach has been 
illustrated, through selected quotations, aimed at corroborating a precise interpretation. 
In the following two sections, I will concentrate on the way Menger applies his 
perspective to concrete cases, attempting to figure out whether a correspondence 
between his theory and praxis actually exists. 
 
 
2.4.1 Method Applied I: Prices and Value 
 
While Menger specifically deals with methodology in his second work, within the 
Principles Menger already takes a precise methodological approach, especially when 
describing price formation mechanisms. In a free-market economy prices cannot be 
established by mere convention, as several renown predecessors had on the contrary 
hypnotized
23
. An alternative explanation is therefore required. 
The first step of this type of research consists in recognizing that real prices are 
the unintended complex results of an articulated socio-economic process. According to 
Menger’s analysis, the following descending path is outlined:  
 
prices → exchange → value → (economic) goods → needs 
 
This deconstruction recalls the previously described atomistic/individualistic technique, 
demonstrating Menger’s early tendency towards a very specific way of treating 
observable socio-economic facts. A critical observation may be advanced at this stage, 
regarding the degree of complexity characterizing the levels involved. It should be 
questioned whether, and to what extent, each of them is actually simpler than its 
predecessor. I personally consider these phenomena as complex socio-economic facts in 
themselves. The deconstruction of these phenomena refers to finding ultimate 
independent elements in the chain, which are identified within human needs, conceived 
of as the very starting points of the entire economic process.  
However, Menger’s economic work immediately leads one to observe that the 
Principles are actually structured according to an ascending (hence, inverse) path. This 
                                                          
23
 For a detailed criticism to the conventionalist approach see Section 2.4.2.  
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corresponds to the «compositive» part or, in other words, to the “reconstructive” part of 
his methodological strategy:  
 
needs → (economic) goods → value → exchange → prices 
 
It is worth stressing that, according to Menger, prices do not actually represent 
the crucial economic phenomena to be observed. They constitute the starting point of 
the investigation, since they are «the only phenomena of the process that are directly 
perceptible, since their magnitude can be measured exactly». (Menger 1871/2007, p. 
191) Indeed, prices represent the only objective moment of the whole process. A further 
peculiarity consists in the idea that prices are to be properly conceived of as «incidental 
manifestations», which do not necessarily emerge from the strict economic actions. 
Every essentialist standpoint is consequently rejected.  
 
 
Prices are 
 
Prices are not 
 
only incidental manifestations of 
economic activities; 
 
the real essence of exchanges; 
 
unintended results of economic 
actions. 
 
conventionally established. 
 
Figure 2.3: Prices. 
 
The second step in Menger’s descending path is represented by exchange. 
Considered the fact that exchanges also take place in the absence of prices and money. 
Conversely, exchanges involving prices and money cannot be properly conceived as 
economic exchanges. On this topic, Menger clearly contrasts Smith’s position in 
Inquiry, in which the tendency to exchange would be a peculiar trait of the “human 
nature” (cf. Menger 1871/2007, pp. 175ff). In Menger’s view, this position would 
simply justify a psychological approach to economics, which not be able to explain the 
phenomenon itself. If this tendency was an innate behaviour of human beings, we would 
constantly feel the necessity to exchange goods, without any precise goal in mind. 
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These kind of compulsive exchanges may also take place, but are never expressions of 
economic behaviour. 
A consideration of economic value is primary focus of Menger’s contributions. 
Economic exchanges are based on improving the initial conditions of each partner, in 
relation to some sort of commodity. However, it is first required that the parts involved 
are aware of the value of their own commodities. This value is the result of a subjective 
calculation, which takes into account a series of elements such as needs, environment, 
availability of the commodities themselves, etc. Once these elements have been 
evaluated, the agent can proceed on exchanging and bargaining with the counterpart(s). 
The subjective value does not determine the final price, nor the exact quantity of 
commodities the agent might wish to trade in order to obtain a certain quantity of a 
different good. The price finally emerges from the negotiation during which each agent 
aims at maximizing his own utility, intending to avoid falling under the threshold 
representing his minimum gain:  
 
The effort to satisfy their needs as completely as possible is therefore 
the cause of all the phenomena of economic life which we designate 
with the word “exchange”. (Menger 1871/2007, pp. 179-180; italics 
added) 
 
At this stage, in order to define the subjective economic value it is necessary to 
specify the distinction between economic and non-economic goods, and thereby identify 
the defining features of an economic good, particularly given that: 
 
experience […] teaches us that goods of the same kind do not show 
economic character in some places but are economic goods in other 
places, and that goods of the same kind and in the same place attain 
and lose their economic character with changing circumstances. 
(Menger 1871/2007, p. 102) 
 
Goods are needed to satisfying human needs, but only some of them are directly 
available to the agent. In the case goods are unavailable, the agent is motivated to look 
for different economic subjects, who need the commodities they are going to sell and 
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trade the wares necessary to them. At this point, the agent is motivated to exchange, but 
not for psychological reasons as hypothesized by Smith. The scarce availability of 
quantities of a specific good finally determines if it really is an economic good. 
Consequently, changes in the availability of goods imply changes in their status as 
economic or non-economic: 
 
there can be only two kinds of reasons why a non-economic good 
becomes an economic good: an increase in human requirements or a 
diminution of the available quantity. (Menger 1871/2007, p. 102) 
 
Appling atomistic/individualistic methodology to the formation of prices allows 
one to differentiate the different steps of the process, but does not allows one to 
elaborate universally valid economic laws. However, it should be noted that the 
individualistic approach is particularly useful if the socio-economic facts to be 
explained are conceived of as unintended results of intentional human actions. A 
collectivist perspective instead would, at most, be able to provide explanations of the 
unintended outcomes by referring to “macro-agents’ actions”. However, problems 
would inevitably arise, since: i) only individuals act; ii) referring to macro-subjects 
requires utilizing categories that are difficult to define, to which essentialist features 
would be arbitrarily attributed. 
Once the subjective path has been identified a posteriori, the 
isolation/abstraction technique comes into play. Menger outlines a standard and 
simplified definition of an economic agent by assuming a set of hypotheses: i) the 
subject’s rationality, consisting in their ability to maximize their own utility, i.e. their 
awareness of how to improve their initial conditions; ii) the information held by the 
agents themselves; iii) the lack of any kind of coercion. In “real life”, these conditions 
are hardly observable, but Menger consciously treats them as results of the abstraction 
technique. On this basis, he formulated the principle of marginal utility (though he 
never employed this term), affirming that:  
 
[…] the satisfaction of any one specific need has, up to a certain 
degree of completeness, relatively the highest importance, and that 
further satisfaction has a progressively smaller importance, until 
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eventually a stage is reached at which a more complete satisfaction of 
that particular need is a matter of indifference. Ultimately a stage 
occurs at which every act having the external appearance of a 
satisfaction of this need not only has no further importance to the 
consumer but is rather a burden and a pain. (Menger 1871/2007, p. 
125) 
 
Menger’s theory has been often defined the “Robinson Crusoe’s theory” (Nozick 
1977), emphasizing how the economic agent is seen as an isolated subject, acting in a 
very simplified and therefore unrealistic context, whose relationships and interactions 
with others are extremely limited. In fact, the economist himself uses this paradigmatic 
figure as a model for describing his theory. Nevertheless, I believe that Menger is fully 
aware of the theoretical level of his explicative proposal. Moreover, he does not 
describe reality as it is at all, neither he is interested in doing that. He begins with the 
observation of an economic phenomenon, aiming at obtaining universal laws through 
the application of precise procedures. 
 
2.4.2 Method Applied II: Money  
 
The elaboration of an original theory of money represents the Menger’s second pivotal 
economic contribution. He particularly concentrates on this theme in the 1890s, even 
though references to the theme are already present in both of his early works. In the 
current subsection, I particularly refer to the article “On the Origins of Money” (1892) 
and the Chapter “The Theory of Money” as they appear in the second Grundsätze’s 
edition edited by Menger’s son, Karl, in 1923.  
Menger’s initial examination of the phenomenon of money considers three 
different aspects, namely its origins, its function and its nature. His aim is to overcome 
the still widespread conventionalist interpretation, which presupposes the pragmatic 
origin of money (by law or convention), and consequently to provide a more convincing 
explanation. Contrary to the conventionalist perspective, defended by several eminent 
philosophers such as Aristotle, Plato and Medieval thinkers, Menger especially stresses 
that money is, at its very origins, a social institution, that was spontaneously introduced 
by economic agents at a certain time, in order to avoid a specific series of difficulties 
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that arose from economic exchanges. Menger never rejects the role of the state(s) in the 
regulation of the phenomenon of money, but he firmly maintains it to be only a later 
step of the process:  
 
Money has not been generated by law. In its origin it is a social, and 
not a state institution. Sanction by the authority of the state is a notion 
alien to it. On the other hand, however, by state recognition and state 
regulation, this social institution of money has been perfected and 
adjusted to the manifold and varying needs of an evolving commerce, 
just as customary rights have been perfected and adjusted by statute 
law. (Menger 1982/2009, p. 51). 
 
In order to support his thesis, he once again applies the methodology employed for the 
analysis of prices and value, attempting to deconstruct the phenomenon of money into 
its simplest and most elementary aspects, establish the initial conditions of commodity 
exchange, and identify the exact moment when the introduction of money becomes 
necessary for economic activities.  
This initial analysis immediately suggests a few critical considerations. It seems, 
in fact, fully unjustified to identify Menger as a conservative thinker, deeply indebted to 
the classical and Medieval philosophy, in particular to the Aristotelian tradition (cf. 
Kauder 1958, Smith 1990, Campagnolo 2010). In this regard, I especially emphasize 
not only that Menger rejected the idea of money as the result of mutual agreements, but 
also the essentialist interpretation of the phenomenon itself (this second item will be 
discussed in greater detail later). Nevertheless, the Austrian economist did not develop 
his theory of money in full isolation. In particular, a decisive contribution was 
undoubtedly provided by the German jurist Friedrich von Savigny
24
, whose reflections 
in Das Obligationenrecht als Theil des heutigen römischen Rechts (1853, § 40) are 
explicitly recalled by Menger. Savigny is concerned with that (inexplicable) economic 
phenomenon, according to which some commodities are destined to be medium of 
exchanges (Tauschmedien), regardless of the concrete forms they assume within 
specific contexts (coins, salt, tea, etc.).  
                                                          
24
 For a detailed analysis of the relationship between Menger and the German Historical School of Law, 
see Chapter 4. 
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We have addresses the origin of money so far, underlining that as a social 
institution it represents a further example of unintended results of intentional human 
actions. According to Menger’s reconstruction, only a restricted number of economic 
agents had the insight of introducing money as medium of exchange at the beginning, 
i.e. a useless commodity in itself, but which could allow them to exchange other objects 
at different times. Only at a later stage, coins were systematically and diffusely 
employed for economic activities. In such context, practice and habit would have 
evidently played a crucial role. Whereas the first subjects acted according to a conscious 
means-ends calculation, the others actually acted by imitation, and therefore not 
rationally (even though not properly “irrationally”).  
However, the recognition that the function of money actually consists in 
working as medium of exchange is not enough in Menger’s view. The challenge is to 
understand why money, and not a different commodity, was chosen for this task. In 
order to answer to this question, Menger reduces the theory of money to the so-called 
“theory of saleableness (Absatzfähigkeit) of goods”, according to which some wares 
are easier to exchange than others. Therefore, the function of money turns out to be 
strictly interwoven with its nature, which is not to be interpreted in an essentialist 
way
25, but as the whole set of money’s features, which are recognized as the following:  
 
i) great adaptability; 
ii) great divisibility;  
iii) unlimited durability; 
iv) easy preservation; 
v) unlimited saleableness in space and time; 
vi) easy transportability. 
 
These peculiar traits spontaneously made money a privileged commodity. However, a 
further characteristic is to be taken into consideration, its recognisability. This feature 
determines its transformation from a social institution to a state institution. By coining 
money, the state finally controls and regulates its circulation.  
                                                          
25
 An example of essentialist interpretation is provided by Knies (1858), who maintains that money has an 
intrinsic special value, not dependant on its degree of saleableness.  
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 Let it be noted that whereas the inquiry on the origin of money is strictly related 
to the general problem of the kind of explanations employed in the social sciences, the 
analysis of the function and nature of money are specifically economic-oriented. 
 The atomistic method implies a theoretical reduction from the complex 
phenomenon of money to the very first initial phases of the economic exchanges, 
identifying the intentional actions of individuals generating the phenomenon, which 
however spontaneously develops and broadens, finally becoming an institutionalised 
fact. Different from how he addressed prices and value, Menger does not apply the 
isolation or abstraction to the analysis of money. He simply elaborates an alternative 
explanation of the origin and diffusion of a very special commodity, not looking for a 
law.  
It is worth noting that the Menger’s theoretical approach to the investigation of 
economic phenomena does not exclude the employment of the historical discipline as a 
supplemental tool. His reconstructions are in fact based on: i) an individualistic 
perspective (complex socio-economic facts are explicable in terms of individuals and 
their actions); ii) abstraction, that allows for artificially simplifying a precise 
phenomenon in order to formulate general laws; iii) the description of historical 
conditions in which those phenomena emerged.  
 
 
2.5 Menger’s Ontological Commitments 
As previously emerged, explanation is not merely a matter of prediction, but of 
comprehension (Verständnis) according to Menger, which consists in identifying the 
micro-level causal relations leading to macro-level economic phenomena. This 
perspective generated a rift between him and other Austrian economists.  
For example, Schumpeter embraces a genuine instrumentalist perspective, 
according to which economic statements are not aimed at affirming anything about facts 
and reality. Pure theory is therefore just a tool that allows us to control phenomena in 
view of our goals. Only what is useful for reaching given scopes has to be introduced in 
the theory, evidently leaving aside any ontological commitment. Even discussions 
regarding the most appropriate methodology to be employed are absolutely trivial in his 
view (cf. Schumpeter 1908/2010 and 1909). Similarly, Hayek claims that «[a]ll that the 
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theory of the social sciences attempts is to provide a technique of reasoning which 
assists us in connecting individual facts, but which, like logic or mathematics, is not 
about the facts. It can, therefore, […] never be verified or falsified by reference to facts» 
(Hayek 1948, p. 73). In Hayek’s perspective, explanation and prediction are the same 
and nothing more is expected (Hayek 1955, p. 215n). 
I believe that the perspectives of Schumpeter and Hayek represent clear examples of 
anti-realist and anti-essentialist approaches within the Austrian environment.  
 Conversely, Mises embraces a different perspective. Referring to praxeology, 
i.e. his theory of action at the basis of economic investigations, he explicitly claims the 
discipline of economics to convey «exact and precise knowledge of real things». He 
also adds that «the end of science is to know reality» (Mises 1949, p. 39 and p. 63). 
Mises defends positions which would be hardly held by the previous authors, 
recognizing for instance that «[a] collective whole is a particular aspect of the actions of 
various individuals and as such a real thing determining the course of events» (Mises 
1949, p. 43; italics added). In Mises’ case, there is indeed an evident contrast between 
the aprioristic and deductive perspective he defends, as well as his constant references 
to the actual existence of theories’ entities. Nevertheless, he remains firmly convinced 
that social entities are not to be conceived as elements arbitrarily introduced in theories 
for practical reasons. 
From the relevant divergences between these authors, there inevitably follows 
the impossibility to take seriously the trivial interpretations that treat the “Austrian 
School” as a monolithic tradition, both from a scientific and a philosophical viewpoint. 
It is undoubtedly a matter of fact that Austrian scholars basically share an individualistic 
approach, but that individualistic element is differently articulated among them, not 
only in regard to methodological and theoretical matters, but also to ontological items 
and other philosophical implications. 
This scenario should contribute to a more complete comprehension of Menger’s 
precise position on ontological commitments, which at a first glance could be conceived 
as a middle point between Schumpeter-Hayek and Mises. However, several ambiguous 
issues are still present. Menger declares intent to discover the very «nature» (Wesen) of 
economic phenomena. Such an explicit purpose has led a number of scholars (like 
Kauder 1958, Mäki 1990a,b and 1997, Smith 1990, Campagnolo 2010) to read 
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Menger’s perspective as typically essentialist. In opposition to them, I firmly retain that 
German terms such as «Wesen» and «wesentlich», which are commonly translated 
respectively as «essence» and «essential», assume a more complex meaning, which 
requires deeper investigation.  
In Menger’s view, “essential” are for instance those relationships between 
phenomena which can be described as typical, i.e. relationships that show a certain 
regularity. As previously seen, he is completely aware that those regular events can be 
identified only through “artificial” atomistic and isolation techniques. This aspect 
clearly emerges, among others, from investigations on the alleged egoistic behaviour of 
human beings, which is exemplified by the search for personal utility maximization. 
However, at a closer analysis Menger recognizes human beings to be constantly 
influenced by errors, ignorance and external constraints. Methodological procedures 
allow one to characterize a standard for human behaviour. This simplification is 
therefore instrumental, not descriptive. Whether phenomena and their mutual 
relationships are real is not a crucial point for theoretical inquiry. The essential features 
discussed by Menger are not to be read as either hidden metaphysical features or real 
features of the world. To this regard, he clearly affirms that the «[e]xact science does 
not examine the regularities in the succession of real phenomena either. It examines, 
rather, how more complicated phenomena develop from the simplest, in part even 
unempirical elements of the real world in their (likewise unempirical) isolation from all 
other influences […]» (Menger 1883/1986, p. 61; original italics). 
 It must be admitted that Menger also makes statements, like the following two, 
which add credence to an essentialist interpretation: 
 
The purpose of the theoretical sciences is understanding of the real 
world, knowledge of it extending beyond immediate experience, and 
control of it. (Menger 1883/1985, p. 55; italics added) 
 
The theoretical sciences are […] supposed to teach us the types (the 
empirical forms) and the typical relationships (the laws) of 
phenomena. By this they are to provide us with theoretical 
understanding, a cognition going beyond immediate experience, and, 
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wherever we have the conditions of a phenomenon within our control, 
control over it. (Menger 1883/1985, p. 56; italics added) 
 
How can we reconcile Menger’s apparently contrasting statements? I suggest 
that we can interpret “the real world” he is talking about as the whole of observable 
phenomena to be explained. «Going beyond immediate experience» would not mean 
grasping alleged hidden essences of the phenomena themselves, but simply to pinpoint 
causal relationships that emerge through observation and methodological investigation 
techniques. Causal relationships are not essential relationships, because they are 
partially due to arbitrary decisions. In this direction, further quotations can be 
considered:  
 
We understand phenomena by means of theories as we become aware 
of them in each concrete case merely as exemplifications of a general 
regularity. (Menger 1883/1985, pp. 55-56) 
 
Whether the individual constitutive factors of human phenomena, 
thought of in their isolation, are real; whether these can in reality be 
measured exactly; whether those complications, in the case of which 
(according to the nature of exact research) an abstraction must be 
made from the effect of a variety of factors of real human life, actually 
put in an appearance-all this is no less irrelevant for the exact 
orientation of theoretical research in the realm of social phenomena 
than in the realm of nature. (Menger 1883/1986, p. 62; italics added) 
 
As I have illustrated earlier, the exact orientation of the theoretical research 
represents the crucial moment in Menger’s scientific investigations. The second passage 
in particular suggests that whether entities postulated within the theories are real or not, 
whether they exist or not, is irrelevant. I think that in Menger’s perspective what exists 
is not important, but rather what is observable. For the same reason, he also rejects any 
reference to psychological motivations in explaining economic phenomena. 
Psychological factors may also play a role, but scientists should only consider what is 
effectively observable in order to provide material for theoretical analysis. 
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A further objection to the essentialist reading, primarily advanced by Milford 
(1990), correctly emphasizes that it is inappropriate to consider someone an essentialist 
who, like Menger, fully rejects the idea that the value of commodities is an intrinsic 
property. He originally conceives of it as the result of a complex relation, as has been 
argued in detail in Section 2.4.1.  
Among those that interpret Menger as an essentialist, or realist, I believe Uskali 
Mäki (1990a,b and 1997) has provided the strongest and most convincing arguments. 
Menger’s position represents a version of Aristotelian immanent realism26 for Mäki. 
Exact types (or empirical forms) coincide with economic universals, i.e. with features 
(properties, kinds, relations), shared by a variety of particular economic objects. Mäki 
suggests two examples. In the first, he considers the homo oeconomicus paradigm 
outlined by Menger, interpreting it as a complex universal (in turn composed of other 
universals like self-interest, maximizing and perfect information). He reads the homo 
oeconomicus not as an independent universal, but rather as a trait that coexists with 
other universal traits within single individuals. As a second example he addresses the 
“economic price”. In Mäki’s view, the economical price represents a common feature of 
specific real prices and cannot exist independently from other features that characterize 
prices themselves. In order to further support his thesis, Mäki compares Menger’s and 
Max Weber’s positions, especially emphasizing the fact that Weber does not describe 
his ideal types as universals, but as conceptual constructions, thus contrasting the 
Austrian economist’s perspective. Therefore, according to Mäki, the very goal of 
Menger’s exact research would consist in studying economic universals. 
I intend to critically discuss more than one aspect of Mäki’s analysis. It is correct 
to recognize that in Menger’s view, explanation is not exhausted by predictions of 
future events, as we instead see in instrumentalist approaches à la Schumpeter. 
However, accepting this interpretation does not necessarily mean admitting that types 
(empirical forms) are universals; and, even though they were interpreted as universals, it 
would be wrong to claim that these entities are “real” in Menger’s view. 
                                                          
26
 Let it be noted that most Aristotelian interpretations of Menger’s work (including Mäki’s) insist on the 
centrality of Aristotle’s works within the Austrian academy of those years. I maintain this argument is 
weak. Menger seldom quotes Aristotle except when criticizing his positions, for instance when the Greek 
philosopher defends a conventionalist explanation of the origin of money. As will be shown in Chapter 4, 
seeing as Menger was a jurist, other authors certainly play a more significant role in his education than 
Aristotle.  
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Types are conceived of as abstractions of concrete (i.e. observable) phenomena, 
attempting to capture their common features and their typical mutual relations. If 
Menger tries to pinpoint the lowest common denominator among phenomena of the 
same kind (regardless of their specific contextual conditions), he is also conscious of the 
arbitrary character of the formulation of his “working hypotheses”. Similarly, Menger 
maintains that a concrete phenomenon can never coincide with an “ideal” one as treated 
in the theory.  
Let’s consider Mäki’s examples again. At this stage, it is possible to recognize 
that Menger does not maintain homo oeconomicus, a subject that maximizes its own 
utility function, exists in reality as such. Mäki would agree. However, in opposition to 
Mäki’s opinion, Menger does not imply it characterize individuals either. In concrete 
situations: individuals could act according to the homo oeconomicus standard (even 
though it is quite implausible); they could act by partially following that standard; they 
could not follow it at all. Indeed, the homo oeconomicus paradigm is not a common trait 
(immanent universal) of individuals, but a plausible hypothesis partially obtained by 
observing and partially by outlining an ideal situation. Even crucial aspects influencing 
actions must be arbitrarily left aside, in order to avoid the exponential increase of the 
number of variables at stake. 
Similarly, economic prices are not conceived of as existing independent entities 
or as constitutive parts of the real prices. Economic prices are instead reference prices, 
which coincide with real ones only if the hypothesized conditions are verified. In the 
complex social realm, economic prices cannot be pinpointed, but rather represent ideal 
benchmarks for analysing the evolution of real prices. 
If Menger’s types are not universals, the thesis that the goal of exact research is 
the knowledge of universals consequently fails. However, a question arises: Is it 
possible to reconcile Menger’s attempt to overcome the appearance of economic 
phenomena with the partially arbitrary strategy he actually employs? What is the real 
meaning of comprehension (not knowledge)? I believe that a useful suggestion is 
provided by Menger himself:  
 
The investigation of types and of typical relationships of phenomena 
is of really immeasurable significance for human life, of no less 
significance than the cognition of concrete phenomena. Without the 
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knowledge of empirical forms we would not be able to comprehend 
the myriads of phenomena surrounding us, nor to classify them in our 
minds; […] (Menger 1883/1985, p. 36; italics added) 
 
Deeper comprehension of any given phenomenon would therefore mean 
classifying it through types and exact laws, i.e. to the ideal evolution of the phenomenon 
itself. Were this hypothesis correct, it would be possible to contemporarily accept: i) the 
arbitrary features within Menger’s system; ii) his attempt to create a methodology that 
looks beyond mere predictions; and iii) the rejection of any form of realism and 
essentialism.  
The following schema summarizes both the main arguments of the 
realist/essentialist interpretation and their respective criticisms: 
 
 
Menger’s ontological commitments 
 
 
Essentialist/realist theses 
 
Anti-essentialist/anti-realist theses 
 
 
Ontological individualism: only 
individuals and their actions exist. 
 
 
Methodological individualism coincides 
with the atomistic technique.  
 
Employment of terms like Wesen, 
wesentlich. 
 
 
Both Germans terms actually assume a 
more complex meaning. Translations can 
be misleading. 
 
 
Essences of economic phenomena are 
looked for. 
 
 
Counterexamples are identifiable. For 
instance, value is not an essential property 
of commodities, but it is conceived of as 
the result of a relationship. 
 
 
Types and typical relationships are real 
(economic) universals. 
 
 
Types and typical relationships are results 
of observation, abstraction and arbitrary 
decisions. 
 
Immanent (Aristotelian) realism is 
defended. 
 
 
Types and typical relationships are 
abstractions, not universals shared by 
particular economic objects and 
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phenomena.  
 
 
Figure 2.4: Essentialist and anti-essentialist arguments. 
 
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this Chapter I aimed at providing a re-examination of Menger’s scientific 
contributions by addressing specific themes.  
The first critical analysis regarded the characterization of the individualistic 
perspective of the economist. I argued that Menger’s methodological individualism 
excludes any kind of ontological commitment and moral assumption. Although he never 
uses the expression “methodological individualism”, he undoubtedly introduces this 
innovative methodological approach, which in his view is intimately linked to the 
recognition that the socio-economic facts to be explained are actually manifestations of 
unintended outcomes. The individualistic theory is the only plausible approach for 
Menger, if the phenomena at stake are not “pragmatically” generated by human beings’ 
will. Moreover, the individualistic or atomistic technique is evidently an aspect of the 
general methodology employed by Menger, who also conceives an abstractive 
component. Taken together, the two concepts constitute the methodological strategy of 
the Austrian economist. At this stage, we can also identify the kind of methodological 
individualism employed. Referring to the framework in Chapter 1, we can now describe 
it as a second degree methodological individualism. In order to develop his own 
theories about prices, value and money, Menger utilizes a simplified context, where 
subjects of the theories are considered individuals and their very basic actions and 
mutual relationships.  
 The second purpose of my inquiry is the reconstruction of Menger’s perspective 
with reference to specific epistemological topics. By strictly referring to his two main 
works, I outlined his position on the so-called “demarcation problem”, and then tried to 
single out the exact theory of explanation assumed in his research. From both analyses, 
Menger’s intent to decisively reject metaphysical considerations emerges, aiming 
instead at a scientific treatment of economics and social sciences. His methodological 
contribution, together with his innovative economic results, are proof of the significant 
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role Menger played within the cultural context of 19
th
 century. He was one of the first 
scholars to really comprehend the necessity of joining the economic and methodological 
aspects of research. 
 Finally, I considered interpretations of Menger’s ontological commitment. The 
reason why I decided to direct my attention to this topic consisted in the fact that the 
position of the Austrian economist is usually described by the mainstream as a 
metaphysical and essentialist, defending the thesis that Menger was a traditional and 
conservative thinker. However, this position results as completely in opposition with the 
scientific approach to socio-economic facts that he actually inaugurated. Basing the 
review on Menger’s texts, I rebutted the strongest theses of the conservation 
interpretation of Menger, primarily defended by Mäki. What emerges is an original 
description of Menger as an innovator in his research field. 
 Reconstructing Menger’s thought was not easy. He worked at a time when 
concepts and categories for the social sciences were far from fully established. 
Nevertheless, a careful reading of his major and minor writings, a scrupulous 
comparison of passages which seemed to be contradictory and incoherent, a reference to 
theoretical frameworks, and the avoidance of privileged interpretations, finally allowed 
for a complete and articulated reconsideration of this pivotal figure in the history of 
economic thought.  
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3. Rethinking the Psychological Interpretations of Menger’s Approach 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the current Chapter I will examine some of the psychological interpretations of Carl 
Menger’s theories, which was somewhat successful in critical literature. Apparently, his 
subjective economic perspective and individualistic methodological approach could 
justify the hypothesis that Menger himself wished to provide a psychological foundation 
for his own theories. Authors like Barry Smith (1986, 1994), Reinhard Fabian and Peter 
M. Simons (1986) even suggest a direct connection between the Austrian School of 
economics and the Austrian psychological tradition (inaugurated in the same period by 
Franz Brentano and his colleagues). As we will see later, readings like this one are 
undoubtedly fascinating, yet remain questionable.  
I am not specifically interested in identifying potential influences between these 
scientific research fields (if any).My actual purpose is rather to comprehend whether, 
and to what extent, Menger in effect needed, and consequently introduced, 
psychological elements to his system.  
In order to provide an exhaustive analysis of this topic, I will structure this 
Chapter as follows: i) I will reconstruct the main psychological schools in the second 
half of 19
th
 century within the German-speaking environment, focusing on the key 
issues that psychology scholars initially tackled and the (contrasting) solutions they 
advanced (Section 3.2). I will also clarify how these first psychologists actually 
employed terms like «psychological», «psychic», «mental»; which meanings they 
attributed to them; whether they referred to different kinds of facts and events; or if they 
used these labels as synonymous. This specification will be helpful when considering 
any potential relationship between Menger’s and his contemporary psychologists’ 
research (Section 3.2.1); ii) I will then present the most popular views embraced by 
defenders of the psychological reading of Menger’s work (Section 3.3); I will compare 
Menger’s perspectives with Brentano’s and Wundt’s, discussing whether similarities 
exist between their respective approaches (concerning both contents and methods) and 
whether the psychological interpretations of Menger’s work are justified. In this regard, 
I will also address unpublished material from Menger’s Archive (Sections 3.3.1 and 
62 
 
3.3.2); iii) finally, I will discuss two epistemological models from psychology, cognitive 
and behavioural models, examining whether Menger’s perspective fits one of these 
models (Section 3.4). At this stage, it will be possible to provide an original and 
convincing interpretation of Menger’s real purposes, conclusively dismissing each 
version of the widespread psychological reading (Section 3.5). 
 
 
3.2 19
th
 Century Psychological Traditions: Contextualization 
 
In the second half of the 19
th
 century, political economics, and also psychology, were 
attempting to establish themselves as independent scientific research disciplines. 
Similarly to economics scholars
27
, early psychology scholars basically shared a 
philosophical background. At least at the beginning, the new discipline was conceived 
of as a branch of philosophy itself. It is worth noting that the first serious attempts to 
emancipate the field took place in the German-speaking context. 
The German scholar Wilhelm W. Wundt (1832-1920) was one of these initial 
pioneers. Wundt wrote the first systematic work of modern scientific psychology, the 
Grundzüge der physiologishen Psychologie (first edition in 1873-74), and also 
developed an innovative experimental methodology specifically addressed to 
psychological research. However, we must keep in mind that Wundt’s scientific 
production was particularly broad, and often internally incoherent. It is therefore 
difficult to provide a general overview of his position. Yet a few basic aspects can be 
outlined.  
According to Wundt, inner phenomena that are immediately perceived at the 
conscious level are psychology’s research objects. His view conveys materialistic 
influences, since he maintains that psychic events can be exclusively explained by their 
corresponding physiological input and stimuli. Access to the psychic realm is therefore 
only guaranteed by experience, which constitutes the genuine empirical aspect of the 
psychological investigation. Metaphysical concepts should be completely abandoned for 
describing human mental activities. It is obvious that such a perspective also entails the 
defence of mind-body dualism.  
                                                          
27
 On the steps that brought political economy to become an autonomous discipline, see Chapter 4.  
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As mentioned above, Wundt’s most original contribution is the introduction and 
elaboration of an experimental methodology for the investigation of psychic events, 
intending to identify the laws governing the relationships between these events. To this 
aim, he developed an analytical procedure that intended to deconstruct consciousness 
into its essential and indivisible components. This is the reason why his psychology is 
also defined «Elementenpsychologie» (psychology of elements). In critical literature on 
Wundt, the role that «introspection» plays in his experimental investigations remains 
controversial. On the one hand, he explicitly rejects it as an inadequate tool for scientific 
research, as introspection inevitably implies reflection and therefore a willing act, which 
cannot be conceived of as the proper object of psychological research. On the other, he 
actually employs introspection, in the sense of self-observation.  
In the same period, the Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano (1838-1719) 
developed act psychology, publishing his significant work, Psychologie vom 
empirischen Standpunkt in 1874. He certainly shares a series of concepts with Wundt. 
Both assume an individualistic perspective and aim at transforming psychology into an 
empirical discipline through the introduction of a rigorous and exact method. However, 
Brentano took a very different path, as opposed to Wundt, he distinguished between the 
«mental» level, which is constituted by acts, and the «physical» one, which differently 
refers to states. In doing so, he breaks away from mind-body dualism, given that he 
described psychic events as totally independent from the physical ones and, therefore, 
not determined by them. In Brentano’s view, empirical psychology is meant to describe 
the mental acts that address physical objects, not perceived objects provided by senses 
and perceptions:  
 
The common feature of everything psychological […] consists in a 
relation that we bear to an object. The relation has been called 
intentional; it is a relation to something which may not be actual but 
which is presented as an object. (Brentano 1889/1969, p. 14; italics 
added) 
 
Within such a perspective, intentionality inevitably becomes the pivotal concept. 
In order to investigate intentionality, Brentano bases his approach on the idea that 
consciousness can only be described from the first-person. The description is the proper 
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task of what he defined descriptive psychology
28
. It is worth emphasizing that in 
Brentano’s view there is no contradiction between first-person observation and 
empirical research.  
The distinction between psychic and physical facts also drives Brentano to 
elaborate a specific vocabulary for the new discipline, and this represents a further merit 
of his contribution to the field. However, it must be recognized that, in the short term at 
least, Brentano’s perspective had a more modest success than Wundt’s, whose 
renowned experimental laboratory became a worldwide standard of excellence for 19
th
 
century scholars. In the long term instead, Brentano’s concepts and perspectives 
constituted a significant body of work to draw on for the authors who would later 
develop innovative trends in the history of psychology. We find this in 
Gestaltpsychologie and functionalism, both arising from the clear rejection of the 
elementalism introduced by Wundt. 
 
 
3.2.1 Meanings and Uses of “Psychological”, “Psychic” and “Mind” 
 
Before exploring the similarities and divergences between Menger and his 
contemporaries Brentano and Wundt in detail, a preliminary reflection on the meanings 
and uses of terms like «psychological», «psychic», and «mental» is required. Are these 
expressions employed in a synonymous manner in the literature, or do they mean 
distinct aspects of psychological investigation?  
 Brentano and Wundt most frequently use the expression «psychological» 
(psychologish in German) to refer to the empirical research field that addressed 
«psychic» (psychisch) phenomena. As emerged previously, both of them aim at 
investigating human beings’ inner activities, maintaining this phenomena to be 
intrinsically different from physical phenomena. Despite this, they had distinct ideas on 
what properly characterizes an empirically conceived psychic fact. Brentano states that 
intentionality (i.e. the conscious internal act towards an object) that defines psychic 
                                                          
28
 Brentano distinguishes between descriptive psychology and genetic psychology, where the latter is 
maintained to study psychological phenomena from a third-person standpoint, also involving empirical 
experiments. Therefore, descriptive psychology does not properly fit with the contemporary scientific 
standards of psychological investigations.  
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phenomena. Wundt instead identifies psychic facts as immediate perceptions at the 
conscious level, deriving from external stimuli. The concept of consciousness is pivotal 
for both of them, however differently interpreted. Nevertheless, the way in which 
Brentano and Wundt employ «psychological» and «psychic» is basically the same. With 
the first term they identify a precise empirical research field, and with the second one 
they mean to characterize phenomena that are different from physical phenomena.  
The word «mental» (whose literal translation into German is geistig) provides a 
different situation, referring to a spiritual or metaphysical sphere in German. It is most 
likely that this is the reason that early German-speaking psychologists avoid using that 
term in their texts. Their intent is to clearly demarcate the new scientific and empirical 
course for psychology, no longer coincides with the study of the soul. Different from 
German, the meaning of «mental» in languages like English and Italian is less subject to 
misunderstandings.  
With regard to Menger, my attention is especially addressed to his three main 
works: Grundsätze, Untersuchungen and Irrthümer des Historismus. Within these 
works, he usually employs «psychology» and «psychological»; he never uses «mental» 
(geisting); and just once, in the Untersuchungen, he uses «psychic». However, even the 
occurrences of «psychological» are sporadic. In his methodological works it is possible 
to single out a pair of interesting passages in this regard. Menger opposes Gustav 
Schmoller’s idea that «the science of political economy also investigate the 
‘psychological and ethical causes...systematically in their significance for economy’ 
along with the ‘technical-natural’ causes»29 (Menger 1883/1985, pp. 75ff; original 
italics). Menger argues that there is no real contrast between these two sets of causes, 
since: 
 
[h]uman needs and the resulting desire to satisfy them, in any case by 
far the most important factors of the human sciences, are e.g., 
certainly just as much natural causes of economic phenomena as they 
are psychological ones. (Ibid.) 
 
                                                          
29
 Menger is referring to Schmoller’s Über einige Grundfragen des Rechts und der Volkswirthschaft 
(1875, p. 42f). 
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Let us now consider the single occurrence of the term «psychic». This time 
Menger explicitly separates the research fields that investigate socio-economic 
phenomena and mental events. Both are still considered empirical domains, which 
address distinct objects. If any connection between the two areas is possible, it is not 
specified here: 
 
The “laws of phenomena” (in contrast to normative laws!) can be 
classified according to the empirical realm to which they refer 
(according to objects!) or else according to their formal nature. In the 
first connection we distinguish laws of nature in general and of 
inorganic and organic nature in particular, laws of psychic life, laws of 
social phenomena in general and of economic phenomena in 
particular, etc. (Menger 1883/1985, p. 201; italics added). 
 
 In the following, I compare Menger’s approach to Brentano’s and Wundt’s. On 
the basis of the terminological analysis just sketched, I employ the expression 
«psychological» for general references to the empirical research field, whereas I use 
«psychic» and «mental» as synonymous when considering the specific kind of facts and 
processes that early psychologists aimed at explaining. 
 
 
3.3 A Critical Inquiry: Does Menger Really Use Psychological Motivations in his 
Theory? 
 
Scholars that defend a psychological reading of Menger’s work elaborate arguments 
that are significantly different from one another. I will sketch the most frequent. 
The first popular set of theories calls the notion of “value”’ into play. 
Interpretations that suggest that the two Austrian Schools had a parallel course of 
development usually insist on the fact that, for both of them, a good’s value is the result 
of a subjective process and does not correspond to an intrinsic quality of the commodity 
itself. This general assertion is not called into question. The issue consists in clarifying 
what the economic and psychological traditions meant by referring to “subjective 
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processes”. Let us take Grassl’s analysis into account, in which «value» is a product of 
emotions for Austrian economists, corresponding to «a relationship between a state of 
consciousness and an object in the world» (Grassl 1986, p. 150). It is suggested here 
that actions are driven by mental intents, and that economic subjects are intentionally 
oriented towards external objects. However, Menger’s perspective is much more 
complex, as in his view value certainly involves calculation on the part of the subject, 
yet this process originates from environmental aspects and therefore must also consider 
inter-subject relations. Whether, and to what extent, the «mental» actually does play a 
role for Menger is questionable. 
 Alternately, one could motivate a psychological interpretation by referring to 
feelings like pleasure and pain. The search for pleasure and the avoidance of pain can be 
seen as root justifications of human actions. It is not rare to find this sort of explanation 
in subjective economic theory. For instance, the English economist Stanley Jevons built 
his economic theory upon these assumptions. It is quite clear that, in this manner, he 
recognized economic matters as subordinated to the moral field. Menger, however, did 
not know Jevons’ works at the time, and would have completely rejected a similar 
approach as unscientific.  
 A third attempt to psychologically explain the origins of economic actions could 
consist in calling “human nature” into question. Adam Smith in Inquiry, suggests that 
human beings are naturally disposed to economic exchanges. Menger instead indicates 
that if human economic exchanges were actually the expression of an inevitable natural 
propensity, humans would exchange incessantly and this evidently does not happen. 
 The introduction of psychological motivations, however interpreted, represents a 
highly problematic topic for any economic theory. The aim of the following sections is 
to show how Menger treats the issue, and to deconstruct attempts to interpret his work 
as an example of the application of a cognitive approach to economics step by step.  
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3.3.1 Austrian Economics and Austrian Psychology. Menger vs. Brentano 
 
A certain interest in psychological topics is actually present in the work of Menger’s 
two major colleagues, Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk and Friedrich von Wieser. Both 
maintained relationships with Brentano’s most renowned disciples in the Austrian 
academic environment, namely Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932) and Alexius 
Meinong (1853-1920). However, some critics insist in establishing a deeper connection 
between the two groups. Among others, Emil Kauder (1958) argues that both schools 
would have been profoundly influenced by the Aristotelian and Scholastic traditions, 
and that this would explain shared interest in mental human activities. To this regard, 
Kauder repeatedly quotes Böhm-Bawerk and von Wieser, stressing their frequent 
references to the «inner experience of our mind». Nevertheless, their effective recourse 
to psychological justifications is an open matter of discussion, and statements like the 
following evidently make interpretations of this kind partly inconsistent: 
 
This investigation uses the method recently designated as the 
“psychological”. The name is applied because the theory takes its 
point of departure from within, from the mind of the economic man. I 
myself once spoke of economic theory in this sense as applied 
psychology. The designation, however, is not a fortunate one. It may 
lead to the misunderstanding that the “psychological” economic 
theory starts from scientific psychology. This is by no means the case. 
[…] The observations concerning the inner life of man, which our 
“psychological” theory of economics develops, have been made by it 
independently. They are entirely independent of the result which 
scientific psychology might reach with regard to the psychical 
elements, the analysis of which are within its province. […] Economic 
theory would be benefited, had scientific psychology advanced further 
beyond its beginnings; but our discipline does not seek and could not 
find direct aid from this source. The tasks of the two branches of 
knowledge are entirely distinct. (von Wieser 1927, p. 3; italics added) 
 
Current speech regards the concept of need in its most general form. It 
embraces a multitude of meanings that can never be the basis of 
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economic demand. Thus economic theory must fashion a narrower 
concept. It must discriminate the specific need, which leads to 
demand, from all other needs. This refinement requires no more exact 
analysis of the psychological nature of human needs.  
This is the province of scientific psychology. Economic theory has 
only to explain needs in their economic sense. Briefly, they may be 
called economic needs. And even this explanation is sufficient if it 
distinguishes them from the most closely related phenomena. (von 
Wieser 1927, p. 21; italics added) 
 
In the following, I argue that the relationship between Menger and the Austrian 
psychological tradition was weaker than that later claimed by scholars. This could 
depend, in part, on the fact that psychological studies were still developing when the 
Austrian economist started his own research. In particular, I focus on the comparison 
between Menger and Brentano, as they are the founders of their respective scientific 
traditions. To this aim, I will particularly examine three aspects:  
 
i. the effective role of the Aristotelian tradition;  
ii. the meaning that popular notions like subjectivism, intentionality, 
rationality, etc. assume for Menger and Brentano;  
iii. the similarities and differences in their methodological approaches. 
 
The first issue can be addressed quickly. Menger’s position regarding 
Aristotelian philosophy has been already illustrated in Chapter 2. Therefore, it is already 
possible to underline a preliminary distance from Brentano, who bases his entire 
research on traditional studies of the soul. Hence, although Brentano’s intent is to 
provide an empirical foundation for his research, he actually starts with metaphysical 
considerations taken from the Greek tradition. Brentano acquires numerous concepts 
from Aristotle, such as: the threefold partition among presentations, judgments and 
phenomena of love and hate; the distinction between primary goods, which are ends in 
themselves and have a psychic status, and secondary goods, typically external and 
conceived as means; the introduction of the category of pleasure as principle of 
preference; the attribution of a moral meaning to the choice criteria, and so on. (cf. 
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Fabian and Simons 1990, pp. 45 ff.) As we have seen, these aspects are irrelevant for 
Menger, regarding both their purely speculative and ethical character. In spite of some 
primitive notions roughly sketched by Aristotle (for instance, utility, value in use, 
exchange value), we cannot consider the Greek philosopher the common reference for 
Brentano and Menger. Whereas the former constructs his psychological theory by 
reviving Aristotelian philosophical concepts, Menger moves independently from the 
influences of both Ancients and modern philosophers. 
The second issue leads to several critical reflections. As emerged in the previous 
chapters, subjectivism, not to be confused with individualism, plays a pivotal role 
within the economic “marginal turn”. Early psychological studies were contemporarily 
addressing the investigation of subjective (and conscious) mind activity. Nevertheless, 
subjectivism is interpreted differently within those two scientific areas. Menger’s 
subjectivism is strictly connected to the detailed survey of the actual environment in 
which individuals act. This is the reason why I maintain that, in his theory, the actions 
performed by the economic subjects are determined by specific contextual situations. In 
this case, subjectivism is to be conceived as a rational reaction to a set of precise 
inputs. Conversely, in Brentano’s view, mental activities directed towards physical 
objects are primary activities: the internal facts come before the external ones.  
As shown above, intentionality constitutes one of the main concepts of 
Brentano’s psychological theory. Through this concept, he stresses that proper mental 
acts are never unconscious. He justifies this position by arguing that each mental act is 
primarily directed towards an object, but secondarily towards itself. This makes the 
subject conscious of every mental act, even though Brentano himself admits the 
existence of different degrees of intensity of consciousness. Menger’s usage of the 
concept is very different. In his writings, two distinct meanings of the concept are 
identifiable, respectively with reference to: 
 
i. social institutions;  
ii. the decision-making process.  
 
When addressing social institutions the Austrian economist explicitly employs 
terms like «intentionally/intended» or «unintentionally/unintended». More specifically, 
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Menger distinguishes between pragmatic institutions, which are intentional results of a 
common will, and organic institutions, which instead are unintentional consequences of 
intentional human actions. Some further considerations are required. First, the intended 
outcomes are those obtained at a collective level. In this case, people intentionally 
decide to create and develop an institution with specific socio-political targets. On the 
contrary, the emergence of organic institutions is due to a combination of human actions 
derived from different goals. The generation of organic institutions do not depend on 
the intentional behaviours of singular components of the society. Intentional actions of 
single agents do not produce any institutions of this sort. Collective intentionality 
creates pragmatic institutions; conversely, intentional acts, singularly taken, do not 
generate organic institutions. The asymmetry is evident. Menger’s notion of 
intentionality thus appears very different from that employed by Brentano, especially 
when considering its collective character, which rejects any psychological reference.  
As we have seen, another option for interpreting Menger’s notion of 
intentionality exists. This time we have to address the subjective decision-making 
process, through which the economic agent evaluates the pros and cons of the available 
alternatives, and aims at maximizing their own utility function. Given that, in this case, 
Menger does not explicitly use the expressions «intentionality» or «intentional action», 
it is our task to reconstruct how he could have conceived of these concepts here. 
Intentionality could be read as the conscious decision of an economic agent that 
identifies the objects they should get in order to satisfy some specific needs. To clarify 
this issue, we must take two additional related topics into account: the intimate 
relationship between intentionality and (instrumental) rationality; and the discrepancy 
between the ideal standard of human action and the effective performance of 
individuals. 
With reference to the first topic, I offer a preliminary observation. It can be 
easily noted that a rational action is intentional, yet, conversely, an intentional action is 
not necessarily a rational one. Hence, I argue that in Menger’s investigations 
«intentionality» assumes the same meaning of rationality. An intentional action is a 
rational action, where rational holds an instrumentalist meaning. It is not just a matter of 
addressing attention to an object, but rather of obtaining that object through the most 
efficient means. This clearly shows that Menger is not concerned with either the 
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reconstruction of mental processes or the explanation of how the means-ends 
calculation works “internally”, since he exclusively relies on descriptions of external 
(i.e. observable) human performances. In addition, whereas Brentano sustains that all 
individuals act intentionally (consciously), Menger constantly refers to the standard 
behaviour of economic agents. He understands that, in daily life, human behaviours 
never fully coincide with his ideal paradigm of rationality: 
 
Even individuals whose economic activity is conducted rationally, and 
who therefore certainly endeavour to recognize the true importance of 
satisfactions in order to gain an accurate foundation for their economic 
activity, are subject to error. Error is inseparable from all human 
knowledge. (Menger 1871/2007, p. 148) 
 
Discrepancies between Menger’s and Brentano’s views on subjectivism, 
intentionality and rationality are schematically summed up in the table below: 
 
  
Menger 
 
Brentano 
 
Subjectivism 
 
 
Subjects rationally react to a 
set of contextual inputs. 
 
 
Subjects address their 
attention, desires etc. to 
external objects. 
 
Intentionality 
 
An intentional action 
coincides with a rational 
action. 
 
 
The mental act directed at an 
object. It does not properly 
coincides with rationality. 
 
Rationality 
 
Subjective reasoning dually 
intended to: i) identify the 
sufficient goods that need to 
be acquired in order to satisfy 
precise needs; ii) conduct 
pros-cons calculation, through 
which the most efficient 
means to achieve a precise 
goal are established.  
 
An ideal standard behaviour. 
Not investigated from a 
psychological point of view, 
but on the basis of external 
 
Refers to the first-person 
conscious reflection on 
mental acts.  
 
Individuals are actually aware 
of every occurring mental act, 
because every mental act is 
directed towards itself as a 
secondary object. 
 
Investigations are addressed 
to internal activities and aim 
at explaining functioning of 
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observations. 
  
psychic processes. 
Figure 3.1: Menger’s and Brentano’s divergences on subjectivism, intentionality and 
rationality. 
 
 
I will now focus on methodological matters. Both authors attribute a privileged 
function to empirical investigation in their respective research methods, but they 
conceive of the meaning of «empirical» in different ways. As previously sketched, 
Brentano maintains that first-person observation is a direct form of experience and thus 
a genuine empirical tool for investigating mental phenomena. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that he explicitly rejects introspection as an research method for the survey of 
mental phenomena. In fact, Brentano distinguished between inner perception and 
introspection, arguing that only the former is useful for psychological research: 
 
Psychology, like the natural sciences, has its basis in perception and 
experience. Above all, however, its source is to be found in the inner 
perception of our own mental phenomena. […] Note, however, that 
we said that inner perception [Wahrnehmung] and not introspection, 
i.e. inner observation [Beobachtung], constitutes this primary and 
essential source of psychology. (Brentano 1874/1973, p. 29; original 
italics) 
 
According to Brentano, introspection and inner observation are similar. The 
reason for rejecting their use in the psychological field is that observation can properly 
be addressed only to external objects. The observer is in fact able to direct his full 
attention to external objects. them. On the contrary, this cannot happen for objects of 
inner perception. The observer cannot focus on a mental phenomenon at the exact 
moment it occurs, but only at a later stage and independently from their own will, when 
it has already disappeared or diminished: 
 
It is a universally valid psychological law that we can never focus our 
attention upon the object of inner perception. […] It is only while our 
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attention is turned toward a different object that we are able to 
perceive, incidentally, the mental processes which are directed toward 
that object. (Brentano 1874/1973, p. 30; original italics) 
 
Therefore, Brentano’s psychological method is «empirical to the extent that it 
refers to a direct inner experience. Nevertheless, the meaning of «empirical” here is 
particularly weak, for at least two reasons:  
 
i. Brentano acknowledges the impossibility of real observation of mental 
phenomena; 
ii. Inner perception ultimately consists in first-person description 
(descriptive psychology). 
 
The philosopher places psychology and natural sciences on the same level, 
stressing the fact that both are based on “perception and experience”. However, it 
appears quite evident that his explanations present serious limitations.  
In Chapter 2, we broadly discussed Menger’s methodological procedure. In the 
current section, I will just recall two aspects, aimed at establishing the actual boundaries 
between him and Brentano, with particular reference to the role of observation and, 
consequently, to the meaning attributed to the notion of «empirical». In Menger’s 
perspective, observation constitutes the starting point for socio-economic investigations 
with reference to the empirical or realistic orientation of the research. The observation 
of the social realm allows one to capture regularities in socio-economic phenomena. 
However, these regularities are not universally valid, since they refer simply to 
concrete, and therefore not abstract, facts. According to Menger, observation is a third-
person activity that allows one to select the phenomena to be investigated. Without 
observation, no scientific research is possible. In Untersuchungen, Menger clearly 
claims that «the observation of the singular phenomena of human economy […] is 
indispensable. […] Without the observation of the singular phenomena of the human 
activity we cannot image a theory of them at all» (Menger 1883/1985, p. 117; original 
italics). As emerged earlier, empirical observation alone is not enough, if ones’ aim is to 
treat political economics scientifically. Nevertheless, the meaning and role of 
observation in Menger’s perspective is crucial and evidently divergent from Brentano’s.  
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On the basis of these remarks, the reason why Menger decides not to introduce 
psychological motivations into the explanation of economic human actions is more 
comprehensible. Psychological phenomena and processes are not observable from a 
third-person perspective. Therefore, there is no place for these elements in his scientific 
system. I hold that Menger would not a priori exclude the useful contribution that 
psychological discoveries could provide to the economic field in the future, even taking 
the subjective turn he sustains into account. Nevertheless, in developing a rigorous 
method for economic research, he fully rejects any recourse to non-observable elements, 
including mental phenomena and events. If political economy is to be treated as a 
scientific discipline, only direct shared observation and experience can legitimately 
produce research data. Therefore, even when Menger explicitly refers to “psychological 
motivations” (actually, on just a pair of occasions), he does not intend to reduce the 
explanation of economic phenomena to the explanation of psychological facts.  
Menger’s meaning of «empirical» follows from the previous analysis. However, 
trouble arises, since he alternatively uses the term with reference to two distinct 
connotations. In the first one, realistic-empirical theoretical research refers to the direct 
observation of both social and economic phenomena as well as their mutual 
relationships, spatially and temporally determined. As a consequence, the laws obtained 
in such context are empirical laws, characterized by an high degree of inexactness, 
given that they have to take a large number of variables into account contemporarily. 
However, Menger also refers to “empirical forms” (or “types”) in his writings, 
referring to the exact orientation of the theoretical research. Empirical forms are 
distinguished from concrete phenomena, and the relationships among them are 
conceived of as real scientific laws. A precise definition of empirical forms is never 
exactly provided in the Untersuchungen. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to interpret them 
as general idealized facts, which in turn allow us to classify singular observable socio-
economic phenomena. Undoubtedly, the employment that Menger uses of this 
expression is quite unusual, and evidently generates a certain confusion. Why does he 
decide to utilize this phrase then? Most likely, in using «empirical forms» he just wishes 
to emphasize the dual nature of his research. On one hand, by referring to the 
“empirical” he recognizes the role played by observation and experience. On the other, 
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through the term «forms» he stresses the ideal components of the investigation, obtained 
by individualistic and abstraction techniques.  
This analysis leads us to identify another element of opposition between the two 
scholars. Menger’s theoretical system is based on the distinction between empirical and 
exact laws, respectively corresponding to the two articulations of his research. Brentano 
instead maintains that the «laws of succession» of mental phenomena is not universally 
valid, since psychological phenomena depend on a great number of psychological 
conditions, of which we never acquire a complete knowledge: 
 
[…] the fundamental laws from which we can derive the phenomena 
of mental succession, now and probably for a long time to come, are 
merely empirical laws. What is more, these laws have a somewhat 
indefinite and inexact character. (Brentano 1874/1973, p. 65; italics 
added) 
 
We must examine Brentano’s positions on two further topics: the role of 
induction and deduction; and the proper methodology for psychological investigations. 
In his major works, the prominence of induction clearly emerges. This is particularly 
evident in his treatment of the indirect knowledge of others’ mental phenomena. He 
argues that in addition to the knowledge of our own mental states, due to inner 
perception, we are also able to perceive others’ mental states thanks to their “externally 
perceivable changes”. Verbal and non-verbal communication, as well as involuntary 
behaviours provide precious information about other individuals’ mental processes. 
Intuition provides the basis for this thesis, according to which subjective experiences are 
basically similar one to one another. Moreover, he is convinced that psychological laws 
can be extended from the single case to a wider set of situations: 
 
[…] in the induction of the most general laws we naturally find the 
common characteristic first in individuals, then in specific groups, 
until it is finally established throughout its entire range. (Brentano 
1874/1973, p. 44; italics added) 
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 This is not the only issue on which he methodologically contrasts with Menger. 
In fact, Brentano also rejects the idea that an atomistic technique could be of any help in 
the investigation of mental states. He is especially critical of Wundt, who maintains that 
mental phenomena can be explained through the identification of basic elements of 
consciousness. Brentano severely affirms: 
 
We are forced […] into an analytic procedure which has been 
compared with that of chemist. […] Just as the chemist separates the 
constituent elements of a compound, it seems that the psychologist, 
too, should try to separate out the elementary phenomena which make 
up the more complex phenomena. […] Since, however, mental life 
never ever reverts from a later to an earlier stage, it seems absolutely 
impossible for us to relieve an elementary phenomenon in the purity 
and simplicity in which we originally experienced it. (Brentano 
1874/1973, p. 45; italics added) 
 
Brentano holds analytical methodology to be completely inappropriate, even 
while considering the fact that one is typically not conscious of those basic elements (cf. 
Feest 2014). Inner perception is in fact a reflexive and secondary activity, which would 
be unable to grasp the basic elements of consciousness(if any). Neither the atomistic 
technique nor the isolation procedure is useful in Brentano’s perspective. As previously 
emerged, psychic events are characterized by a high number of variables which make it 
impossible to formulate exact psychological laws. No model of mental phenomena 
seems feasible for psychological activity. 
 I conclude the comparison of Menger’s and Brentano’s methodological 
perspectives by considering how they respectively conceive of scientific explanation. 
Even though this topic could have been discussed at the beginning of the current 
analysis, I believe that at this stage it is easier to catch the significant differences in their 
positions.  
 By distinguishing between descriptive psychology and genetic psychology, 
Brentano attributes the task of providing descriptions of mental phenomena to the 
former, and the task of providing explanation of them to the latter. In this case, the 
problematic aspect consists in the fact that, for him, genuine psychological research is 
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based on the description of mental acts and not on their explanation. There are many 
reasons for this. First, genetic psychology would inevitably extend beyond conscious 
mental acts (which constitute the only authentic psychological phenomena for 
Brentano), to unconscious and/or physiological elements. Moreover, Brentano is 
sceptical about the possibility of discovering laws that connect mental states. Providing 
descriptions of mental phenomena is therefore the real aim. Inner perception is 
conceived of as a descriptive method and not an explanatory one. Explanation is 
subordinated to description.  
The meaning that Menger attributes to scientific explanation has been discussed 
in Chapter 2. What emerged there was an idea of explanation involving the possibility 
of both forecasting the future developments of socio-economic phenomena, and 
comprehending their very “nature” (i.e. classifying them). Explanation is the pivotal 
concept for research in the economic field. Hence, the two perspectives are quite 
different. However, Brentano’s need to keep psychology and physiology well-separated 
is proof of his recognition of the autonomy of psychology itself, more than we see in 
Wundt. Similarly to Menger, he maintains that in order to scientifically investigate a 
discipline, the first step is to clearly establish its boundaries with reference to other 
scientific fields. 
 At this stage, it also seems important to tackle a pair of issues regarding 
ontological matters. In Brentano’s early works, largely influenced by his study of 
Aristotle, psychology and metaphysics are conceived of as complementary research 
fields. At the time, Brentano still refers to «rational psychology» as the «doctrine of the 
soul». In the 1870s, Brentano begins to rethink the relationship between psychology and 
metaphysics. If psychology is to be transformed into an empirical discipline, it must be 
separated from traditional ontological conditioning and categories. However, in his 
view, this does not mean abandoning all metaphysical discourse. Instead, he intended to 
establish a study of metaphysics based on unquestionable empirical criterion (i.e. inner 
perception).  
Apart from these manifest goals, the major difficulties finally arise in Brentano’s 
approach when interpreting the ontological status of objects towards which conscious 
mental acts are directed. In this regard, let us first recall the definition he provides: 
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Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastic of 
the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an 
object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, 
reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be 
understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every 
mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, 
although they do not all do in the same way. (Brentano 1874/1973, p. 
88). 
 
In fact, are intentional objects a kind of “duplication” of external physical 
objects? Moreover, how can we treat non-existent objects such as fictional characters? 
In the course of time, Brentano’s students attempted to provide solutions, often 
contrasting with one another. Some of them read his position as a form of 
“immanentism”, according to which objects exist exclusively in the mind of the subject. 
Scholars such as Alexios Meinong instead defended the idea that intentional 
relationships are always established between a mental act and an external object, even 
when the object does not properly “exist”. In fact, Brentano firmly rejected the 
immanentist reading of his approach to metaphysics, he rather suggested intentionality 
is a special kind of relationship (i.e. a «quasi-relation» (Relativichles), which subsists 
even though one of the objects of the relationship itself does not properly “exist”. It is 
therefore evident that the issue of the ontological status of these objects remains an open 
matter.  
At this stage, it is clear that Menger’s and Brentano’s perspectives are divergent 
also on metaphysical questions and (above all) ontological commitments. With 
reference to the first item, Brentano is not particularly concerned with giving up the 
metaphysical implications of his research, even after his “turn” in the 1870s. Whereas 
on one side he intends to empirically found the new discipline of psychology, on the 
other inner perception is treated as the basis of a correspondent new metaphysics for 
psychology itself. Therefore, metaphysics is not overcome, but just conceptualized 
differently. Menger’s approach is quite different, in which scientific and metaphysical 
aspects are definitely distinguished, Treating political economy from a scientific 
perspective means avoiding any metaphysical notions. Menger does not retrieve those 
old concepts anywhere in his writing. Let us finally consider ontological commitments. 
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Brentano commits to the existence of a wide range of phenomena regarding humans’ 
inner activities. Intentionality exists, as well as the objects to which it is oriented. This 
holds for both physical objects and for objects having an uncertain status. On the 
contrary, I have already argued against the rigid realist interpretation of Menger’s 
perspective
30
. Despite basing investigations on observable facts, he is well aware that 
the elements and concepts of his theory have a significant degree of arbitrariness. 
 
So far I have attempted to show to what extent Menger’s and Brentano’s 
methodological and epistemological perspectives differ from each other. I will now take 
a different level of the analysis into account, emotional and ethical issues. As mentioned 
above, emotions like pleasure and pain have been often introduced as explanations for 
(economic) actions, but it has been widely demonstrated that, in Menger’s view, 
economic behaviours cannot be explained in these terms. Economic activities are driven 
by other aims: 
 
[t]he propensity of men to trade must accordingly have some other 
reason than enjoyment of trading as such. If trading were a pleasure in 
itself, hence an end in itself, and not frequently a laborious activity 
associated with danger and economic sacrifice, there would be no 
reason why men should not engage in trade in the cases just 
considered and in thousands of others. There would, in fact, be no 
reason why they should not trade back and forth an unlimited number 
of times. But everywhere in practical life, we can observe that 
economizing men carefully consider every exchange in advance, and 
that a limit is finally reached beyond which two individuals will not 
continue to trade at any given time. (Menger 1871/2007, pp. 176-177) 
 
In Brentano’s philosophy, actions and action motivations are treated quite 
differently. In order to understand how, let us first consider certain concepts he 
develops. In particular, he outlines three kinds of mental phenomena, which are not 
conceived as separate categories classes: 
 
                                                          
30
 See Section 2.5. 
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i. Presentations: the very basic psychic acts; the image presentation of an 
external object is generated every time the subject orients himself 
towards that object.  
ii. Judgments: through them, the subject accepts or denies the existence of 
the object as it appears to them in the presentation. 
iii. Phenomena of love and hate: they comprehend emotions, desires, acts of 
will, etc. In this case, positive or negative feelings are associated with the 
presentation of the object. (Cf. Brentano 1889/1969, pp. 15ff.)  
 
From these definitions, some considerations inevitably follow. First of all, 
Brentano and Menger evidently conceive of actions in a different manner. According to 
the Austrian psychologist presentations and judgments are already actions; they are 
inner acts, preceding any external performances. Instead, for Menger actions are 
exclusively external and observable. Secondly, Brentano attributes feelings and moral 
considerations to mental acts, thus intertwining distinct levels of analysis, while Menger 
would have firmly rejected this analysis.  
A final aspect needs to be taken into account, if we want to fully dismiss the 
psychological reading of Menger’s work, the treatment of preferences. In Brentano’s 
view, a thing A is better than a thing B, when it is correct to prefer A to B. This 
principle, actually rather trivial for Brentano himself, implies a set of corollary issues. 
All the following preferences are maintained to be desirable: 
 
i. Preference of something good over something bad; 
ii. Preference of the existence of something good over its non-existence; 
iii. Preference of the non-existence of something bad over its existence; 
iv. Preference for more intense pleasure to less intense pleasure; 
v. Preference for less intense pain to more intense pain; 
vi. Preference for longer-lasting to shorter-lasting joy or pleasure; 
vii. Preference for shorter-lasting to longer-lasting pain31.  
 
                                                          
31
 The full list is provided by Fabian and Simons (1986, p. 49). 
82 
 
The above list shows us that, according to Brentano, to prefer something over 
something else can be justified from different perspectives:  
 
i. From a strictly psychological point of view, since preferences are 
maintained to be determined by the quest for pleasure and the rejection of 
pain (and their respective intensity), where pleasure and pain are 
conceived of as feelings. An utilitarian perspective is evidently defended 
here; 
ii. From an ethical point of view, since Brentano introduces the concepts of 
good and bad as criteria for choosing;  
iii. From an ontological point of view, given that Brentano, by recalling 
Leibniz’s philosophy, connects the ethical dimension to the existence (or 
non-existence) of the objects at stake.  
 
All these considerations clearly demarcate the distance between Brentano and 
Menger. Indeed, Brentano’s positions on preferences are explained through non-
scientific factors, which confuses psychology too much compromised with other 
disciplines, which actually have different scopes.
32
  
 
 
3.3.2 Austrian Economics and German Psychology. Menger vs. Wundt 
 
Generally speaking, it is quite surprising to note that most critics have exclusively 
concentrated on the (alleged) theoretical relationship between Menger and Brentano, 
while neglecting the polemic contrasts between Menger and Wundt, which are evident 
in their writing and notes.  
A comparison of Menger’s and Wundt’s scientific research reveals two 
interesting issues. The first consists in examining whether, and to what extent, Wundt’s 
«elementism» is similar to Menger’s methodological individualism. Second, it seems 
appropriate here to address the debate they pursued regarding the relevance of 
theoretical economics.  
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 A detailed discussion on the reasons why Menger cannot be considered an utilitarian is provided in 
Chapter 5.  
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 In the introduction to this Chapter, the «psychology of elements» was 
preliminary presented. Wundt aims at decomposing consciousness into its indivisible 
components and attempts to render this possible through an experimental methodology. 
However, Menger questioned more than one aspect of the «psychology of elements». 
 First of all, it would be extremely hard to define consciousness from Menger’s 
position. People do not observe inner life of others, but exclusively their external 
behaviours that are the result of a given set of conditions. Whether something actually 
happens “inside”, and what, cannot be described, at most assumed. Conversely, Wundt 
intends to analyse consciousness and its constitutive parts. As an empirical discipline, 
psychology can legitimately use the same methodological tools employed in other 
natural sciences, observation and experiments. However, in this case too, observation is 
meant as self-observation, i.e. a first-person observation. Instead, the Austrian 
economist believes that only a third-person observation, therefore only an external and 
shared observation can be accepted as scientific. This is valid for both the natural 
sciences and “new” disciplines like political economy and psychology, inspired from 
the natural sciences. Psychological motivations might exist, but cannot be objectively 
investigated. Moreover, psychological motivations and consciousness could mean very 
different things.  
 Given such premises, let us then consider the similarities and divergences 
between Menger’s atomism and Wundt’s elementism in more detail. Menger’s atomistic 
method intends to capture the fundamental components of complex economic facts, 
which the Austrian economist identifies in individuals, and their personal and mutual 
actions. This is the first step before introducing the abstraction procedure, which allows 
one to formulate universal laws. Quite differently, Wundt believes that consciousness is 
reducible to sensations and feelings, these are the ultimate components of the 
psychological realm. In particular, the «psychological synthesis of sensations» generates 
representations, i.e. images of things and processes in the external world. Through an 
extremely codified experimental standard, Wundt’s aims at establishing how 
physiological stimuli and changes affect psychic events, and which laws govern their 
relationships. Wundt’s purpose in deconstructing a complex phenomenon like 
consciousness into its constitutive parts is clear. However, a few differences arise with 
respect to Menger’s position. As previously exposed, Menger’s basic concern is to 
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provide an explanation for unintended economic phenomena, and the introduction of 
methodological individualism has to be understood to serve this goal. Wundt’s starting 
point is quite different, as he maintains psychic acts to always be conscious acts. There 
is therefore a remarkable asymmetry between the two scholars, since a theoretically 
similar deconstruction is applied to opposite kinds of complex phenomena.  
In addition, the facts to be explained belong to very distinct research 
frameworks. Economic facts and processes are conceived of as exclusively social 
products. It is possible to identify trends and tendencies in the social realm, however 
these regularities and laws are not reducible to other scientific areas. Menger not only 
rejects the possibility of anchoring the explanation of social phenomena on 
unobservable (non-empirical) facts, but he also consciously avoids explaining facts 
from one scientific discipline by referring to another one. Economics is maintained as 
an autonomous science, in this sense too. On the contrary, Wundt investigates externally 
non-observable phenomena, and in order to do this he needs to refer to the physiological 
realm. Only by adequately manipulating physical inputs, modifications in psychic 
events can be grasped and consequently examined. 
There are two practical reasons that most likely explain the insufficient attention 
of critics to the debate between Wundt and Menger:  
 
i. the lack of translation of Wundt’s original German Logik into other 
languages, where he outlines his considerations of types of 
methodologies applied to different scientific areas; 
ii. Menger’s critical notes on Wundt were never published33.  
 
Before considering further divergences, let us noted that Menger’s interest in 
Wundt’s work was mostly methodological. The Austrian economist does not reference 
Wundt’s work driven by the desire to psychologically ground his economic theory. As 
largely illustrated, “introspection” plays no role in identifying the origins of subjective 
decisions for Menger. 
                                                          
33
 In the posthumous volume of the Grundsätze, edited by Menger’s son Karl, the project of future 
publication of the Austrian economist’s notes criticising Wundt is mentioned. However, they were never 
published. 
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The German psychologist dedicates a whole section of Logik to the examination 
of methodologies in economics. Let us preliminary observe that Wundt employs the 
labels «concrete approach» and «abstract approach» in referring respectively to what 
Menger defines «realistic-empirical orientation» and «exact orientation» in research. 
Wundt firmly rejects the idea that abstract research could be useful for identifying 
economic concepts and laws. More specifically, he pinpoints three theoretical Menger’s 
assumptions (Voraussetzungen) as completely unfounded: 
 
i. The idea of society as the mere sum of individuals and their economic 
actions; 
ii. The presupposition that agents have perfect knowledge of their own 
interests; 
iii. The belief in free trade and the absence of economic privilege.  
 
In his personal notes, Menger critically summarizes Wundt’s position as follows: 
 
Wundt wirft der abstrakten Theorie vor, dass sie die einzelnen der 
Güterbewegung, nicht nur von dem sozialen Tatsachen, mit denen sie 
in der Wirklichkeit stets verbunden sind, sondern auch von allen 
konkreten politischen und historischen Bedingungen losgelöst habe, 
und die Begriffe und Gesetze, zu denen man so gelangte, einen 
abstrakten Charakter zunehmen mussten. (Reel 29, Menger’s Archive) 
 
 Similarly to other German economists, Wundt evidently maintains historical, 
political and social information as fundamental for economic analysis. However, 
Menger denies that economic theory is based on the assumptions listed above or, at 
least, he refuses to interpret them as Wundt does. These presuppositions are not 
conceived of as circumstances of the real world. In fact, theoretical research consists in 
grasping the «ultimate configuration of economic phenomena» (die Gestaltung der 
Wirtschaftserscheinung).  
 Quite differently, Wundt believes abstract research to be incomplete. As Menger 
himself recognizes: «Wundt sucht im Verkaufe seiner Untersuchung die 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte als Vervollständigung, ja geradezu als Vertiefung und 
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Verbesserung der Theorie darzustellen» (Reel 23, Menger’s Archive; underlined in the 
original text). According to the German psychologist, theory alone is not enough. The 
explanation of economic facts inevitably requires reference to precise historical events 
and conditions. In his notes, Menger argues against this perspective, economic history 
and economic theory are distinct areas of research, with specific goals. For this reason, 
historical investigation is not the criterion for theoretical research. Abstract economic 
theory does not require historical integration:  
 
Die Geschichte ist keine Ergänzung oder gar Vertiefung der 
Wirtschaftstheorie; ihre Erkenntnisziele und ihre Bedeutung für das 
Erkenntnisstreben sind wesentlich andere, als jene der 
Nationalökonomie. Indem Wundt die “abstrakte 
Volkswirtschaftslehre” gleichsam als eine unvollkommene 
Geschichtsschreibung, die Geschichtsschreibung als eine vertiefte und 
vervollkommnete “abstrakte Volkswirtschaftslehre” darstellt, 
verwechselt er die Aufgaben der Wirtschaftstheorie und der 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte und erlebt die letztere zum Maßstabe für das 
Werturteil über die erstere. (Reel 23, Menger’s Archive) 
 
Later in his annotations, Menger further clarifies his ideas about the scope of 
economic theory. In so doing, he also takes other scientific fields into account. 
Generally speaking, the theoretical sciences do not provide explanations for 
phenomenon from every possible perspective, nor of concrete real life facts. Therefore, 
theoretical economics’ only real interest is towards the strictly economic side of 
phenomenon. A lot of variables are excluded from the exact orientation of the economic 
analysis. If we took all of the variables into consideration, the survey would assume a 
«realistic-empirical» perspective.(«An sich wird die Wirtschaftstheorie stets nur 
geeignet sein, uns die wirtschaftliche Seite des Volkslebens zu Verständnisse zu 
bringen»): 
 
Ich glaube, dass die Wirtschaftstheorie für sich allein gar nicht die 
Aufgabe habe, uns das allseitige Verständnis komplexer 
Gesellschaftserscheinungen zu verschaffen. Eine Aufgabe dieser Art 
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hat, wie mir scheint, überhaupt keine einzelne theoretische 
Wissenschaft. Weder die reine Chemie, noch auch die reine 
Mechanik, noch auch irgend eine andere theoretische Wissenschaft 
vermag beispielsweise für sich allein Tatsachenkomplex der Natur in 
der Weise zu erklären wie die Wundt der abstrakten 
Nationalökonomie verlangt. Man versuche z.B. die Erscheinung eines 
konkreten Erdlebens, die Erscheinung eines Staatfeldes oder gar die 
Erscheinung eines kranken Organismus durch eine einzelne 
theoretische Naturwissenschaft, etwa die Physik, die Chemie oder die 
Physiologie vollständig, das ist in ihren vollen empirischen 
Wirklichkeit. (Reel 29, Menger’s Archive; underlined in the original 
text) 
 
 As opposed to Wundt, Menger also stresses the importance of keeping 
theoretical and practical sciences separate and, therefore, theoretical and practical 
economics. More specifically, in his notes he recognizes surgery, mechanical and 
chemical technology as examples of practical sciences. Similarly, private economy and 
economic policy are two of the practical articulations of the more general economic 
field. Indeed, these aspects of economics are not aimed at studying social world 
phenomena in their development. At the same time, they do not look for laws and 
regularities regarding facts and events. They have very precise goals in well-determined 
practical situations. (Cf. Reel 25) 
 This divergence sheds light on how the two scholars treat the scientific research. 
Menger disagrees with Wundt not only when he applies his method to non-observable 
phenomena, but the economist also accuses him of confusing the theoretical and 
practical level of research, similar to German economists. 
 
 
3.4 Epistemological Models in Psychology and Menger’s Perspective 
 
So far I have illustrated the divergences between Menger and the most prominent 
psychological traditions of his time, respectively inaugurated by Brentano and Wundt. 
What has emerged is that Menger is far from sharing their perspectives, both regarding 
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content and methods. Psychological motivations for economic human actions are 
conceivable, but scholars cannot count on them for the elaboration of economic theories 
for two reasons:  
 
i. Psychological events have no empirical (observable) basis;  
ii. and, consequently, the methods employed for these investigations cannot 
be objectively (scientifically) shared.  
 
Economists must initiate their investigations from observation of human 
behaviours. They are asked to provide explanations of these behaviours exclusively on 
the basis of empirical facts. According to Menger, needs and their satisfaction are 
independent from human will: 
 
The most original factors of human economy are the needs, the goods 
offered directly to humans by nature (both the consumption goods and 
the means of production concerned), and the desire for the most 
complete satisfaction of needs possible (for the most complete 
covering of material needs possible). All these factors are ultimately 
given by the particular situation, independent of human choice. 
(Menger 1883/1985, p. 63; italics added) 
 
He is not attempting to interpret if human attitudes are rigorously determined, 
but rather avoid reduction, or the implication of factors that do not have clear 
explanations. However, in Menger’s view there exists a clear distinction between 
assumptions, like the self-interest principle, and elements that cannot be investigated. 
Assumptions or hypotheses, the basis on which economic theory is constructed, are 
always abstractions. Even if they do not properly describe the world as it really is, they 
are constructed from empirical observations. Psychological motivations, instead, cannot 
be assumed, given that scholars have no possibility of observing them. 
Menger’s position on the irrelevant role of psychological motivations in 
economic theory is not isolated within the Austrian tradition. Therefore, I consider it 
particularly astonishing that the Austrian School is usually interpreted as a 
psychological tradition as a whole. In this regard, let us think for instance about Joseph 
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Schumpeter’s perspective, which seems to be perfectly in line with Menger’s, except for 
being more explicit. In his essay on The Nature and Essence of Economic Theory 
(1908), Schumpeter investigates whether, and to what extent, economics should be in 
debt to psychology: 
 
Which methods or results would we have adopted from [psychology]? 
Let us only distinguish between experimental and introspective 
psychology for our purposes; thus, we see that the methods and results 
of the first ones, which are primarily dedicated to the “perceptional 
analysis” and lie against psycho-psychics and physiology, are as far 
away from our area as possible; and we have seen well enough that 
introspection offers us nothing. […] We can summarize our present 
argument by stating that no connection exists between economics and 
psychology, neither a methodological one, nor a material one of the 
type that we would have to follow the latter one in order to attain our 
results. (Schumpeter 1908/2010, p. 397; original italics) 
 
Schumpeter’s response is evidently negative for all points. Both experimental 
and introspective psychology are considered unable to provide useful content for 
economic research. The relationships between psychic and physiological phenomena 
does not contribute to the elaboration of an economic theory. How could the objective 
measurement (if feasible) of these relationships be of any utility in explaining the 
behaviour of an economic agent? In a similar manner, introspection has never provided 
information regarding the basic reasons why an individual acts. How could the 
observation of exclusively mental phenomena be objective and, therefore, reliable? 
Economists do not draw any special knowledge or content from these two branches of 
psychology. Moreover, by virtue of their peculiar object of study psychology has 
developed methodologies that are not suitable for study of the economic field. When 
terms such as «psychology» or «psychological» are employed by the economists, no 
specific meaning is attributed to them. They do not refer to an essential axiom, instead 
they are conventionally used in speaking of certain general concepts. “Psychological 
motivations” are used as mere labels: 
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The psychological manner of expression is only an attachment, does 
not touch the essence of the matter, and one easily sees that one can 
replace it with another, without affecting the value of the observations 
for our area in the least. It solely proceeds from the effort to explain 
the observations. However, this is a vain effort and if one knows to 
add nothing else to the simple presentation of a social phenomena than 
the mere indication of the psyche, and it is nothing more, then one has 
only produced a tautology […]. (Schumpeter 1908/2010, p. 399; 
original italics) 
In line with Menger, Schumpeter affirms that «only the visible behaviour of man, not 
his psychological processes are of interest for our purposes. In fact, those psychological 
statements are only statements about facts […]» (Ibid.). 
On the basis of the analysis conducted so far, we may wonder whether Menger 
embraced a specific psychological model (regardless of its application to economic 
research), keeping in mind that the psychological field was at its very beginning at the 
time. For this purpose we can take a brief look at two epistemological models, 
cognitivism and behaviourism.  
According to the cognitive model, psychology is conceived as the science of the 
mind Even though the first cognitive psychologists recognize that mental facts and 
processes are not investigable in the same manner as physical phenomena, they still 
shared the intent of looking for a rigorous scientific method. Both Brentano’s and 
Wundt’s perspectives evidently belong to this epistemological model. In Brentano’s 
perspective, intentionality is maintained as an important feature of mental processes, 
which distinguishes it from the physical world. In Wundt’s perspective, psychological 
facts are those immediately apperceived at the consciousness level. The introspective 
method, and self-observation, allow for the deconstruction of data derived from the 
conscious experience into constitutive elements. Both authors stress the role of 
consciousness, but from different points of view. It is one thing to consider the act of 
consciously addressing ones own attention to a precise object (or to its representation); 
it is another to relate external physical stimuli and inputs to a conscious perception of 
their intensity. In the first case, consciousness is conceived of as an active concept; in 
the second, a passive one. However, Brentano and Wundt agree on the idea that «mental 
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process» is actually something intrinsically different from the physical and that it 
deserves to be investigated as something beyond a metaphysical concept.  
The behaviourist theory arose in reaction to cognitivism. According to 
behaviourism, psychic phenomena, like thoughts, emotions and beliefs, cannot be 
empirically observed and measured. These events are all internal and private facts, 
inaccessible to scientific examination. For this reason, it is a mistake to treat psychology 
as the science of the mind. What psychology legitimately studies is exclusively human 
behaviour, which can be explained by referring to its external and environmental 
origins. Therefore, behaviourists reject the cognitivist connection between the observer 
and the observed object, stressing the fundamental role of inter-subjectivity for any 
scientific challenge. Concepts like intentionality, and methodologies like introspection 
must be completely abandoned for the behaviourists. However, a part from a few 
extreme positions, behaviourists generally accept the idea that mental facts and events 
could exist. Their critique is rather addressed to the possibility of scientifically 
investigating them. Behaviourists’ rejection of mental phenomena is not ontological, but 
methodological. Finally, it is worth stressing that although behaviourism was developed 
in the United States, it shares some important aspects with neo-positivism, 
geographically rooted in Vienna during the first decades of 20
th
 century. 
Both models are evidently outdated. However, this reconstruction is intended to 
help comprehend whether a psychological-epistemological paradigm may be integrated 
in the interpretation of Menger’s perspective.  
I consider particularly surprising that Menger’s subjectivism has been usually 
read as an example of the application of a cognitive approach to economics. At this 
stage, we can establish a connection between Menger’s method for investigating 
economic actions and the behaviourist paradigm. I do not intend to suggest that Menger 
is a behaviourist or that he is a pioneer of behaviourism. The Austrian economist was 
evidently not concerned with psychological research and does not use psychological 
methods or content. However, analogies between the starting points of these scientific 
endeavours are clear. Menger and behaviourists share the idea that nothing can be said 
about mental facts and processes, since these phenomena are neither empirically nor 
inter-subjectively investigable. Hence, the agreement lies in the axioms that construct 
the methodology.  
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Now, it may be legitimately asked whether this sort of comparison is justified, 
given that suggesting a correspondence between the theories involves several 
problematic aspects. As we know, Menger does not reduce human economic activities 
to their psychological foundations, whatever the meaning attributed to psychological 
facts and events. Moreover, the official birth of behaviourism was 1913, when John 
Watson published the article Psychology as a Behaviourist View, several decades after 
the diffusion of marginalism. The temporal gap between the developments of the two 
traditions is significant. Interpreting Menger’s approach through a later paradigm is 
obviously inappropriate, as he wouldn’t have known of it. 
In spite of these valid objections, the similarities between the approaches are 
undeniable, so how can we address the matter? I am not proposing reading Menger’s 
economic analysis through the filter of behaviourism. The Austrian economist does not 
reduce economics actions to psychologically based behaviour, neither in words nor 
deeds. Perhaps, this comparison could be sustained if, at his time, human external 
behaviour had been established as psychology’s subject matter, yet this was not the 
case. Behaviour was not yet a psychological concept in Menger’s era.  
In my purposes, the reference to behaviourism here has a different goal. I have 
mentioned it in order to demonstrate the inconsistency of the cognitive reading of 
Menger’s works. At this stage, it should be clear to anyone who is still inclined in 
pursuing a psychological interpretation of Menger’s perspective, that they should at 
least abandon cognitive models. 
 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
In the present Chapter, the independence of Menger’s economic perspective from the 
psychological research of his time has been demonstrated. We have addressed all of the 
possible positions which have been used by critics that suggest a psychological reading 
of his work. 
 Menger’s system is based on a clear distinction between the theoretical and 
practical levels of economic research. The identification of universal economic laws is 
the goal of theoretical research. However, he also affirms the importance of the 
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empirical observation of complex social phenomena, providing the rough material for 
the elaboration of theory. As has emerged, the general way in which he conceives of 
empirical observation, theory and explanation is decisively far from both Brentano’s 
and Wundt’s. Both psychologists resort to first-person observation, which does not hold 
up to any scientific standard according to Menger. Moreover, these psychologists are 
unable to formulate a universally valid law for their research field. This is true for both 
Brentano and Wundt, even though Wundt intended to discover how physiological 
stimuli and psychic perceptions are connected through experimentation. Despite of the 
rich amount of data collected in Wundt’s laboratory, the formulation of a general theory 
was found unfeasible. In this context, even explanation is interpreted differently. While 
for Menger “explaining” also means classifying phenomena and forecasting their future 
developments, these roles are lost and the very idea of explanation is weakened in 
Brentano’s and Wundt’s work. 
 In addition to the deep divergences regarding the scientific treatment of their 
respective disciplines, why Menger’s position cannot be interpreted as a psychological 
one has also been illustrated. In particular, he never reduces the explanation of 
economic facts to psychological motivations, since: 
 
i. Psychic motivations cannot be investigated, only behaviours; 
ii. Economic actions do not involve feelings, emotions, pleasure, pain etc., but 
rather needs and their satisfaction; 
iii. Economic actions are not expressions of “human nature”, but rather reactions to 
external circumstances, given a set of human necessities for survival. 
 
The misunderstandings found in older interpretations most likely depend on the 
alleged coincidence in meanings of subjectivism, individualism and psychological 
motivations. As seen in the previous Chapter, the concept of subjectivism is used in 
economic theory, and individualism is utilized in the methodology. Embracing either 
subjectivism or individualism does not imply the adoption of a psychological position 
or methodology. These earlier critics therefore display inconsistency in their analysis. 
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4. The Role of Law in the Development of Menger’s Economic 
Thought
34
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
With the publication of Adam Smith’s 1776 Inquiry, the process starts which leads 
political economy to become an autonomous discipline characterized by precise goals 
and research tools.  
On the basis of the reception and re-elaboration of Smith’s legacy, in the 19th 
century scholars in economics are engaged in solving the problem of circumscribing the 
economic field from other research areas, in particular from the moral, sociological and 
psychological fields. In addition, methodological matters, which had not been tackled 
by Smith, becomes urgent. Within this general context, two tendencies emerge in the 
Anglo-Saxon and German areas respectively. While the major Scottish and English 
scholars elaborate their theories by conceiving political economy as a sub-discipline of 
moral philosophy, their German-speaking colleagues approach it from a juridical point 
of view: during the 19
th
 century the most renowned German-speaking scholars are in 
fact law experts who progressively address contemporary developments in economic 
matters. The same branch of knowledge is thus investigated from perspectives that are, 
although distinct, not in opposition to each other. This fact, usually underestimated, 
enlightens the initial difficulty in clearly framing the new subject matter. However, in 
this case alternative paths have in the end led to common results, as will emerge later 
on. 
 In this Chapter, I will show the relevance of the juridical tradition both in Carl 
Menger’s education and in the elaboration of his economic theory. Even though he is 
considered the founder of an economic tradition in Austria, Menger is fully influenced 
by German studies in law. The investigation of this issue is also useful to identify the 
deep divergences between the German Historical School of Law and the German 
Historical School of Political Economy, which basically share only a similar 
denomination: while the exponents of the Historical School of Political Economy 
                                                          
34
 I am particularly grateful to Professor Marina Lalatta Costerbosa for the precious suggestions on 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
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explicitly refer to the contributions of the Historical School of Law in order to 
legitimate their theoretical position, their core perspectives are actually divergent. This 
survey will clarify which aspects of the German tradition Menger does take and which 
of them he fully rejects. 
 I will therefore focus on the following topics: i) the reconstruction of the 
academic environment in which Menger received his education (Section 4.2); ii) the 
several meanings that the concept of «History» assumes within the German-speaking 
context (Section 4.3); iii) the influence that the major contributors to the juridical 
German thought exercised on Menger’s scientific activity, with particular reference to 
the work by Friedrich C. von Savigny (Section 4.4.2).  
 
 
4.2 The German-speaking Legal Tradition and Menger’s Academic Education 
 
Generally speaking, it may be considered quite inadequate to introduce the 19
th
 century 
scholars in political economy as “economists”, at least as if we use the term in its 
current meaning. At that time, the professional figure of the “economist” was not 
outlined and it was not possible for students to achieve a specialization in that field at 
the university: both in Germany and in Austria only sporadic chairs of political 
economy had been established, but no faculties and departments were committed to a 
complete and articulated study of the matter. The lack of institutional recognition 
characterizes political economy until the end of the 19
th
 century. However, by analysing 
in detail the situation in Germany, we observe a precise tendency: at the beginning of 
the century, the works of the German economists consisted in the elaboration of general 
treatises that blended studies from different fields (from classical studies to philosophy 
and law); within these texts, political economy coincided with attempts at an historical 
reconstruction of national economic activities. Over time, the horizon of the economic 
research was progressively defined: more refined notions were introduced and there 
emerged the necessity of elaborating scientific theories devoted to the explanation of the 
economic facts and events of the real world. 
In Germany, only university professors of political economy were properly 
considered “economists”. The chair of political economy had been established already 
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at the beginning of the 17
th
 century, therefore several decades before the publication of 
Smith’s main work. The attendance at the course was mandatory for law students, who 
could either be willing to acquire the formal requirement to teach political economy at 
university, or to get access to good positions in the state administration. However, in 
both cases no specific recognition for the study of the discipline was obtained: scholars 
generally became “doctors” (cf. Tribe 2003, p. 218).  
Until Menger, the structure of Austrian academy had been largely influenced by 
the German one. In particular, lessons in political economy simply consisted in the 
reading of German handbooks, usually written by exponents of the first generation of 
the Historical School. The teaching of political economy was exercised within the 
Faculty of Law. In Vienna, the professors who preceded Menger on the chair of political 
economy were:  
 
 Joseph F. von Sonnenfels (1732/1733-1817): jurist, among the leaders of the 
illuminati movement in Austria and advisor of the sovereign Maria Theresa. In 
1763 he became professor of “Polizey-Kameralwissenschaft”.35 Sonnenfels is 
mainly known as one of the first intellectuals who opposed the use of torture, 
which in Austria was abolished in 1776.  
 Joseph von Kudler (1786-1853): educated in Science of State 
(Staatswissenschaften) and Law; his major work, Die Grundlehren der 
Volkswirtschaft, was published in 1846. 
 Lorenz von Stein (1815-1890): born and educated in Germany in Philosophy and 
Law; he taught at the University of Vienna since 1855. 
 Albert E.F. Schäffle (1831-1903): German sociologist with an organic 
orientation; he obtained the chair in political economy at the University of 
Vienna in 1868. 
 
These brief biographies show the centrality of the juridical education at the time. 
The awareness of the influence exercised by this tradition was explicitly recognized 
                                                          
35
 The term “Polizey-Kameralwissenschaft” was a general label referring to a wide range of sub-
disciplines: not only political economy (still in its embryonic form), but also public law, sciences of 
administration, city planning etc. It was introduced in the Thirties of the 18
th
 century within the German 
academic context, but disappeared from the universities already in the second half of the 19
th
 century. 
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even by Friedrich von Wieser, in the obituary the he wrote in 1921 in memory of his 
teacher Menger.  
 
we arrived to the political economy through jurisprudence and we did 
always remember with gratitude the great stimulus which our 
knowledge of economics had received from the rigorous legal 
discipline. The private law, which is an unequalled model of 
theoretical elaboration, is property law, economic law […].We eagerly 
mastered the rich material […]. We put the written codes aside and 
turned towards the unwritten laws which regulate the social life. 
(Hayek 1960/2007, introduction to the Italian edition, p. 32n; our 
translation) 
 
Analogously to a large number of his colleagues, Menger’s academic career 
started and developed within the juridical field. At the beginning of his education, 
Menger was not interested at all in economic matters and he had no specific competence 
in that research area. Menger studied «Science of State and Law» in Vienna in 1859 and 
continued in Prague the following year until 1863. In 1867 he got his PhD, which 
allowed him to begin the academic career at the Faculty of Law in Vienna, where he 
became full professor in 1879. Menger’s interest in political economy arose outside the 
academic environment, in particular during his activities as journalist, which he 
conducted in parallel to his studies since 1863.
36
 Menger worked for several 
newspapers, covering different roles. 1866 turns out to be the decisive year, since he 
became supervisor of the economic page of the Wiener Zeitung.
37
 It is almost certain 
that Menger never wrote articles in the brief period during which he covered this 
position, from March to September of that year (at least, we know that no article was 
signed by him). However, this was Menger’s very first occasion to get acquainted with 
economic issues: it was in this period that he began studying, as a an autodidact, not 
only the classic works of the economic thought, but also several contributions of his 
contemporaries. The Archive documents confirm the extremely scrupulous 
                                                          
36
 For a detailed review of Menger’s journalistic experiences, see Yagi (2011, pp. 20-22). For a complete 
reconstruction of Menger’s biography, see Boos (1986). 
37
 The Wiener Zeitung is one of the main Austrian newspapers. Founded in 1703, it is one of the oldest in 
Europe. 
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investigations conducted by Menger from 1867 to 1871 (when the Grundsätze were 
published): in the very first phase, he paid particular attention to the reconstruction of 
issues and the solutions offered by some eminent scholars.
38
 Only later, he gradually 
elaborated a personal economic perspective. For our purposes, I will particularly 
concentrate on the role played by German philosophers and jurists such as Immanuel 
Kant, G.W. Friedrich Hegel and, above all, Friedrich C. von Savigny, in order to show 
how their approaches could have inspired Menger in his economic surveys. 
 
 
4.3 On the Concept of “History” in German-speaking Thought  
 
As mentioned above, some remarkable divergences exist between the two Historical 
German Schools (of Law and Political Economy). The main one concerns the 
interpretation of the historical element, present in both denominations, but which 
actually assumes different meanings. As we know, the 19
th
 century German thought is 
characterized by reflections of historical nature, which aim at identifying an 
interpretation key for reading and comprehending social reality. However, deeper 
investigations show the difficulty of outlining a univocal and unilateral significance of 
the concept of «History». This difficulty especially depends on the discrepancy between 
the research purposes of the two Schools.  
 The emphasis on the value of the historical inquiries stems from a reaction to the 
French rationalist thought of the previous century. The common intent of the 19
th
 
century German scholars was to take position against the abstract and absolute concept 
of «Reason». It was in opposition to the French tradition that they identified in history, 
which on the contrary refers to concrete and particular facts, the most adequate 
instrument for explaining social phenomena.  
However, a further meaning was attributed to history: it was interpreted as logos, 
i.e. the immanent element providing rationality to reality, human and social life, even 
when the facts of the world would appear irrational. Despite the purpose of using 
History as opponent to Reason, it is apparent that this reading is similar to the 
interpretation of Reason common in the 18
th
 century.  
                                                          
38
 Among others, the Scottish economist John R. McCulloch (1789-1864), the English economist Nassau 
W. Senior (1790-1864) and the American economist Henry Charles Carey (1793-1879). 
99 
 
Among the supporters of the first interpretation of history, we find several 
renowned German jurists: not only Savigny, but also Karl Firedrich Eichhorn,39 
Barthold G. Niebuhr40 and Leopold von Ranke.41 The second reading was basically 
defended by philosophers, who were particularly influenced by Hegel’s thought.  
 Unfortunately, the idea of history as a rigorous and “scientific” research method 
was soon abandoned for different reasons. In this regard, we must first consider a 
biographical aspect. Most of those German scholars belonged to the high and 
bureaucratic class and, more or less consciously, they adopted a particularly limited 
perspective in their investigations: for instance they did not engage in the comparative 
study of different societies. They were not interested in explaining social phenomena, 
but exclusively in historically reconstructing the events concerning their own social 
class. The criterion of objectivity was thus compromised, since history was employed as 
a tool to exclusively describe a circumscribed set of facts from a very specific 
perspective. 
 Embracing a historical perspective entailed several theoretical consequences. 
The first consisted in the acceptance of a relativistic point of view, according to which it 
was impossible to formulate universally valid laws about social phenomena. German 
scholars argued that each historical period would present peculiar tendencies, 
expressing the deep essence of the age (this is one of the aspects shared both by the 
juridical and the economic Historical School).42 
This issue was connected to a second kind of reflections. German thinkers were 
also concerned with the demarcation between natural and social phenomena: whereas 
the first obeyed to the unchanging and universal laws of nature, the second did not 
display any regularity, given the high number of variables at stake. This distinction 
inevitably required the identification of an adequate methodology for the investigation 
in the social sciences. History was certainly maintained as an adequate tool, because it 
referred to specific facts. However, another tendency arose. New discoveries in biology 
allowed for the development of an organicist perspective that, progressively substituting 
                                                          
39
 Karl Friedrich Eichorn (1781-1854) was the founder, with Savigny, of the Historical School Law. 
40
 Barthold G. Niebuhr (1776-1831) was a Danish historian. In 1810, he became professor of History of 
Rome at the University of Berlin. This allowed him to meet Savigny and his disciples.  
41
 Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886) is considered as the most important 19
th
 century German historian. He 
was the first to conduct research on the archives documents. In particular, he worked on Archives in 
Germany and Italy.  
42
 This aspect had already emerged in 1748 Montesquieu’s work De l’Esprit des Lois. 
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Hegel’s holism43 of the first half of the 19th century, defended the thesis of the 
correspondence between biological and social bodies. However, this theory presented 
two critical aspects: i) it was in contrast with the intention of keeping the natural and 
social realm separate; ii) it could not be harmonized with historical relativism.  
 Despite the widespread collectivist orientation concerning the interpretation of 
society, it should be remarked that to notice that the Germans considered themselves as 
liberals from both a political and an economic point of view. This aspect is particularly 
interesting when we consider the strong reaction of the German intellectuals to the 
French Revolution and its legacy, and their tendency to interpret the parts of society as 
mere functions of the whole. However, the German liberalism of that period was 
characterized by some peculiar traits. Contrarily to the most popular opinions, the 
concept of individuality did not disappear in German theories, but was only differently 
interpreted. More specifically, these scholars particularly disapproved the concept of 
natural law and human rights conceived as universal and unchanging. Because of the 
reference to an idealized concept of human being, eradicated from their historical, 
cultural and social context, German liberals deemed this interpretation of the human 
rights to be fully useless to grasp essential changes and challenges. However, it was not 
only a matter of offering a historical interpretation of human rights, which should focus 
on the role of the external context: it was also a matter of recognizing the opportunity 
for each human being to reach a higher “spiritual” level. Change was thus conceived of 
as a key element for this alternative interpretation of individualism.44 
 A further feature of German liberalism emerged in the way of treating individual 
liberties: according to it, only the traditional monarchic State would be able to guarantee 
personal liberties. On the contrary, such liberties would be jeopardized in a democratic 
form of government, because of the instability of public opinion. For German liberals, 
only the stability of the State could guarantee the defence of individual liberties and 
                                                          
43
Even though Hegel is the most important thinker defending the holistic approach, his perspective is 
quite peculiar. In particular, his emphasis of the role of the State breaks the dependence relationship 
between the whole and its constitutive parts which characterizes the holistic-organicist positions. This 
feature distinguishes Hegel’s perspective from his contemporaries’.  
44
 Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) was most likely the most influential liberal exponent in the first 
decades of the 19
th
 century in Germany. In particular, he was a defender of individual autonomy and 
individual rights. In his view, institutions should be constructed on the basis of these two principles. 
However, he thought that only in the social collective, individuals could express their own essence. 
Humboldt’s view is a perfect example of how German liberals tried to combine elements from both the 
individualistic and the collectivist approach (cf. Lalatta Costerbosa 2000). 
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rights. Conversely, an unstable political situation would break the intimate relationship 
between the community and the historical fulfilment of its own essence. Political 
uncertainty was thus interpreted as both an a-historical and anti-organic element, given 
that it was accused of interrupting the bond between individuals and their society. In 
this scenario, there was no guarantee that the citizens would be protected. 
 The aspects so far examined may appear contradictory: whereas change and 
historicity were interpreted as intrinsic traits of reality, the static nature of institutions 
was considered indispensable for the protection of the members of society. However, 
the liberties we are talking about are religious, economic liberties and so on. 
Participation liberties are excluded from such set: this means that individuals were free 
as long as they did not call into question the constituted order. It is precisely this factor 
that distinguishes the French and the German perspective on individualism: Germans 
did not contrast individualism as such (even when intertwined with personal interest). 
They rather fight the atomistic degeneration of individualism, which unnaturally 
opposes the citizens to their society. 
A last consequence of the German historicist perspective concerns the normative 
level. Historical relativism inevitably impinges on the moral field: values and 
institutions, historically and culturally determined, cannot be judged through an 
external, universal and rational criterion. However, this anti-normative perspective is 
openly opposed to the positions defended by the members of the Historical School, who 
considered the moral issue as the main bone of contention with Menger (even though 
they confused the moral debate with the methodological one, as illustrated in detail in 
Chapter 5). 
To conclude this analysis, we can now outline the three distinct meanings 
attributed to the concept of history in the 19
th
 century German environment:  
 
i. History as a concrete fulfilment of a universal Spirit that has in itself its reason 
for being. This clearly is Hegel’s philosophical interpretation, who conceived of 
History as a necessary and universal law, according to which each moment is 
synthesis and overcoming (Aufhebung) of the previous one; in particular, History 
is defined as «the process whereby the Spirit assumes the shape of events and of 
immediate natural actuality […]» (Hegel 1821/2008, §346). History is thus 
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treated as an abstract concept and not as an investigative method; it is a purely 
philosophical notion that provides a rational justification of reality. It could be 
claimed that in Hegel’s thought there is no trace yet of the reaction to 18th 
rationalism, which is on the contrary apparent in both Savigny’s perspective and 
in the one developed by the German economists. 
 
ii. History as a methodological tool for investigating the origins and the 
development of the social institutions and, consequently, for explaining the 
reasons of the present state of affairs. This is the meaning employed by the 
Historical School of Law. The historical element is maintained as necessary, but 
it is deemed not to be sufficient for the explanation of social facts. Moreover, the 
scholars who defend this viewpoint believe that the collectivistic approach is 
complementary (and not opposed) to the individualistic one.  
 
iii. History as identification of the laws underlying the human relations in a specific 
period. 
The German economists defending this notion of history do not actually reject 
the idea that history is a rational force operating in the world. Moreover, they do 
not introduce any distinction between historical investigation and theories; 
finally, they oppose (to varying degrees) the possibility of explaining social facts 
by employing individualistic aspects.  
 
 
4.4 Law and the Philosophy of Law in Germany 
 
Kant’s philosophy was the common background of the two competing 19th century 
Schools of Law in Germany: the philosophical School, whose main representative was 
Hegel, and the historical School, led by his colleague Savigny.  
Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie belonged to the philosophical system of Idealism. In 
particular, he brought Kant’s «Copernican revolution» to its extreme consequence: 
whereas Kant believed that perceptible reality was knowable only through the 
categories, Hegel reduced reality itself to the thought knowing it. Hegel’s concept of 
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law was far from Kant’s: in Hegel’s perspective law not only comprehended the whole 
field of practical philosophy, but it also was a manifestation of free will.  
 In spite of his reaction to the 18
th
 century rationalism, Savigny conceived of law 
as «an invisible border line surrounding each one of us within which our essential 
nature and effectiveness finds a secure and unconstrained space» (quoted and translated 
in Hayek 1960/2011, p. 216). In opposition to Hegel, his definition explicitly recalled 
Kant’s perspective, according to which: «Das Recht ist also der Inbegriff der 
Bedingungen, unter denen di Willkür des einen mit der Willkür des andern nach einem 
allgemeinen Gesetze der Freiheit zusammen vereinigt werden kann» (Kant 1798, p. 
xxxxiii).  
 Hegel and Savigny operated in the same cultural environment, but they had 
divergent views on some relevant topics like the so-called «problem of codification» 
and the interpretation of history. Nevertheless, they shared the idea that one of the 
philosophers’ tasks was to provide a definition, and consequently a foundation, of the 
concept of law. Differently, jurists should have been engaged in solving concrete cases. 
A typical trait of the 19
th
 century debate was in fact the subordination of law to 
philosophy. It is essential to keep this aspect in mind, especially when dealing with 
Hegel’s contributions: even though Hegel admitted to being interested in the philosophy 
of law, he actually examined juridical matters with the intention of outlining an all-
embracing system, which could integrate each kind of human institution and bring to 
light the deep meaning of history.  
While reconstructing the debate over law and economics in the 19
th
 century 
German-speaking context we must consider some disputes emerged in the juridical 
field. 
 
 
4.4.1 Hegel’s Philosophy of Law  
 
Among Hegel’s works, Menger was particularly interested in Grundlinien der 
Philosophie des Rechts (1821) at that time considered as fundamental text for the 
juridical education. Some topics which will be later recalled by the Austrian economist 
are clearly identifiable in it. We should observe that whereas Savigny’s contributions 
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were of extreme importance for elaborating a methodology for the study of the social 
sciences, Hegel’s writing captured Menger’s attention from a strictly economic point of 
view. It would be inappropriate to consider Hegel an ante litteram economist; however, 
we are taking into account the articulated network of original concepts, definitions and 
ideas that finally brought about the decisive turn in political economy. 
 By Menger’s original notes, it is possible to reconstruct the path he followed 
throughout Hegel’s Grundlinien. The topic of «decision» (Beschließen) was treated in 
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Introduction: according to him, decision determined the 
will of an individual with reference to impulses and needs that could be satisfied in 
different ways. The analysis of needs and their relation with other key-concepts appears 
more than once in Hegel’s work. More specifically, he established a strict connection 
between needs (Bedürfnisse) and use (Gebrauch), defining the latter as the realization of 
my want through the change, destruction or consumption of the object […]» (Hegel 
1821/2008, §59). In Menger’s subjective perspective, needs constituted the primary 
moment of the economic activity. However, the context plays a crucial role as well: 
needs that cannot be immediately satisfied, because of the condition of scarcity, induce 
the subject to undertake a strictly economic action, i.e. to exchange commodities with 
other agents. Hegel had explicitly pointed out the importance of this relationship:  
 
The person […] has an existence which is purely natural. This 
existence is something partly inalienable, partly akin in its nature to 
the external world. (Hegel 1821/2008, §43) 
 
 It is clear why Hegel’s Grundlinien cannot be conceived of as a juridical 
contribution in a strict sense: that work represented the synthesis between his System 
and the dialectic process leading to the auto-determination of the Idea. Hegel’s 
philosophical and metaphysical approach strongly contrasted with the contributions of 
the scholars of his time, tracing an independent path. Divergences between Hegel and 
Menger concerned not only the research field of interest, but also their respective 
approaches. Hegel conceived the law as the Idea of law, i.e. as a philosophical 
component constituting an essential moment of the dialectic process to be recognized 
and understood; conversely, Menger dealt with political economy from a scientific point 
of view, leaving aside any philosophical, speculative and moral implication. Hegel and 
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Menger were far from each other also with regard to the general approach employed: 
collectivist, essentialist and historicist the former, nominalist and individualistic the 
latter. 
 Despite these irreconcilable divergences, the continuity between the notions and 
definitions used by the two scholars is undeniable: I do not advocate the thesis of a 
direct influence, but I wish to emphasize the role of the juridical debates for the 
development of the subjective economic theories. In his notes, Menger quoted and 
commented other passages of Hegel’s work: in particular, two paragraphs caught his 
attention, the first on the commodities value and the second one on the analysis of 
needs. In the first case, Hegel had identified a precise relationship among needs, 
usability and quantity of the object which should satisfy those needs. According to 
Hegel, different commodities which can similarly satisfy the same need are comparable 
and, thus replaceable:  
 
In use the object is a single one, definite in quality and quantity, and 
answers to a special need. But its special usefulness (Brauchbarkeit), 
when fixed quantitatively, can be compared with other objects capable 
of being put to the same use, and a special want, served by the object, 
and indeed any want may be compared with other wants; and their 
corresponding objects may be also compared. This universal 
characteristic, which proceeds from the particular object and yet 
abstracts from its special qualities is the value. Value is the true 
essence or substance of the object, and the object by possessing value 
becomes an object of consciousness. As complete owner of the object, 
I am owner of the object, I am owner of its value as well as of its use. 
(Hegel 1821/2008, §63) 
 
 The quotation shows that while the definition of «exchange value» is sketched, 
the definition of «value» as such is still too vague. In any case, the last sentence clearly 
demonstrates that Hegel had already recognized that the value of commodities is 
subjectively determined and does not coincide with intrinsic properties of the 
commodities themselves. Despite this, there exists an essential difference with 
Menger’s definition of value: according to Hegel, the economic value of a good is 
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unilaterally established by its owner; conversely, Menger considered value as the 
outcome of a process involving more than one agent.  
 Given that Hegel is generally considered as the major proponent of the German 
idealistic philosophy, it may appear curious that he embraced both a subjectivist and an 
individualistic approach when investigating economic questions. This clearly emerges 
in the «System of wants» which he interpreted as the basic step for the survey in 
«political economy».45 According to Hegel, it is through satisfaction (Befriedigung) that 
a personal need acquires an objective character: it is the possession of external things 
and the performing of external activities that allow humans to concretely satisfy their 
needs. 
 However, Hegel thought that political economy also had to investigate the 
behaviour of the «social masses», by employing both quantitative and qualitative 
methods. This aspect further differentiates between the German philosopher and 
Menger: not only Hegel aimed at transforming collective entities into the macro-
subjects of the economic discipline, but he also rejected any scientific approach to it 
when referring to the qualitative dimension of the economic investigation.  
 
 
4.4.2 Savigny and the Historical School of Law 
 
The intellectual production of the German jurist Friedrich C. von Savigny (1779-1861) 
played an essential role both in Menger’s education and in his later methodological 
reflections. The Austrian economist recalled and examined some relevant topics 
touched upon by Savigny, particularly in his 1883 book. According to Menger, the 
crucial issue consisted in providing an adequate explanation of the origins and 
developments of the «social (and civic) institutions». It should be remarked that Menger 
employed the term «institutions» not only with reference to institutions which are 
“concrete” referent points for the members of a community, but also for institutions 
which we could hardly outline such as language and market. By taking inspiration from 
Savigny’s contributions, Menger in particular concentrates on three topics: 
 
                                                          
45
 Hegel explicitly referred to the economic contributions of Smith, Say and Ricardo.  
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i. The meaning and, consequently, the task of historical investigation for 
disciplines such as law and economics; 
ii. The adequacy of the methods employed for the investigation in these research 
areas; 
iii. The continuity between the German Historical School of Law and the German 
Historical School of Economics.  
 
By separately analysing these topics, Menger also wished to capture the divergences 
between the two Historical Schools that were too often juxtaposed. In fact, younger 
German economists thought that the reference to the Historical School of Law could 
help them in finding a further legitimization to their positions.  
Among Savigny’s most renowned works, Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung 
und Rechtswissenschaft (1814) was a fundamental piece that tackled the problem of the 
origins of the institutions. Although mainly known as a contribution to the so-called 
«debate on codification»,46 in this writing Savigny also dealt with the «organic 
connection» between the law and a people: the jurist interpreted law as one of the 
multiple features of a people that emerges spontaneously. In the course of history, law is 
however subject to modifications in order to adapt to the needs and requirements of the 
citizens of that specific community. In Savigny’s words: 
 
The sum, therefore, of this theory is, that all law is originally formed 
in the manner, in which, in ordinary but not quite correct language, 
customary law is said to have been formed: i.e. that it is first 
developed by custom and popular faith, next by jurisprudence, - 
everywhere, therefore, by internal silently-operating powers, not by 
the arbitrary will of a law-giver. (Savigny 1814/1831, p. 30) 
 
                                                          
46
 In the so-called «debate on codification», Savigny was opposed to Anton F.J. Thibaut (1772-1840), one 
of the most renowned German jurists at the time. In particular, Savigny contrasted the purpose of a 
national codification, by employing the arguments of the spontaneous origin of law and of the relevance 
of the historical contextualization. A written codification would have been in contradiction with the very 
nature of law. Savigny was also sceptical about the opportunity of reforming law. On the contrary, 
Thibaut was favourable to both codification and reforms. It is also interesting to consider the particular 
position of Hegel, who argued in favour of codification but not of reforms. 
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According to Savigny, the evolution of law is historically articulated into three 
phases. The first one corresponds to the achievement of a common law which is 
conceived as the immediate outcome of the “spirit” of a people or a nation. The second 
phase is characterized by the re-elaboration of customs and traditions: common law is 
thus transformed into “scientific” law and a juridical science (Rechtswissenschaft) 
develops. The last phase coincides with the period in which juridical culture is 
decadent: when this happens, the (positive) legislative power formulates and imposes to 
people laws that do not conform to its nature.  
At this stage, we can better grasp some features of Savigny’s perspective. 
According to him, law is a product strictly related to the immanent character of a 
people, even if law is artificial, dynamic and, consequently, “relative”. Law is the 
instrument through which concrete responses to historical requirements of a people are 
provided. Savigny stressed two further aspects. First, he observed that law is a 
particularly articulated matter that cannot be merely identified with a set of rules: law 
also comprehends some characteristics which cannot be codified (this is one of the 
crucial points on which Savigny and Thibaut disagree). 
Moreover, Savigny underlined the difference between the political and technical 
element of law. Whereas the first refers to the concept of law outlined above, the second 
indicates the birth and development of law as science: in this case, law requires to be 
simplified and exclusively treated as a systematic and coherent collection of laws. In 
this process, essential features of the law get inevitably lost, but this is the price to pay 
for facing theoretical and technical necessities. 
We can now investigate the reasons why Menger employed Savigny’s reflections in 
his scientific production. In particular, the Austrian economist expressed his agreement 
with Savigny in some passages of the Untersuchungen, like the following: 
 
[L]aw, like language, is at least originally not the product in general of 
an activity of public authorities aimed at producing it, nor in particular 
is it the product of positive legislation. It is, instead, the unintended 
result of a higher wisdom, of the historical development of the 
nations. […] The further development of law, too, […], like that of 
language, does not occur by arbitrary intention, but organically, by 
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inner historical necessity […]. (Menger 1883/1985, pp. 174-175; 
original italics) 
 
Later within the same text, Menger emphasized the role that the Historical School of 
Law had played in identifying the «organic» element which is present in the 
development of social institutions: 
 
It was an undeniable merit of the historical school of jurists to have 
restrained those immature and precipitate reform efforts in the field of 
legislation and to have pointed out again the organic origin of 
common law and the unintended wisdom in it. (Menger 1883/1985, p. 
232; italics added) 
 
In this context, the real meaning of the term «organic» requires a clarification: in 
particular, it is employed to refer to the origin of the social formations which are not 
intentionally created by the common will, even when they are institutions of extreme 
relevance for the whole society. According to Menger, «organic» applies, therefore, to 
institutions which had an «individual-teleological birth»: in this cases, institutions are 
the results of individual behaviours oriented to personal goals. Therefore, «organic» 
means «non-voluntary», «spontaneous», «unintentional» and has nothing to do with the 
organicist theories of society. In fact, Menger rejects the analogy between social 
phenomena and natural organism: only in a few cases a similar comparison can be 
established, but most of the time it is just an «obscure sensation» with no scientific 
justification. This is true also for the popular tendency to identify a «mutual causation» 
between the whole and its constitutive parts both in social and biological organisms:  
 
Natural organisms are composed of elements which serve the function 
of the unit in a thoroughly mechanical way. They are the result of 
purely causal processes, of the mechanical play of natural forces. The 
so-called social organisms, on the contrary, simply cannot be viewed 
and interpreted as the product of purely mechanical force effects. 
They are, rather, the result of human efforts, the efforts of thinking, 
feeling, acting human beings. (Menger 1883/1985, p. 133; original 
italics) 
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Unexpectedly, the German economist Wilhelm Roscher had already used a certain 
prudence in employing concepts like «organism» when discussing social and economic 
facts: according to him, comparisons between social and biological bodies should be 
just instrumental, without any scientific relevance: 
 
The idea conveyed by the word organism is doubtless one of the most 
obscure of all ideas; and I am so far from desiring to explain by that 
idea the meaning of public or national economy, that I would only use 
the word organism as the shortest and most familiar expression of a 
number of problems […]. (Roscher 1854/1878, p. 81)  
 
Menger employed the adjective «organic» as opposed to «pragmatic». The latter 
was maintained to refer to the rational behaviours which produce some wished 
outcomes. In this case, the common will intentionally constructs institutions with 
precise goals for the public interest: in Menger’s words, this kind of institutions have a 
«social-teleological origin».  
Some reflections are here required. The first concerns rationality: we observe that 
individual rationality indirectly causes the formation of institution with an organic 
origin; conversely, collective rationality causes the birth of institutions with a pragmatic 
origin. Secondly, we observe that two distinct kinds of human action generate two 
distinct kinds of institutions. To be sure we can easily explain the origin of some 
institutions as the result of a convention or agreement; nevertheless, we must recognize 
that most of them are actually the product of unintended actions. It is in this regard that 
Menger used Savigny’s analysis of institutions with the aim of extending it to the 
economic field: 
 
Law and economy in their concrete form are parts of the total life of a 
nation and can be understood historically only in connection with the 
entire history of the nation. […] And the separation of the economic 
element from the total complex of the life of the state and the nation 
[…] would not be historical nor adequate to real life. (Menger 
1883/1985, p. 76) 
111 
 
 
At this stage, we can better focus on the way Menger actually interpreted the 
historical element. He did accept that the investigation both of political economy and 
law could benefit from the study of history. According to him, both disciplines can be 
adequately studied only by taking into account the whole context, which clearly 
involves sociological, cultural and historical aspects. If we consider Menger’s well-
known criticism of the role of history in the methodological debate with the German 
economists (Methodenstreit), this position may appear contradictory and some passages 
in Menger’s work appear rather confusing. 
 
[Savigny] had no thought of interpreting law historically in its 
concrete formations by some definite propensity or in general by some 
one-sided point of view and at the same time of failing to recognize 
the influence of all the other cultural factors and all the other historical 
facts affecting it. He had no more thought of doing this than a 
historian of economy has the idea of wanting one-sidedly to explain 
its historical development exclusively by some definite propensity, 
e.g., the economic self-interest of the nations or of the members of a 
nation. (Menger 1883/1985, p. 76) 
 
As we can see, Menger clearly argued that the studies in political economy cannot 
be based on a unilateral perspective. In particular, he rejected the idea that egoism is the 
real motivation of economic actions: on the contrary, egoism must be interpreted by 
also considering external influences acting on the economic subject. However, I do not 
retain Menger’s position as internally incoherent: in fact, he just kept separate the 
concrete, historical situation and the theoretical study of economic laws. Hence, Menger 
agreed with Savigny on two points. First, although he recognized the contribution of the 
historical element to the study of political economy, he did not want to absolutize it. In 
this regard, Savigny maintained that:  
 
All success in our science depends upon the joint working of various 
intellectuals activities. The expression, historical School, was formerly 
used both by me and others simply to denote one of those activities 
and the scientific direction especially arising from it. At that time this 
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side of the science was made especially prominent, not for the purpose 
of denying or even of depreciating other activities and directions, but 
because that form of activity had, for a long time previously, been 
more neglected than others and thus, more than others, needed a 
zealous defence in order that it might again step into its natural rights. 
(Savigny 1840/1867, p. iii) 
 
Moreover, both Savigny and Menger insisted in keeping separate the theoretical and 
practical parts of their respective disciplines. Theoretical and practical researches are 
both necessary, but social scientists must approach them differently.  
At this stage, the divergences between the two Historical Schools are clearly 
identifiable. For both law and political economy the historical research is essential, as it 
allows to reconstruct the development of social phenomena and to provide concrete 
examples. Menger was eager to acknowledge the relevance of the historical research, 
but he also recognized the necessity of identifying the real nature of socio-economic 
phenomena and, therefore, to comprehend them.  
The major mistake of the Historical School of Political Economy was to argue in 
favour of the full coincidence of the historical research and the identification of specific 
tendencies («unilateral points of view») which should explain the evolution of the 
discipline. However, in these terms, historical investigations are useless and misleading: 
not only they do not appropriately capture the complexity of social phenomena, but they 
also arbitrarily establish which perspectives should be used for interpreting social events 
and facts. On the contrary, the historical understanding of law and economics is feasible 
only if both disciplines are conceived as historical expressions of a people, according to 
the relationship which Savigny had defined «organic connection» (Savigny 1814/1831, 
p. 27). 
In Savigny’s considerations on law, some typical traits of the 19th century German 
thought are evident: the references to the Volk (particularly to its essence), the reference 
to the intimate relationship between a people and the development of some disciplines, 
the reference to the bond between a nation and its history. Generally speaking, Savigny 
interpreted history similarly to most German thinkers; but, at the same time, he 
introduced an original interpretation of historical investigation.  
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The reference to the Volk, and more generally to the collectivist approach in the 
social sciences, is crucial when we consider the debate on «atomism» between the 
Germans and Menger. In this context, there occurs a misunderstanding of the concepts 
at stake: from a strictly scientific point of view, Menger believed that considering 
collective entities as the object of social investigation was incorrect; he argued that, on 
the contrary, universal and exact laws could be derived from the analysis of individual 
economies. Hence, for Menger the term «atomism» had a methodological meaning, not 
a moral one as for German economists. According to the Austrian economist, entities 
like State, people, nation are necessarily abstract, whereas scientific research has to 
investigate concrete situations. Savigny’s position was among the sources of the 
Historical School of Political Economy and this is the reason why Menger critically 
quoted a paragraph of a 1815 writing: 
 
There is no completely separate and isolated human existence. Rather, 
whatever can be viewed as separate is, when considered from another 
side, a member of a larger unit. Thus each separate human is of 
necessity to be considered at the same time as a member of a family, 
of a nation, as the continuation and development of all previous time. 
(Savigny 1815, I, pp. 3ff; translated in Menger 1883/1985, p. 91) 
 
However, in Savigny’s works some aspects recalling Menger’s individualistic 
approach are also present. The “concreteness” of Menger’s investigation was not 
dissimilar from Savigny’s one, who constantly focused on particular cases and, 
consequently, on individuality. In his case too, this is not a moral position, but a 
methodological one. Savigny emphasized a further aspect which showed the 
complementarity of the individualistic and collectivistic approach. In particular, this 
point is related to his idea of State. The State was not only the visible expression of the 
intimate character of a community, but also the instrument for the correct functioning of 
the community itself. This means that Savigny did not conceive of the State as 
emanation of popular sovereignty. At the same time, he thought that the State should 
guarantee the liberties of its citizens and, as a mediator, should avoid any abuse. 
Moreover, the State, conceived of as the lawmaker, was presented as an objective 
element: by virtue of this objectivity, its actions were considered legitimate. This was 
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clearly in contrast with the idea of law as the result of the personal believes of the 
judges: 
 
Der Grad der Beschränkung des einzelnen muss von der Willkür des 
anderen unabhängig sein, ein Dritter müsste dann entscheiden, wie 
weit di Beschränkung gehen solle. (Savigny 1802-1803/1951, p. 14) 
 
Another example of how Savigny balanced the individualistic and collectivist 
approach is provided by the definition of the relationships among the members who 
constitute members of society. The defence of individual liberties must be safeguarded; 
however, if necessary, the same liberties can be legitimately limited, for instance when 
some behaviour threaten individual rights.  
According to Savigny, societies are based on the relationships among their 
individuals, but these individuals are never considered as merely functional parts of 
larger entities. Savigny’s individualistic approach clearly derived from Kant’s 
philosophy, whose influence is also apparent in Savigny’s formal and positive 
interpretation of law. On the contrary, the idea of State as an impartial entity which has 
the task of objectively regulating human actions and the employment of history in 
opposition to the abstract rationality of the previous century, are typical features of the 
19
th
 century thought.  
However, the fact that Kant was one of one of the thinkers that most inspired 
Savigny is particularly relevant. Several exponents of the Historical School of Political 
Economy, in particular Bruno Hildebrand (1848), were firmly hostile to Kant’s 
perspective, critically interpreted as solipsistic. Solipsism, not individualism, was 
considered morally and socially dangerous and useless for the sociological research. 
Other German scholars, like Roscher, attempted instead to somehow justify the 
individualistic approach. What is important is that Savigny, in opposition to most 
Germans, did not conceive of individualism as a negative or problematic component.  
Savigny and Menger also shared the purpose of precisely identifying the subject 
matters of law and political economy. Both disciplines were involved in the 
examination of human relations in well-defined contexts (cf. Marini 1966, p. 81). Even 
though the general field of social sciences is concerned in the general field of social 
sciences, considering relations among individuals as the ultimate element of a social 
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discipline is not a trivial operation. The Historical School of Political Economy, for 
instance, did not undertake this path. According to Savigny, the relations among 
individuals are the basis of social life; this is the reason why the priority of law consists 
in regulating these such relations and guaranteeing individual liberties as well as the 
individuals’ right of developing their life projects: 
 
Die freie Existenz und Unabhängigkeit des einzelnen von Willen 
anderer muss in jedem Staate notwendig behauptet werden. (Savigny 
1802-1803/1951, p. 14) 
 
According to the German jurist, law is primarily private law (Privat- or Zivilrecht) 
and criminal law (Kriminalrecht), with public law (Öffentliches Recht) moved to the 
background. Therefore, the task of law is to identify standard behaviour and the 
adequate way of disciplining it. However, the laws must be formulated by taking into 
account also the common law, i.e. the set of customs and traditions which have been 
historically and organically produced. 
It must be recognized that Menger’s debt to Savigny, and more generally to the 
Historical School of Law, has a clear limit: despite the original character of Savigny’s 
perspective within the German environment, the jurist never elaborated a methodology 
to investigate the spontaneous development of social institutions. In addition, he never 
considered the formulation of a rational strategy for «transforming and improving» the 
institutions themselves: 
 
The historical school of jurists has, to be sure, emphasized the 
“organic origin” of common law, its “primeval nature” and 
“originality”, its genesis in the national mind, etc. But it has stopped 
here, as if the problem of the origin of common law were in some way 
solved by the above partly figurative, partly meaningless phrases. It 
has neglected to make us understand theoretically the nature and the 
course of that process, the result of which is common law. (Menger 
1883/1985, pp. 232-233; italics added) 
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We can conclude that there are substantial differences between the approach of the 
Historical School of Political Economy and the one of the Historical School of Law. 
According to Savigny, research was not a mere collection of facts, but an inquiry aimed 
at reconstructing the articulated development which transforms law into a peculiar 
emanation of a people. In his interpretation, law was a historical, positive fact: it is 
partly the unintended result of human actions and partly the product of rational 
adjustments (an idea shared with Thibaut). Savigny took position against the 18
th
 
century natural law, by emphasizing the historical traits of human institutions and, 
consequently, their artificial character. However, Savigny never thought that historical 
investigations could be of any help neither in the identification of social universal laws 
nor in the discovery of specific trends in well-determined periods. Menger revealed the 
misappropriation operated by the German economists; in this case too, his main target is 
Roscher, who: 
 
wants to attain for political science something similar to what the 
Savigny-Eichhorn method did for jurisprudence. But what he has 
designated as the nature of his method has scarcely a remote similarity 
to the Savigny-Eichhorn orientation. Neither Savigny nor Eichhorn 
designates as the main task of his research, nor in general as a major 
problem, the setting up of laws of the development of law itself, on 
the basis of comparison of the legal evolution of nations insofar as he 
can grasp it. And neither seeks to attain to a juridical science of 
“objective truth” in this way. What they seek is the historical 
understanding of concrete law codes […]. (Menger 1883/1985, p. 186; 
original italics)  
 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
Some final considerations arise from the analysis so far developed leads to some final 
considerations. I have identified Menger’s debt towards the German cultural 
environment. In my opinion, this wasn’t the result of an influence, be it direct or 
indirect, since this suggests partial and misleading interpretations. Both Menger and the 
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German scholars were interested in examining problematic aspects of their disciplines 
and tried to offer adequate solutions to them. However, the reconstruction of the rich 
intellectual scenario was necessary, which stimulated relevant reflections on the aims 
and research tools of political economy in the 19
th
 century.  
I wished to offer arguments against the popular interpretation which too easily 
describes Menger and the German scholars as opposed. For such purpose, I focused on 
some relevant topics and I have shown that the German milieu was all but unitary: it is 
not legitimate to trivially place Menger in opposition to Germans, as most critics do, 
rather, each case must be considered individually. The 19
th
 century debate on the 
meaning and the use of «History» for social research is a perfect example of the 
fragmentation of the German thought. Exponents of the Historical School of Political 
Economy and of the Historical School of Law differently interpreted the concept of 
«History»; in addition, we have seen that there were distinct positions even among 
economists.  
It is curious to note that German economists used the common denomination of 
«Historical School» in order to underline the continuity with a specific and prestigious 
tradition. However, behind the common labels deep divergences emerged. Critics did 
not adequately investigate these differences and they were not able to correctly evaluate 
the intellectual relationship between Menger and Germans. 
The survey has also emphasized the link between juridical and economic studies 
in the German-speaking context. In particular, we stressed that in Germany and Austria 
the research in the economic field originated as an offshoot of the juridical studies. In 
this geographical context, political economy had no relationship with philosophy and 
moral sciences. This was a peculiar feature which characterized the development of 
continental and Anglo-Saxon political economy. Despite some divergences, German 
and Austrian economists basically shared the same perspective on political economy.  
 A further essential element has been captured in the analysis. Hayek (1948) 
argued that one of the main traits of the Austrian School, the idea that most social 
institutions are the unintended result of intentional human action, was a legacy of the 
Scottish Enlightenment. Hayek defended this thesis in particular by referring to Adam 
Ferguson’s position which was reported in The Constitution of Liberty (1960): 
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[…] the establishments of men […] are suggested by nature, and are 
the result of instinct, directed by the variety of situations in which 
mankind are placed. Those establishments arose from successive 
improvements that were made, without any sense of their general 
effect; and they bring human affairs to a state of complication, which 
the greatest reach of capacity with which the human nature was ever 
adorned , could not have projected; nor even when the whole is 
carried into execution, can it be comprehended in its full extent. 
(Ferguson 1767, quoted in Hayek 1960/2006, p. 370, note 1) 
 
 However, the analysis carried out in this Chapter has shown that concerning this 
way of conceiving the origin and development of human institutions, there was no leap 
from Scottish philosophy to Austrian economics: the German jurist Savigny was the 
real mediator between them.  
I believe that this analysis has shed light on some underestimated elements 
which are actually essential for the reconstruction and comprehension of the Austrian 
economic tradition.  
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5. Self-interest and Egoism. The German and Austrian Reception of 
Adam Smith’s Work in the 19th Century47 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter provides a critical analysis and interpretation of the debate on the 
relationship between political economy and ethics developed among 19
th
 century 
scholars. The survey focuses on the German-speaking context, without omitting the 
decisive influence of English economists. It also aims at showing that such topic had 
been largely tackled already in the very first phases of the scientific discussion over 
political economy, even though it is often trivially attributed to a more recent debate, 
namely the one inspired by Amartya Sen’s writings during the 1970s and the 1980s. 
 
 
5.2 Topics and Unsolved Problems in Adam Smith’s Legacy  
 
The 19
th
 century has represented a pivotal stage in the history of economic thought: 
political economy, which at that time was turning into an autonomous discipline, had 
been set at the heart of a wide and articulated theoretical discussion within a number of 
European schools of thought. Several issues were actually at stake: i) which were the 
specific scope and object of the discipline; ii) which method was most adequate to 
investigate economic phenomena; iii) whether precise boundaries could be established, 
not only between economics and moral philosophy, but also with reference to other 
areas of research, such as psychology and sociology, which were progressively gaining 
relevance within the general scientific landscape. 
Such debate began in the wake of the publication in 1776 of Adam Smith’s main 
work, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, whose 
circulation among the European cultural environments had been almost immediate.
48
 A 
                                                          
47
 I presented this article at the Second International Conference on Economic Philosophy, held at the 
University of Strasbourg on 9-10 October 2013. The Italian version of the article appeared in Dianoia 
19/2014, pp. 203-222. 
48
 The first German translation, in two volumes and edited by Johann Friedrich Schiller, dates back to 
1776-1778 and was therefore contemporary to the publication of Smith’s book. Further and more accurate 
translations followed, but this shows the immediate impact of Smith’s work. A detailed list of editions is 
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few topics touched upon by Smith had been earlier treated by other scholars; this makes 
the originality of his own analysis an open matter of discussion. Nevertheless, the 
systematic and uniform approach to the study of economic facts is undoubtedly to be 
acknowledged as one of Smith’s merits and it inaugurated the modern conception of this 
research field. A further aspect concerned the (real or alleged) rift between the strictly 
economic investigation and Smith’s following work of 1790, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. The two volumes seemed to be grounded on opposite and antithetical 
perspectives. In the first pages of the Inquiry, we can read one of the most famous 
sentences of Smith’s work, apparently justifying the widespread opinion according to 
which self-interest is the main driving force of the whole economic action: 
 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we 
expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our 
own necessities but of their advantages. (Smith 1776/1993, p. 22) 
 
In a different way, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith posits as the basis of 
social relationships a feeling, the so-called «sympathy»: by this he mean that natural 
empathy, which human beings instinctively feel towards each other and which makes 
them capable of immediately understanding other people’s positive and negative moods, 
before any kind of rational reflection. Such a deep and mutual comprehension would 
lead individuals to look for and mutually support each other, thus generating social life:  
 
Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the 
sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps originally the same, 
may now, however, without much impropriety , be made use of to denote our 
fellow-feeling with any passion whatever. 
Upon some occasions sympathy may seem to arise merely from the view of a 
certain emotion in another person. The passions, upon some occasions, may seem 
to be transfused from one man to another, instantaneously, and antecedent to any 
knowledge of what excited them in the person principally concerned. (Smith 
1790/2010, Ch. 1) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
provided by Monika and Erich Streissler in the introductory part of their own edited and translated 
Inquiry published in 1999.  
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From an interpretative point of view, the question was how Smith’s real position 
had to be considered: could his two works be integrated without contradictions within a 
unified system or, on the contrary, were they theoretically independent and 
incompatible?
49
 As it will be shown later on, this constituted a delicate matter of 
discussion, particularly within the German-speaking environment, and generated a sharp 
distinction between scholars accusing Smith of intentionally making an anti-moral 
science of political economy and, conversely, those claiming that the Scottish 
philosopher’s perspective guaranteed the scientific treatment of the discipline by 
properly conceiving it as autonomous from, even though never opposed to, moral. 
 
More recently, it was the economist Amartya Sen, in his renowned text On Ethics 
and Economics (1987), who drew attention once again on this discussion, by suggesting 
a sort of “rehabilitation” of Smith, too long considered (erroneously, according to Sen) 
as the forerunner of an economic view based on a negative and reductionist 
anthropology. However, upon closer examination of the features of 19
th
 century 
discussions, Sen’s survey can be claimed not to provide any original or additional 
element if compared to such debate. At that time European economists were completely 
aware of the troubles deriving from the assumption of a specific reading of Smith’s 
works (cf. § 5.3.1). 
It is worth emphasizing that the 19
th
 century criticism of Smith’s approach was 
developed taking into account two further levels of explanation. The first one was 
strictly economical: German scholars immediately grasped the weakness of the 
objective theory of value assumed by Smith, since it was unable both to provide a 
satisfactory explanation of the mechanism underlying price formation and to solve some 
well-known paradoxes. German economists therefore provided a decisive contribution, 
too often ignored, to the elaboration of the subjective theory of value, constituting the 
first essential element of that “marginal revolution” which took place at the end of the 
century. 
The second level concerned method. Despite the systematic approach, Smith’s 
economic work does not develop any reflection about methodology nor does it 
                                                          
49
 This is known in literature as «Das Adam Smiths Problem». 
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explicitly elaborate any tool to be employed in economic investigations. As a 
consequence an essential issue remained still unsettled and economists were strongly 
motivated to look for satisfactory solutions to it. In this connection radical theoretical 
contrasts about the nature and status of political economy as a scientific discipline 
progressively arose: should they borrow the method from other fields, for instance 
physics and biology? Or, given the peculiarity of socio-economic facts, was the 
elaboration of a sui generis approach more appropriate? Moreover, how to employ and 
combine inductive and deductive methods? Finally, which unit of measurement had to 
be settled for the study of economic phenomena: individuals or social groups? 
The article emphasizes both affinities and dissimilarities among European 
Schools. All viewpoints under consideration share a subjective theory of value, even 
though differently articulated, in opposition to the objective standard defended by 
Smith. For this reason, the economic survey by Karl Marx, although playing a crucial 
role within that historical and political context, has not been taken into account here, 
since it belongs to that set of theories adopting an objective standpoint to the 
explanation of value. 
 
 
5.3 From the Objective Theory to the Subjective Theory of Value 
 
A primary aspect to be investigated is the radical change of perspective within the 
economic discipline that started with the beginning of the 19
th
 century and concerned a 
strictly technical element, i.e. the elaboration of a theory of value, which should have 
been capable to provide a satisfactory explanation of the mechanism underlying the 
formation of commodities’ prices. According to the classical theory of English 
economists (not only Smith, but also David Ricardo), the value of a commodity is 
obtained by adding the costs of production and the costs of the labour employed for the 
production itself: the value was thus conceived as an intrinsic property belonging to the 
object. However such a formulation could not explain the so-called «diamonds-water 
paradox», already outlined by Smith in his Inquiry when showing the distinction 
between «value in use» and «exchange value» (cf. Smith 1776/1993, pp. 34-35)
50
. 
                                                          
50
 Smith defined the «value in use» as the utility of a specific object, while the «exchange value» as the 
capacity of a commodity to be employed for the purchase of other goods. 
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According to the new generation of economists, this remained a dilemma: how to 
explain the fact that water is an irreplaceable utility for humans but has no economic 
value at all, while it is exactly the opposite for commodities like diamonds? 
German economists were among the first scholars who completely turned over 
the traditional perspective. In their viewpoint, the value was not to be considered as a 
property of commodities, but rather as a threefold relation among an economic subject, 
the goods he needs and the external conditions characterizing the context where the 
economic subject performs his actions. It is worthy to note that, despite such scientific 
insight, German economists were unable to elaborate a fully developed theory of value. 
Two essential elements were still missing in their subjective paradigm: the introduction 
of the principle of marginal utility and the development of an appropriate methodology. 
In addition, the subjective theory was not rigorously and systematically applied by those 
authors. In such a context, this would be attempted only later by Carl Menger, founder 
of the Austrian School of economics. 
This paradigm change implied a number of consequences. The first one 
concerned the very definition of «Political Economy». While the discipline had 
previously been conceived as an investigation of the nature and the causes of wealth, in 
particular reference to national incomes, the new perspective had to tackle some original 
issues: i) explain how economic subjects could maximize their personal utility; ii) 
identify laws or regularities underlying economic phenomena, being implicitly accepted 
that their origin was to be looked for and found in individual behaviour. 
Individual actions thus became the new object of economic research. However, the goal 
was not to consider the human action in its whole complexity; it rather was to isolate 
those specifically economic performances. It was at this level that troubles about the 
demarcation between the economic and moral field emerged. It was required to outline a 
standard of rational behaviour on which economic theories could be based: to what 
extent was it legitimate to take into account only a specific human attitude? Individuals 
are not exclusively provided with pure rationality; rather they are constantly influenced 
by several factors (moral, religious, social, personal), which make it impossible to boil 
down their behaviour to a single motivation. Doubts on the morality of the so-called 
homo oeconomicus had already arisen with regard to the classical approach. But within 
such a peculiar paradigm change, difficulties about the justification of a given action 
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standard inevitably increased, then influencing the general conception of political 
economy itself: a positive discipline or a normative one? 
According to several 19
th
 century scholars, especially John Stuart Mill (1844), an 
initial step to be taken to overcome the (alleged) ambiguity consisted of distinguishing 
two levels of interpretation. The first one coincided with the “economic science”, whose 
aim was the discovery of universal laws. The second level held economy as an “art” or a 
“practical science” or, again, an “applied science”. Both moral rules and precepts 
(offering a recommendation about the right behaviour to be kept in economic 
performances) and practical and political indications (e.g., which measures political and 
economic institutions should have taken under specific circumstances) belonged to the 
latter. Even though the distinction seemed to be an adequate solution in order to treat 
the positive and normative aspects of the discipline, it is correct to stress that a sort of 
confusion was still present in the debate: whereas a few economists, like Menger, 
identified political economy as the union of those two spheres, others, like Mill, 
maintained that political economy exclusively coincided with the positive aspect, being 
the normative one completely autonomous from it. 
Regardless of how economists interpreted positive and normative features, the 
discussion of this topic undoubtedly represented a first attempt at consciously making 
political economy an independent area of research, to be acknowledged as a science. 
However, even if political economy was conceived as a positive (or “pure”) science 
looking for laws and regularities, it still remained an issue strictly connected to the 
moral field. The abstraction procedure, at the basis of the theoretical treatment of 
political economy, established, among other assumptions for the developments of 
theories and models, the self-interested behaviour of the economic agent, whose 
purpose was the maximization of his own utility within contexts characterized by the 
scarcity of resources. But was this behaviour the only one to be recalled for the 
construction of economic theories? Was its assumption misleading or legitimate? 
 
 
5.3.1 The Status of Debate in the German Cultural Environment  
 
Even if German economists were among the first ones to develop the new theory of 
value, they immediately had to tackle the issue of reconciling their own subjectivist 
125 
 
approach with a collectivist, essentialist and historical methodology. The Historical 
School members were committed to demonstrate that there was no contradiction in 
merging a subjective theory of value, built on the survey of individual actions, with a 
method endorsing a holistic conception of history and society. A justification of the 
self-interest principle was therefore required: if, on the one hand, its introduction was 
essential for the new theory, on the other hand there was the risk of undermining the 
(supposed) “moral” unity of society. 
The criticism of Smith’s contribution was first rooted in the harsh reading by 
Adam Müller, a renowned Romantic exponent, whose works represented the benchmark 
for the main 19
th
 century economists in Germany.
51
 Müller strongly disagreed with what 
he believed to be a materialist and individualist conception of society and opposed to it 
an organic interpretation, which privileged the “whole” on the single component parts: 
 
Der Staat ist „die innige Verbindung der gesamten physischen und geistigen 
Bedürfnisse [...] einer Nation, zu einem lebendig Ganzes“. (Quoted in Weber 
1949, p. 12)
52
 
 
Such view was to become an essential element in several contributions of later 
authors as well, but it is worthy to stress the radical meaning of Müller’s position, which 
did not take into account neither a serious examination of Smith’s writings nor any 
attempt at reconciling the emphasis on the individual and the holistic approach. From a 
strictly economical point of view, the theory of value had not assumed those subjective 
features yet, which the German scholars then shared: according to Müller, the value 
itself was a social phenomenon (soziale Erscheinung), specifically determined by 
bourgeois society (bürgherliche Gesellschaft). Müller’s perspective, rough and 
scientifically unambitious, also emerged from his own “theological” interpretation of 
the economic discipline. More precisely, he conceived political science as divided into 
two separate parts, «Law» (Recht) and «Wisdom» (Weisheit); political economy was 
believed to belong to the latter. In this view, both Law and Wisdom were emanations of 
                                                          
51
 Adam Müller’s volumes on economic subjects are the following: Die Elemente der Staatskunst (1809); 
Versuche einer neuen Theorie des Geldes mit besonderer Rücksicht aus Großbritannien (1816); Von der 
Notwendigkeit einer theologischen Grundlage der gesamten Staatswissenschaften und der 
Staatswirtschaft insbesondere (1819). 
52
 «The State consists of ‘that combination of close relationships, which tie together all physical and 
spiritual needs of a Nation…into a vital whole’» (our translation). 
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God, conceived as the supreme “judge” in the first case and as the supreme “father” in 
the second. 
 
Going beyond Müller’s studies, economists like Friedrich B.W. Hermann (1832), 
Karl Knies (1853) and Wilhelm Roscher (1878)
53
 undertook a more detailed 
anthropological investigation of human nature, with the purpose of somehow preserving 
the self-interest principle, given its undeniable role within the economic theory. All of 
them stressed this element to be not simply one of the distinctive features of human 
beings, but the only one actually essential to their own survival. According to this 
interpretation, no negative meaning could be ascribed to self-interest. In Hermann’s 
view, for instance, it was that principle that expressed the capability of single agents of 
managing and evaluating, both considered fundamental aspects of the economical 
practice oriented to the construction of the personal well-being (cf. Hermann 1832, pp. 
14 ff.). However, Hermann also acknowledged the existence of a second force, which 
he considered to be «deeply rooted into the human nature» and capable of naturally 
inducing individuals not to look only for their own well-being, but also for the more 
general well-being of the various communities they belonged: from the close one, the 
family, to the most complex and articulated one, the State. On a more intimate level, 
Hermann defined as «mutual feeling»(gegenseitige Anhänglichkeit) the instinct driving 
a subject towards his mates, whereas the author employed the term «Gemeinsinn» when 
referring to the social field, defining it as follows: 
 
Der Gemeinsinn ist eine Grundbedingung der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung eines 
Volks, da man nur ihm die gemeinnützlichen Anstalten und Anordnungen 
zuschreiben kann, welche der Erwerb der Einzelnen voraussetzt, die aber der 
Eigennutz nicht herzustellen vermag.
54
 (Hermann 1832, p. 15) 
 
The self-interest principle and Gemeinsinn were maintained to be two 
complementary characteristics of the economic science, since only jointly they could 
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 In this article, I refer to the English version of Roscher’s volume, which translates from the German the 
thirteenth edition of 1877. The first publication of his work is dated 1854. 
54
 “The sense of responsibility towards the common good is a fundamental condition to the economic 
development: it is only by virtue of it that those institutions and organizations exist, which are essential to 
the personal gain of a subject, but which cannot be constructed on the basis of the self-interest” (our 
translation). 
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explain its phenomena. In Hermann’s perspective, each of these elements thus became 
the object of investigation of a specific articulation of the field: the self-interest as the 
matter of research of the Volkswirthschaftslehre (theoretical investigation), whereas the 
Gemeinsinn of the Lehre von der Volkswirthspflege (practical investigation).  
As emphasized by Knies later, the original mistake consisted of confusing the 
self-interest (Privatinteresse, Privategoismus, Eigennutz) with that typically egoistic 
feeling (Selbstliebe) which makes of each subject a dangerous and immoral individual 
for the social order. Knies acknowledged as fundamental the analysis of this 
misunderstood aspect, since: 
 
[d]er Privategoismus, der Eigennutz, spielt in der Theorie der Nationalökonom eine 
so bedeutsame Rolle, er ist in eine so unmittelbare und tief eingreifende 
Verbindung zu der Methode, Gesetze der Volkswirtschaftslehre zu gewinnen, 
gebracht worden, er hat eine so bedingende Einwirkung auf die Ganze Stellung 
unseres Wissenschaft ausgeübt.
55
 (Knies 1853, p. 147) 
 
Even Roscher shared the purpose of keeping separated the self-interest principle 
from strictly egoistic human behaviour. In Roscher’s analysis, which appears more 
developed and better structured than the previous ones, the origin of the 
incomprehension is precisely identified within some of the European Enlightenment 
trends. In detail, he defines the so-called “Kantian individualism” as the authentic 
danger for social life: the problematic aspect of the Kantian system did not consist of 
the central role attributed to the subject, but rather of the fact that the subject was 
conceived to be “complete” in itself: this generated a solipsistic attitude, according to 
which moral norms could be formulated apart from any kind of socializing approach 
and any feeling of belonging to a specific community or social organization.  
Roscher formulated a further criticism: he took a strong position against the 
widespread tendency to justify individual egoism on the basis of alleged unintentional 
advantages, which it allegedly produced. In this regard, Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of 
the Bees (1714) could be considered the most renowned contribution in the pre-
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 «Private egoism, i.e. self-interest, played a significant role within the economic theory, it is 
immediately and deeply connected to the method through which the economic laws are obtained, it has 
widely influenced our science’s position» (our translation). 
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Enlightenment period; according to Roscher, his theses had been later recalled and 
elaborated by eminent scholars such as Helvetius, Voltaire, and De Rochefaucald (cf. 
Roscher 1878, p. 76, ft. 8). If we follow the first interpretation, the risk is that of 
generating a rift between the individual and society, even when the negative facet of 
individualism (or solipsism) does not openly emerge; differently, by assuming the 
second interpretation the trouble consists not only of justifying actions based on an 
selfish behaviour, but also in encouraging those very actions as bearers of social 
benefits. 
Roscher also dealt with a third perspective, namely that of Scottish 
Enlightenment, which Smith himself had been part of. Scottish philosophers 
emphasized the necessity of considering human instincts in their reciprocal 
complementarity, hence neither as opposed nor as mutually exclusive. Only by taking 
into account such complexity, satisfactory explanations of the human behaviour could 
be achieved in its typical relationship with both the social context (more generally) and 
the economic one (more specifically). There are at least two reasons for viewing it as an 
important passage of Roscher’s investigation. First, it is possible to grasp a distinctive 
evaluation of Smith’s legacy: Roscher is aware that the juxtaposition between Smith’s 
two main contributions is absolutely illusory, since each of them tackles a specific 
feature of human action. Secondly, the author seems to anticipate the special attention 
towards the Scottish approach to the explanations of social institutions, which will be 
one of the distinguishing traits of the Austrian School, and which had been perfectly 
summarized by Adam Ferguson when defining the institutions themselves as «the 
results of human actions, but not of human design» (1767/1969, p. 205). 
It is thus worth underlining the common attempt by some major German 
economists at outlining a more refined definition of “self-interest”. Despite acute 
awareness of the limits of Smith’s approach, their treatment of such aspect shows a kind 
of benevolence to him, seen as the first scholar who tried to separate the various 
articulations of human activity. Nevertheless, the German economic landscape was 
actually quite fragmented, contrary to some popular readings which draw it as a 
monolithic one. In this regard an important argument is provided by another renowned 
exponent: Bruno Hildebrand. In his main work, Die Nationalökonomie der Gegenwart 
und Zukunft (1848), Smith was throughly criticised (cf. Rothschild’s analysis 2013). 
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More specifically, he was accused of having transferred within the economic field three 
dangerous elements of rationalist-enlightened political thought
56
: i) cosmopolitism; ii) 
atomism; iii) materialism. The criticism of the first point is a position generally shared 
in the German School, which maintained that the aim of political economy does not 
consist of identifying universal laws concerning phenomena, but rather of analysing 
economic facts within their historical context. In this sense too, political economy is a 
historical science and it cannot aim at formulating universally valid theories. The strong 
criticism to the second and third aspects is typical of Hildebrand’s position and provides 
a proper overview of his viewpoint on the relationship between economics and ethics. 
Hildebrand faced the (apparent) Smithian “atomism”, which in his view attributed to the 
individual agent a privileged role with respect to society, thus undermining the unity of 
the community to which the subject belongs. According to Hildebrand, such theoretical 
aspect fostered and justified an “immoral” behaviour, with consequences in both 
political and economic fields. In the first case, the State would simply have guaranteed 
individual liberties, therefore losing any ethical function; similarly, in the second one, 
the economic system would have become a mere conglomerate of individual economies 
aimed at the egoistic satisfaction of personal needs and generating a fight of everyone 
against everyone else. This last point also implied the condemnation of materialism, 
namely of what Hildebrand derogatorily defined «economic rationalism» 
(oekonomischer Rationalismus) (cf. Hildebrand 1848, pp. 29-31). Differently from the 
previous authors, Hildebrand’s criticism was absolute and particularly influenced by 
Müller’s contributions. 
In Germany Smith’s work had been objected to from the viewpoint of the theory 
of value. Nevertheless it has been generally defended (with a few exceptions) from 
attacks acknowledging in Smith’s position the actual origin of the “political economy-
ethics contradiction”. The individualist stance could be preserved exclusively on 
condition that its real meaning was correctly clarified and balanced with a 
“communitarian” one. However, in this case, it would have been difficult to make 
political economy an autonomous discipline, thus renouncing to treat it as the other 
sciences. 
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 Hildebrand considered Thomas Hobbes as the forerunner of such position with reference to the political 
thought. 
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5.3.2 The Austrian Side: Carl Menger’s Special Contribution 
 
Within the German-speaking environment, the publication of Carl Menger’s Grundsätze 
der Volkswirthschaftslehre (1871) represented a turning point. Together with his two 
great contemporaries, the Englishman William S. Jevons and the Frenchman Léon 
Walras, Menger was among the pioneers of the so-called “marginal revolution”, which 
influenced the discipline towards the end of the 19
th
 century. Even if the three 
economists walked distinct and independent paths, their works largely shared an 
innovative and original combination between the assumption of a subjective theory of 
value and the introduction of a principle only later defined «principle of marginal 
utility».
57
 
Menger’s position appears quite special when compared with both the German 
School mainstream and the approaches of his foreign colleagues. Unfortunately many 
interpretations of his work are misleading and incomplete with reference to both cases: 
in the first one, contrasts between the German and Austrian Schools have been 
extremely emphasized and such opposition has been inappropriately reduced to the 
well-known Methodenstreit; in the second one, Menger’s orientation has been 
incorrectly interpreted as very close to the utilitarian perspective especially undertaken 
by Jevons. 
Concerning the first item, a stimulating contribution has been provided by a 
contemporary heir of the Austrian tradition, Erich Streissler, who in his 1990 article has 
attempted a reconstruction of the intricate network of influences between the German 
scholars and Menger, and shed light on the affinities between their respective views. 
Streissler claims the Austrian School to be greatly in debt to German authors, and not 
diametrically opposed to them, as too commonly has been claimed. In his analysis, the 
originality of Menger’s contribution is therefore largely downplayed.58 However, it 
needs to be considered that the readings of Menger’s production usually move between 
two extremes: whereas a few interpreters consider him as a real “revolutionary” in the 
history of economic thought, others argue that he actually was a mere traditionalist, who 
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 Menger did not personally coin the expression «principle of marginal utility» (Prinzip des 
Grenznutzens), which would be introduced by his disciple Friedrich von Wieser only later.  
58
 It is interesting to notice that the reading of the relationship between German and Austrian scholars had 
alternate phases. For instance, Joseph Schumpeter tried to undermine the German scholars’ influence on 
the Austrians, likely in order to stress the originality of the new School, which he belonged to.  
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simply rediscovered and combined previously elaborated viewpoints.
59
 For this reason 
the first step consists of keeping well-separated the levels of the content of the economic 
theory and of the methodological approach employed. In the first case, Menger seemed 
fully aware of his debt towards the German Historical School. This emerges not only 
from the (superficial) fact of having dedicated the Grundsätze to an eminent German 
scholar such as Roscher, but in particular from a careful analysis of the very detailed 
footnote 23 of the volume, where he explicitly recognized that the ambition to «achieve 
the general concept of ‘value’ is typical of all the most recent German authors, who 
have elaborated the theory of value autonomously». Menger also added a meticulous 
exposition of different definitions through which Germans had tried to explain the 
notion of value but he considered them either too general or too limited. From such 
accurate study Menger developed his own position according to which «the value is 
thus the importance that individual goods, or quantities of goods attain for us because 
we are conscious of being dependent on command of them for the satisfaction of our 
needs.» (Menger 1871/2007, p. 115; italics added). 
On the methodological side Menger decisively left the German tradition, having 
elaborated that “methodological individualism”60 through which «economic phenomena 
theoretically are reduced ultimately to individual economic efforts or to their simplest 
constituent elements, and are thus explained» (Menger 1883/1985, pp. 90-91). He was 
primarily interested in identifying the universal laws underlying the economic 
phenomena and not in providing explanations regarding circumscribed historical 
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 Starting with Emil Kauder (1958), who was among the main interpreters of the Mengerian scientific 
production, the belief has been supported that Menger had been strongly influenced by some of the main 
Aristotelian works. Menger surely knew well a number of those volumes (De Anima, Nicomachean 
Ethics, Politics) and Aristotle was a referent author in the Austrian academy of that period. Nevertheless, 
Menger’s investigations have been developed as a conscious research aimed at elaborating a theory 
capable of offering adequate explanations of economic facts. In Menger’s whole production, references to 
Aristotle are rare and not particularly relevant. Even the interpretation of Aristotle as an ante litteram 
marginalist seems therefore inappropriate. The copies of Menger’s archive, conserved at the University of 
Vienna, prove both that Menger elaborated his own theory after a wide and careful research of the 
publications of contemporary economists (Germans, Englishmen, Frenchmen and Americans) and that the 
knowledge of Aristotelian texts has not played any significant role in his scientific approach to political 
economy. 
60
 Menger did not refer to his own methodology by using such expression, which would be introduced 
only later by Schumpeter (and not with reference to Menger’s work, but Max Weber’s). He rather defined 
his own method as “atomist” or “compositive”. Moreover, “methodological individualism” has not to be 
confused with “psychological individualism”, as it often happens. Menger did not reduce the explanation 
of social socio-economic facts to the psychology of the individuals as it was, for instance, in Mill’s case. 
An explanation of the development of social institutions on psychological basis should have been 
grounded on features like intentionality and motivation: but this could not be the right way, given that the 
institutions themselves were conceived as the results of non-intentional human actions. 
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periods, as was the goal of Germans. Moreover he believed the wide number of human 
institutions, including economic ones such as money and market, to be the unintentional 
result of intentional actions (thus agreeing with the Scottish tradition). Assuming this 
premise meant to reject any kind of collectivist explanation, both contractualist ones and 
those aimed at interpreting the essence of an institution as emergent from its own 
historical development. Only an individualist approach could then provide an incisive 
explanation of most human actions and their outcomes. 
As it is well-known, Menger’s standpoint has been firmly obstructed by the 
German School, which combined the criticism to the methodological “atomism” with 
that to the so-called “self-interest dogma”, the latter read as the main feature of anti-
historical researches (as in the case of Smith’s investigations too). On the one hand 
individualism was conceived as a reductionist orientation, which did not take into 
account the innumerable (both internal and external) aspects influencing an agent and, 
consequently, not able of representing an adequate methodology for social sciences; on 
the other hand the self-interest principle was considered as a serious obstacle for social 
stability, according to the materialist and individualist reading of it. 
Actually, Menger acknowledged every human action (not only economic ones) 
to be defined both by the complex network of external social conditioning and the 
always open possibility of making mistakes (a genetic feature of human nature). 
However, in order to construct a “rigorous theory”, hypotheses had to avoid any 
unessential trait. If the economic discipline aspired to get the status of science, a series 
of mere methodological hypotheses had to be introduced: not only the self-interest 
principle, but also assumptions such as the complete information possessed by agents 
and their total freedom from any coercion. In this connection, it is correct to notice that 
the German School too was inclined to consider the freedom of economic agents as a 
simple methodological hypothesis, not necessarily having an objective confirmation in 
the real world. It was therefore unclear the reason why the self-interest principle could 
not be similarly treated within a theoretical investigation: the aim was not constructing a 
theory on precise anthropological assumptions, avoiding other ones, but only delimiting 
a research field. This approach allowed Menger to distinguish between strictly 
economic actions and actions of different nature, without the need of justifying the first 
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group from a moral point of view. In this way Menger partially recalled Smith’s 
perspective, but integrating it with an explicit methodological analysis. 
To better comprehend Menger’s perspective with reference to the relationship 
between political economy and ethics, a helpful contribution is also provided by the 
comparison with Jevons’ position. Two preliminary considerations are here required: i) 
several scholars have evaluated Menger’s production not as rigorously “scientific”, 
since he always intentionally avoided employing mathematical tools (differently from 
both Jevons and Walras); ii) others have maintained that Menger, similarly to Jevons, 
had developed his theory according to a utilitarian standpoint. 
In Menger’s view, political economy had to be divided into two areas, theoretical 
economics and practical science. The necessity of keeping clearly distinct these two 
fields for reasons of scientific opportunity makes Menger’s position more advanced 
than Jevons’.61 From the very beginning of his Theory of Political Economy (1871), 
Jevons claimed that political economy could become a science only if able to explain 
phenomena like wealth, utility, value, demand and supply through the employment of 
mathematical tools. Nevertheless, his analysis was grounded on strictly moral elements, 
explicitly referring to Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian philosophy. Indeed, according to 
Jevons, political economy was a sub-discipline of the moral field, but it required a 
mathematical treatment, having to deal with quantities and relations among them: 
 
The theory which follows is entirely based on a calculus of pleasure and pain; and 
the object of economics is to maximize happiness by purchasing pleasure, as it 
were, at the lowest cost of pain. […] According to [Bentham] whatever is of 
interest or importance to us must be the cause of pleasure or pain; […] pleasure and 
pain include all the forces which drive to action. They are explicitly or implicitly 
the matter our all calculations, and form the ultimate quantities to be treated in all 
moral sciences. (Jevons 1871/1970, p. 91) 
 
Unlike Jevons, Menger rejected the idea of grounding theoretical economy on 
both psychological motivations and on a precise moral theory. The economic action 
                                                          
61
 It is worth remembering that Jevons often dealt with logic and methodology. However, he did not look 
interested in elaborating a specific methodology for the study of political economy.  
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consists of the relation between the agent subject and a specific need within a given 
context, usually characterized by scarcity conditions: all this concerned the subject-
wealth relationship, primarily conceived as survival opportunity. Aspects like pleasure, 
pain, happiness, etc. were left apart from economic theory, as belonging to an 
independent area. Menger would certainly not have denied the influence of such 
elements for the concrete, real action of an individual, but the theory was required to 
make abstraction, i.e. only consider those parts essential to the economic research. 
  Nevertheless, the belief that Menger’s production had a utilitarian orientation 
was rather widespread already at the end of the 19
th
 century. Among others, it is worth 
remembering the case of the Italian economist Matteo Pantaleoni, who by virtue of his 
great prestige had a prominent role in the reception of Menger’s work in Italy.62 In his 
Principii di economia pura (1889), Pantaleoni attributed to Menger an “hedonist” 
approach, in line with Jevons. However, the Italian scholar went well beyond, accusing 
Menger of having plagiarized not only Jevons’ investigations, but also Hermann 
Gossen’s works, who had been among the very forerunners of the marginal theory (cf. 
Monceri 2001). 
Even divergences between German scholars and Jevons can be grasped. Both 
considered the economic discipline and the moral field to be mutually dependent, but 
their perspectives were quite different. German economists believed the moral field to 
have not only a normative function (as social binding), but also an essential 
methodological role. On the contrary, in Jevons’ view feelings like pleasure and pain 
simply constituted the bases of a calculation and, in his case, it is not adequate to 
interpret the “self-interest” neither as Germans criticized it as a dogma nor as a research 
hypothesis à la Menger. The latter point inevitably separates Jevons’ approach from 
Smith’s too. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
62
 Even though Pantaleoni’s reading was decisive for the (negative) reception of Menger’s thought in 
Italy, a number of eminent economists openly shared the analyses of the Austrian scholar, without 
expressing any kind of criticism in his regard. Among them, Luigi Cossa and Augusto Graziani.  
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5.4 Concluding remarks 
 
From these investigations it emerges that in the course of the 19
th
 century the 
controversies on the relationship between political economy and ethics have been 
developed in three main directions. First, the delimitation between the two fields 
became a crucial matter of discussion. The motivations of people requiring mutual 
independence of those disciplines were merely scientific: only by defining the own 
scopes of political economy and isolating its typical elements, the universal laws 
governing the socio-economic phenomena could be discovered. Ethics has to be 
exclusively included within the practical part of political economy and not in the 
theoretical one. On the contrary, opponents of such position emphasized the exclusion 
of any kind of connection between economics and ethics to be not only “dangerous”, as 
it opposed the individual to the society, but also counter-productive for the scientific 
study of political economy itself, as the actions of the economic subject appeared 
excessively simplified. 
  The second theme is strictly connected to the previous one and concerns the 
justification of the self-interest principle as research hypothesis. In this regard, it is now 
clear that expressions like “self-interest” and “egoism” have been indiscriminately 
employed, thus determining a serious misunderstanding. Assuming that, in given 
circumstances, the standard behaviour of an individual basically follows a determined 
trajectory is surely a simplification. Those scholars who introduced such principle in 
their theories were perfectly aware of that. It was therefore a mere research hypothesis, 
employed among others, and did not entail a negative view of human nature. For this 
reason, economists could not renounce that principle. 
The last issues concerns methodology. In this regard, it is useful to approach the 
topic through the careful reading by Karl Popper in his Open Society and Its Enemies 
(1945/1995). In this text, it is stressed that the couple of concepts “individualism-
collectivism” have not to be confused with the couple “egoism-altruism”. An 
individualist perspective does not imply any justification of egoism; similarly, the 
assumption of a collectivist point of view does not guarantee the generation and 
development of a society based on an altruistic attitude. Therefore individualism and 
egoism, on the one side, collectivism and altruism, on the other, refer to distinct levels 
and can be differently combined. 
136 
 
  The dealt with issues show the discussions on the relationship between ethics 
and political economy to be particularly rich and articulated since the very beginning of 
the path leading the economic discipline to become an autonomous scientific one. 
Within such debate, the different interpretations of Smith’s contribution played an 
instrumental role. If Smith’s volume represented a first decisive step in the history of 
the economic thought, it was in the second half of the 19
th
 century that a crucial turn 
determined those essential changes concerning both the strictly economic elements and 
the methodological ones. 
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Conclusion 
 
This multifaceted investigation allowed me to gather together several fundamental 
elements that help us reply to our initial question: Should we, in accordance with the 
mainstream philosophical interpretations of Menger’s contribution, simply consider him 
as a conservative scholar, passively influenced by the Aristotelian and German 
traditions? Or alternatively, according to handbooks of political economy, should we 
consider him as a revolutionary thinker who originally contributed to the development 
of the economic research? Or should we keep a middle position between these two very 
contrasting readings? At this stage, I believe we can firmly defend the idea that the 
Austrian economist provided an innovative contribution to the study of economics. 
Menger was the first to really comprehended the necessity of combining strictly 
economic investigations with the elaboration of an appropriate methodology for 
political economy. In this regard, we have seen that Menger’s contribution consists in 
three precise elements: 
 
i. The subjective theory of value; 
ii. The principle of marginal utility:  
iii. Methodological individualism as a research method. 
 
However, the first two items are already present in the works of some of Menger’s 
contemporaries, not only Jevons and Walras, but also (and unexpectedly) some German 
scholars writing in the first half of 19
th
 century, such as Hufeland. Early Germans had 
sketched a subjective theory of value without systematically employing the principle of 
marginal utility. Menger’s contemporaries provided more complete economic theories, 
but avoided explicitly addressing methodological isssues. In the meantime, later 
Germans developed the collectivist methodology, ideologically influenced, that rejected 
the subjective theory of value. In this very complicated context, Menger drove the 
development of the three innovative aspects forward. In his view, the elaboration of an 
appropriate method of research was indispensable not only in itself, but above all to 
justify economic results as scientific results.  
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Menger’s effort to make political economy a scientific discipline is also testified by 
his recurring attempts to separate political economy from other research areas such as 
moral philosophy, psychology, history, and so on. This approach was quite unusual at 
his time. Not only German authors, but also economists such as Jevons himself founded 
their whole theory on moral principles. In this aspect too, Menger can be considered a 
pioneer. 
 
The portrayal of Menger’s work that has emerged from my research is different 
from the most common interpretations. In particular, I offer alternative readings 
regarding the following topics:  
 
i. The Aristotelian influence on Menger’s education and later reflections; 
ii. The psychological interpretation of his economic thought; 
iii. The relationship between Menger and the German cultural environment. 
 
The first point was generally brought up due to the relevance of Aristotle’s 
philosophy within the 19
th
 century Austrian University, and because the Greek 
philosopher texts were found in Menger’s library. In addition, we certainly find 
references to concepts such as “utility”, “exchange value” etc., for example in 
Nichomachean Ethics. For many scholars, this is sufficient evidence to conclude that 
Menger was strongly influenced by Aristotelian thought. However, actual references to 
Aristotle are sporadic in Menger’s manuscript, and never referred to in the elaboration 
of his economic theory. Moreover, as we have seen, the interpretation of Aristotle as an 
ante-litteram economist is not well founded. He was not concerned with economic 
matters, but with the evaluation of different kinds of relationships between humans. At 
the same time, the essentialist reading of Menger’s position must be rejected. His 
definition of economic value as a relationship between several elements (agent’s needs, 
believes, interactions), and not as an essential property of goods, perfectly shows the 
inaccuracy of the essentialist interpretation. 
With regard to the second item, we have seen that the Austrian School has 
commonly been considered an example of the application of the psychological cognitive 
model to economics. However, I argue against this thesis for two distinct reasons. The 
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first is historical: Menger never established any intellectual relationships with early 
psychologists in his cultural context. Even though he was aware of both Brentano’s and 
Wundt’s research, he did not integrate the results of their investigations into his system, 
because he did not need them to ground his economic theory. The second reason is 
methodological: (economic) subjectivism and (methodological) individualism cannot be 
confused with the search for psychological motivations. In Menger’s view, 
psychological motivations, if any, cannot be objectively investigated and, therefore, 
cannot play a role in socio-economic explanations. 
Finally, I reconstructed the relationship between Menger and certain eminent 
German scholars. This allowed me to demonstrate that the German intellectual 
environment was much more heterogeneous than is usually described. This 
heterogeneity contrasts the interpretations that exclusively concentrate on the 
Methodenstreit and aim to counterpose Menger to his German colleagues. On the 
contrary, German research had great relevance for Menger’s studies from different 
points of view. Not only had essential elements of the subjective theory of value been 
sketched by German economists, but also original methodological reflections for the 
analysis of social institutions had been developed, in particular within the Historical 
School of Law. Moreover, critics focussing on Methodenstreit particularly insisted on 
the (alleged) contrasting meaning of the concept of “History” as used by Menger and 
the Germans. However, as I have shown, the truth is that a certain continuity exists 
between the two traditions, and divergences in the readings of the role of History in 
social explanations is not always so clear. 
 
Future perspectives. This research project has allowed me to use my philosophical 
background to pursue my interest in economics. In particular, this dissertation has 
provided an opportunity to investigate and clarify several issues that have characterized 
the economic discipline since its very beginnings. In this sense, this type of historically 
oriented research provides the foundations to further investigation at the interface 
between the epistemological and the historical reconstruction of economic theories.  
As a philosopher, I am mainly interested in the methodological and epistemological 
aspects of economic theories. This is the reason why I devoted Chapter 1 to the 
construction of a conceptual framework through which Menger’s position could be 
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better evaluated. Of course, methodology would only be systematically tackled later in 
the 20
th
 century. This means that an analysis of early economic scholars must be based 
on what they actually did, not on what they said they intended to do. 
My future research project consists in refining and enriching the conceptual 
framework that I have outlined, in order to apply it to the study of other economists and, 
consequently, to offer rational comparisons between their respective approaches. 
However, this “exercise” is not meant to be an end in itself, but rather as a gateway to 
contemporary epistemological issues regarding economic theories. This dissertation is a 
step in a work in progress.  
141 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
During my visiting period at the University of Vienna, I had the opportunity to consult 
copies of Menger’s Archival documents. The original notes are now conserved at the 
Duke University, North Carolina (US). For more details, see the website: 
http://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/findingaids/menger/#c01_9 
 
Below is the list of boxes/reels of Menger’s Archive that I examined in Vienna.  
 
1. Notebooks (Box 1 – Box 3) 
 
Box 1 
Nos. 1-4 (Notebooks, 1867-1868) 
Nos. 5-9 
Nos. 10-14 
Nos. 15, A, B. 16, 17A 
Nos. 17B-20, 3 unmarked 
 
Box 2 
Geflandügelte Worte, ca. 1867-1868 
Excerpts to 1899 
Unmarked, 1870 
5 Notebooks 
6 Notebooks, c. 1909-1918 
4 Notebooks, 1917 
6 Notebooks, 1918-1920 
 
Box 3 
8 Notebooks, 1903, 1917-1919 
4 Notebooks, 1902-1919, 1919/1920 
 
 
2. Notes on Economic Principles (Box 3 – Box 9) 
 
Box 3 
Excerpts from English works; Sonnenfels and others 
Misc. Notes 
 
Box 4 
Excerpte 
Theoretisches Repertorium, 1867 
Grundsätze, table of contents, 1870 
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Einleitung. Zusammenhandangende aber nicht abgeschlossene Darstellung der theor. 
1889 
Einleitung I 
Gandüter Wesen 
Gandüter 
Oekon. Gandüter 
Arten der Gandüter 
 
Box 5 
Ad Gut (Grundsätze, Ch. 2) 
Gut 
Wirtschaft, ca. 1888 
Complicationen der menschlichen Wirtschaft 
Gangbarkeit; Wirtschaft und Gandüter 
Wirtschaft 
Wirtschaft 
Subjekte der Wirtschaft 
Wirtschaft, 1907. Includes material on Bedürfnisse. 
Wirtschaft, 1906-1907. Also, material for introduction to a 2nd edition. Dates from c. 
1899 (Reel 12) 
 
 
Box 6 
Wirtschaft; includes material on etymology, Gandüter, and an introduction to a 2nd 
edition. (Reel 12) 
Volkswirtschaft (Reel 12) 
Vermögen (Reel 12) 
Notes on goods and needs, includes material from 1st edition and Karl Menger’s notes 
for 2nd edition. (Reel 12) 
Notes on value, human demand, needs (Reel 12) 
Bedürfnisse (Reel 13) 
Misc. notes on needs, c. 1912-1916 (Reel 13) 
Bedürfnisse, 1918 (Reel 13) 
 
 
Box 7 
Bedürfnisse, 1907 [1898-1910] (Reel 13) 
Bedürfnisse, 1907 (Reel 13) 
Wert der: (1) Grundstücke und Bodennutzungen; (2) Arbeitsleistung (Reel 13) 
Wert (Problemestellung der Productivität des Capitals) (Reel 13) 
Ad subjektive Wertlehre (Reel 13) 
Wert (Reel 14) 
Wert; Tausch (Reel 14) 
Tauschhandel (Reel 14) 
Theorie der Preises (Reel 14) 
 
 
Box 8 
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Notes on monopoly (prices) (Reel 14) 
Freihandel und Schutzzoll, 1908 (Reel 14) 
Diverses [ad Preislehre], 1908 (Reel 14) 
Waare (Reel 14) 
Münze; Scheidemünze; Urkundengeld (Reel 14) 
[Einkommen]: Die Problemestellung (Reel 15) 
Einkommen (Reel 15) 
Einkommen/Wert (Reel 15) 
Erwerbswirtschaft und Aufwandswirtschaft (Reel 15) 
Kritik der Smith’schen Einkommens Analyze (Reel 15) 
Capitalseinkommen (Reel 15) 
Capitalbegriffe (Reel 15) 
On Capital (Reel 15) 
Capital: Erspartes Einkommen (Reel 15) 
Misc. notes on etymology of terms, capital and interest (Reel 15) 
Notes on exchange, capital, etc. [on back of R.R. map of Central Europe] (Reel 15) 
On: Vermögen, Capital, Einkommen (Reel 15) 
On origin of term, capital; Wert; Vermögen (Reel 15) 
Capital: Gegen Böhm (Reel 15) 
On Böhm-Bawerk’s theories: transcripts by A. Zlabinger (Reel 15) 
Typescript on capital (Reel 15) 
On Capital 
 
Box 9 
Capital 
Böhms Capitalzinstheorie 
Material on Böhm, including a draft obituary notice 
Material on Zinslehre, 1879 
Notes on interest 
Notes on production and interest 
Theorie des Vermögenertrages, 1901 
On property and ownership 
Gemein-Eigentum 
Besitz-Eigentum 
Grund Eigentum 
Kritik ad Lotz, c. 1890s-1910s 
 
3. Notes on Money (Box 9 – Box 13) 
 
4. Teaching Materials (Box 13) 
 
5. Notes on Methodology (Box 15 – Box 20) 
 
Box 14  
Material on Irrthümer (Reel 22) 
Schmoller (Reel 22) 
Franz. Nationaloekonomie (Reel 22) 
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Notes on Classical Economics (Reel 22) 
Untersuchungen, 1 p. (Reel 22) 
Die Frage über die Methode... from Juridicheski Westrik No. 12 (1884) (Reel 23) 
Methode, 1876 (Reel 23) 
Methode Material (Reel 23) 
Diverses ad Methode pt. 1 (Reel 23) 
 
Box 15 
Diverses [ad] Methode pt. 2 (Reel 23) 
Typed transcript of plan for work on method and other notes (Reel 23) 
Ad Methode (Reel 23) 
Misc. Notes (Reel 23) 
Grundrichtungen der Forschung (Reel 24) 
Etymologie/Philosophie (Reel 24) 
Schema für eine Classification der Wissenschaften überhaupt (Reel 24) 
Notes on Classification der Wissenschaften (Reel 24) 
Classification der Wirtschaft. Wissenschaften includes material on Erkenntnisziele der 
Forschung and die realistische Richtung der Forschung (Reel 24) 
Classification der Wissenschaften, c. 1892-1894 (Reel 24) 
 
Box 16 
Printed work on plants, 11 pp., concerned with classification 
Verständnis und Voraussicht (Reel 25) 
Gegen Wundts Auffassung der Wissenschaft (Reel 25) 
Mathematik: Ideele Richtung, c. 1898 (Reel 25) 
Erkenntnisziele/Richtungen der Forschung (Reel 25) 
Material on directions of research, with special attention to Deduction, 1890s 
 
Box 17  
On Induction 
Induction, ca. 1899 (Reel 26) 
Ueber Wesen der Methoden... [Induction/Deduction] 
Empirismus in der deutschen Nationaloekonomie [late 1890s] 
1. Empirische Gesetze; 2. Arten (Reel 27) 
Material ad Unzulänglichkeit des Empirismus (Reel 27) 
Empirismus, Realismus, Positivismus in deutscher Nat. Oek. (Reel 28) 
 
Box 18 
Realistische Richtung... (Reel 28) 
Ob exacte realistische Theorien auf Geb. d. Tat. Erscheinungen mogl? [c. 1890s] (Reel 
28) 
Realismus (Reel 28) 
Realistische auch idealistische Richtung der ideologischen Forschung (Reel 28) 
Theorie...Realismus... On Logic (Reel 29)  
 
Box 19 
Kritik von Wundts Logik (Reel 29) 
Causalität, c. 1905-1914 (Reel 29) 
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Willensfreiheit; Ethik, c. 1904-1910 (Reel 29) 
Notes on free will; self-consciousness, c. 1912- 1914 (Reel 29) 
Notes on role of value judgments in Wissenschaft (Reel 30) 
Moral im Handel, scattered pp. and notes (Reel 30) 
Notes on philosophical topics, c. 1907-1913 (Reel 30) 
Notes on philosophical topics, c. 1910s (Reel 30) 
 
Box 20 
Notes on philosophical topics, c. 1910s 
 
 
6. Correspondence (Box 20) 
 
7 Biographical Materials (Box 21) 
8. Related Family Materials (Box 22-23) 
 
9. Miscellaneous (Box 24) 
 
10. Printed Matter (Box 24- Box 26) 
 
11. Oversize Material (Box Sec. A OV12) 
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